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ABSTRACT
The history of the Royal Navy during the war with France between 1793 and 1815 is well
documented, but the part played by new technologies in maintaining the Royal Navy as an
efficient fighting force and contributing to its ultimate success is much less well recognised. This
thesis addresses this problem beginning with an examination of the demands made upon
Portsmouth Dockyard, the largest of the Royal Dockyards, due to the growth in the size of the
fleet. It studies the nature of the tasks carried out in the Dockyard and the ways in which its
personnel undertook them.
Following a review of emerging new technologies and considering those which were, or were not
potentially relevant to the Dockyard's activities, the thesis examines the technological advances
actually applied in the period, how they were related to the site, to each other and to the
workforce. The main innovations resulted in a major increase in the throughput of the dry docks,
due to new dock design and the imaginative use of steam-power. In the metalworking area too,
steam-power, together with other new technologies, provided major benefits to the Navy as a
whole, especially in the reprocessing of copper. In the woodworking area revolutionary new
blockmaking machinery was at the forefront of advances in efficiency and increased output of
blocks for the rigging of ships.
These advances were primarily due to a small group of men led by Samuel Bentham and Simon
Goodrich, who became first "Engineer of the Navy". For their innovative use of new technologies
and their management skills, these men can justifiably claim their place in the history of the Navy
and of technology. More importantly, the applications of technology in Portsmouth Dockyard
made a significant contribution to the industrial revolution in Britain during the period.
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CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background. From the 1750s the pace of technological invention and change in Britain gathered
such speed that by the turn of the century the country led the world in technological application and
the output of its new factories was fundamental to the growth of the wealth which was vital to
sustaining the struggle against Revolutionary France. In the war between 1793 and 1815, Britain
depended on the Royal Navy to prevent an invasion of this country. Subsequently the British Army
was totally reliant on its sister Service to protect and sustain the flow of men, ammunition and stores
to the Duke of Wellington's forces in Portugal and Spain who provided the example to the rest of
Europe and aided by British financial subsidies, eventually brought about the defeat of Napoleon's
armies. In parallel with this the Royal Navy was central to the projection and protection of British
trade around the world from PENANG in the East to BUENOS AIRES in the West. Without that
trade, and the inflow of raw materials associated with it, the demand for the outflow from the
factories would not have existed to the degree it did.
This dependence by Industrial Britain on its Navy is well documented but much less well
documented is the Navy's dependence on support from within the country - other than perhaps the
use of the 'Press' to provide manpower. The provision and maintenance of the Fleet at sea and
transportation of the Army outside the United Kingdom would not have been possible without the
pivotal role of the Royal Dockyards. It is a curious facet of the history of the Royal Navy down the
ages that relatively little has been written about its support services and the tendency has been to
denigrate the Dockyards for poor workmanship, corruption and general incompetence. Roger Morriss
encapsulated this view when he wrote "Traditionally they (ie. the Royal Dockyards) have always been
regarded as technologically backward compared with private industry, wasteful of public funds and
ship-building resources and a check, from their inefficiency, on the efforts of the fighting navy".
Whilst there is rarely smoke without fire it seems unreasonable that the Royal Dockyards are not
given credit for keeping upwards of 600 wooden ships in a sea going state for over twenty years -
that is no mean achievement at any time.
Portsmouth was the biggest of the six major Dockyards in terms of the number of ships it
refitted. By 1813, it had a work force of over 4,000 (equivalent to 12,000 at today's population
figures) and to the Dockyard numbers could be added those of the other support organisations in the
area like the victualling and armament stores, let alone the sub contractors who supplied directly to
the Yard. Within the boundaries of the Dockyard a whole range of crafts and skills were utilised and,
2as will be shown, a wide range of the emerging new technologies were being applied by the end of
the war. Yet this Dockyard's standing in the history of the major industrial sites in this country at
the start of the nineteenth century is barely recorded. This seems a loss to history particularly since
on that one site new technologies were being applied in both the metal and wood areas as well as in
a number of discrete "nautical" ones like docks and dredging.
1.2 Purpose. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate Portsmouth Dockyard's right to a place in
the history of technical change and application around the end of the eighteenth/early nineteenth
centuries.
1.3 Introduction. For the readers who will have to decide whether this case has been successfully
established, this chapter sets out the rationale of the thesis and the order in which the evidence has
been collected, assembled and assessed. The thesis starts by examining why the Government
approved and funded in all but two years (1802 and 1803), an annual growth in the Navy from 1793
to 1813. It then moves to consider what this growth consisted of in terms of ship numbers and types
and the resultant demand on Portsmouth Dockyard. This evaluation provided the essential basis for
considering which of the emerging new technologies had potential for application in that Yard. In turn
this led to the examination of those which were introduced and how they were brought together on
one site and in relation to each other and the workforce. Figure 1.1 attempts to encapsulate the flow
of the thesis graphically whilst the remainder of this chapter sets out each step in sufficient detail to
provide an overview of the document as a whole. Throughout the document the spelling and
punctuation of quotations are as they appeared in the original sources; weights and measurements are
in imperial units, and prices in pounds, shillings and pence.
1.3.1. The Period 1790- 1815: The period covered by the thesis runs from 1790 to 1815 within
which the pace of technological change in the Dockyard accelerated because the Government and
the influential trade bodies of the City of London clearly appreciated that the safety of the
country and its overseas possessions from invasion or acquisition by the French depended on the
Royal Navy. The war having created a climate in which change could take place, the costs and
inevitable upheaval to the Dockyard were considered an acceptable part of ensuring the
maintenance of the Fleet. However there was a short interval of peace in 1802-1803 during
which the demand for output by the Dockyard was minimal and this affected the pattern of
Dockyard work but not the installation of technology. With the end of the war the pace of
change reduced dramatically and it was to be thirty years before there were significant increases
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4in the level of demands on the Dockyard again. These were mainly brought about by developments
in ship design and construction such as steam powered engines 2 and Pettit Smith's screw propell&.
Thereafter it was not until the start of the next century, with the introduction of the
DREADNOUGHT class of battleships, that Portsmouth Dockyard regained some of its standing as
a leading industrial complex.
1.3.2. Politics, The Government and the Hi gher level Naval Administration (Chapter 2); It is
often forgotten by those serving within the Armed Services that the paying customer is the
Nation and not the Services' own top management. The Nation, in the form of the Government
of the day, tends to invest in the Armed Services out of fear of invasion, military disaster or loss
of international standing. When these fears are not pressing any Government looks to see how
small it can make its investment in the Services and thus how it can reduce its taxation demands
on the voting public whilst keeping the support of a range of influential bodies - like the
financial organisations in the City of London. Thus the starting point for considering Portsmouth
Dockyard's technological record in the period has to be the Government of the day and what its
demands on the Management of the Royal Navy were.
The top management of the two Armed Services received their funding primarily in relation to
the tasks that the Government required them to undertake and in making their case for financial
resources those managements had to justify, in specific detail, major capital expenditure on new units
or, in the case of the Admiralty Board (on behalf of the Royal Navy), on the new build/re-build of
ships. The detailed management of the support arrangements for the running fleet was delegated by
the Admiralty Board to subordinate bodies who in turn tasked and financed the individual
organisations and sites such as the Dockyards. Thus those yards served three masters; their immediate
organisation's Headquarters (The Navy Board), the Admiralty and the Government. Additionally they
had to respond to, and take advantage of, the various "advisers" their superiors employed and it
needs to be borne in mind that at this time in history "patronage" was an acceptable, indeed
desirable, part of the structure of "power" within the nation. As will become clear, the Nation, the
Royal Navy and Portsmouth Dockyard were extremely fortunate to have available such gifted men
as Samuel Bentham and Mark Brunel, to mention but two, who collectively formed the "engine of
innovation" for introducing technological advances in Portsmouth.
The Navy's administrative process was investigated in some depth by Roger Morriss whose
findings are recorded in his book The Royal Dockyards during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars4 . As that work shows the administration of the Royal Dockyards is a subject in its own right
5and whilst it is not possible in this thesis to avoid it, discussion on it is limited to the detail needed
to support the main thrust of establishing Portsmouth Dockyard's standing in the history of
technology.
1.3.3. The Naval Reciuirement - Fleet operations and composition (Cha pter 3). The broad
Governmental strategic demands of protection from invasion, protection and projection of trade
and support to the Army translated, in the maritime environment, into a number of different
types of operations each of which called for a mix of ship types. The net result was a major
change in the size of the fleet and its composition as the war progressed.
The Royal Navy started the war in 1793 with 390 ships and this number grew until by
1808 it was over 900. It is entirely reasonable to assume that the demand for increases in output
from Portsmouth, in percentage terms, would not have been less than the percentage increases
in the size of the fleet since there was an obvious, and direct link with increases in ship numbers
and increases in the work to maintain them in a sea going state. Therefore the annual increase
in the size of the fleet can be regarded as the "Requirement" for a corresponding increase in
Portsmouth's output. When the fleet increase rate was higher than that of the Dockyard it is fair
to assume that the Dockyard then came under very considerable pressure to increase output and
fly and catch up with the "Requirement".
One way that the Dockyard was able to increase output, in the very short term, was to
sacrifice any new build or re-build work aimed at sustaining fleet numbers in the long term and
concentrate all its efforts on just getting ships back out to sea. However "short termism" of this
type resulted in even greater demands on the Dockyard in later years as the consequences of
"robbing Peter to pay Paul" caught up. Later in this document the rate of change in the
Requirement, representative Dockyard outputs and representative Dockyard inputs are all
compared to assess both the pressure, and the incentive, operating on the Dockyard to introduce
new technology and mechanical innovation.
1.3.4. The Fleet - Maintenance of its shi ps by Portsmouth Dockyard (Chapter 4): It is a
statement of the obvious that the near totality of Portsmouth Dockyard's output derived from
work on the ships that entered it and hence it is necessary to have some understanding of those
ship types.
6The Fleet was composed of a variety of classes of ships the biggest of which were ships
like HMS VICTORY who had a crew of 850 men 5 , carried over a hundred heavy guns and
could, without any assistance from external sources sail to the West Indies and back - in ideal
wind conditions a ship of this class could travel 200 miles, or more, in a day. At this time in
history these ships could lay claim to being the most sophisticated machines built by man and
the fact that many remained in operational service for as much as 30 years, or more, is an
undoubted tribute to their maintainers as well as to their crews. At the lower end of the scale
there were a range of small craft which were no match at all for the bigger vessels in terms of
military might but were very much their equals in terms of the time they spent at sea and the
adverse wind and sea conditions they endured. Not surprisingly, continuous service for these
vessels called for considerable refitting effort.
Whilst the size and scale of the different ship types altered, the basics of their
construction were very much the same and of course it was elements of this construction that
were replaced or restored when ships were refitted. For the purposes of considering the
application of emerging new technologies this construction work can conveniently be examined
under the headings of metal, fibre, wood and, inevitably miscellaneous work. This latter area
embraces those elements which do not fit naturally under one of three more definitive headings.
The scale of the Dockyard's output can be represented in a number of ways. There is the
obvious method of counting the number of ships sent out to re-join the operational fleet each
year and this was probably the only output figure the sea going commanders were interested in.
However the use of this figure is somewhat limited in trying to scale the dockyard work load
since it takes account of neither the length of time a ship was worked on nor the size of the ship.
These problems can be overcome by using the number of days a ship was in dry dock (over
80% of ships entering the Dockyard went through the dry docks) and ships' tonnages. From the
one thousand, eight hundred and ten records of ships entering Portsmouth Dockyard between
1790 and 1815 it is possible not only to see what work was done on the individual ships but also
to generate representative annual figures which reveal the year on year changes in Dockyard
output. As was stated earlier those figures can immediately be compared with those for changes
in the size of the Fleet to show how "output" was/was not lagging against demand and hence
indicate a pressure on the Dockyard for even more output. They are also used in conjunction
with "input" figures and this is discussed in a moment.
71.3.5. Portsmouth Dockyard's Resources. (Chapter 5): The range of resources which made up
the total input to the Dockyard's work process was wide but by far the most significant was
manpower since, with all tasks being manual, an examination of the skills and crafts employed
across the work force leads naturally to the identification of individual processes carried out
and with what tools. Thus the potential candidate areas for new technology are revealed but of
course it is important to refer back to the detail of where the work was undertaken because what
might be possible in a steam powered factory might not be possible in the bottom of a ship
simply because there was no way of delivering steam power to such a site. Whilst it Is not
feasible to enumerate the year on year changes in material input to the Dockyard it is possible
to do so in respect of the manpower and this allows for the direct pattern of change in the metal,
fibre, wood and miscellaneous work forces to be enumerated. These changes are also taken as
representative of the annual changes in resource utilisation as a whole.
Bringing together the results of the output analysis described earlier, with that of the input
mentioned above provides the basis for a considered assessment, after making allowances for
administrative improvements, of the benefit of the introduction of new technology in terms of
more output for the same human input or the same output for a reduced human input. On this,
in the first instance, depends the whole validity of Portsmouth's claim to a place in the history
of technology since, without a financial profit to show for its investment in technology,
productivity increases are the only solid grounds on which a claim for "success" in a technical
investment can be made. Additionally this form of assessment can be of great help in arriving
at a baJanced judgement on which technological advances provided the most benefit since it does
not follow that the most "glamorous" advances were the most significant. For example the
replacement of human "mud shovellers" by a steam powered machine may not, at first sight,
grip the imagination as a major technical advance but its effect was significant for the Dockyard.
1.3.6. Available Technolo gy with potential for exploitation in Portsmouth Dockyard (Chapter
: The sum of the work up to this point provides the solid basis for a review of the significant
emerging technologies in terms of which ones had potential for application in Portsmouth
Dockyard and which did not. Of course it is a matter of judgement which specific technical
advances meet the criteria of "significant" and "potential" for inclusion in the list this work
examines. The "significant" has been assessed relative to the on going work practices, examined
in the earlier Chapters of the thesis. The claims for "potential" is discussed in this chapter.
Inevitably, given the constraints of study time and resources, there will be some inclusions and
8some exclusions which can be challenged but it is believed that they would be very unlikely to
change the conclusions of the outcome of the thesis as a whole.
By this point in the thesis the great majority of those which were applied have been
identified and their technicalities are then examined, although the detail of their specific "on site"
applications is discussed later on. However, for the Dockyard's case to be properly established
it is also necessary to investigate why other, potentially applicable, technologies were
introduced.
The reasons why a particular technical advance, which is assessed as having potential for
application in Portsmouth Dockyard was pursued can often be multi-facetted. At the highest
management level there could have been both overt and covert administrative inter actions
between the Government, the Admiralty and the Navy Board and those are a subject for study
in their own right and outside the scope of this thesis. For the purposes of this work attention
to such matters is restricted to "decision points" directly affecting Portsmouth. Immediately
superior to that dockyard was the Navy Board which was charged with the administration of the
Dockyards as a whole and inevitably considerations of overall plans, priorities and global
resource difficulties would have had a major bearing on its responses to proposals and requests
from Portsmouth. Here again attention is constrained, outside the scope of technology, to
"decision points".
Within Portsmouth Dockyard's sphere of interest and authority priority for research and
assessment has been focused on four broad areas. The benefits (or lack of them) in output terms
of a potential technical advance, the practicalities of an installation, work force factors and
resource aspects as a whole. The same approach was applied to those technical innovations
which introduced into the Dockyard but after the discussion of how a particular advance
related to the Dockyard's working practices further examination is pursued in Chapter Seven
under the heading of "Specific advances in Portsmouth Dockyard" where site aspects and the
inter relationships between various other applications are all examined together.
It would be naive at this distance in time away from the period 1793 - 1815 to expect to
produce conclusive answers to all questions of why particular technologies were not introduced
but in those cases where there is more than one tenable hypothesis and an answer is important
to the outcome of the thesis as a whole those hypotheses are advanced together with a
"preferred" selection. This situation arises specifically in the case of the "Fibre" work where
9Portsmouth appears to have been relatively backward in developing its rope making capability
and certainly lagged behind other Royal dockyards. A case can be made for suggesting that an
imaginative and well organised Navy Board decided to introduce new plant in one dockyard
before introducing it into another and that case could be supported by the instances when
Portsmouth took a lead role. However a case can also be made suggesting that Portsmouth's lack
of enthusiasm for the rope making process was the yard's fear of fire. Three times between 1760
and 17766 the ropewalk had been burnt down and this can be supported by the fact that
Portsmouth had a very early iron fire main7.
1.3.7. Specific Technical advances in Portsmouth Dock yard. (Chapter 7): Following examination
of which technical advances were exploited and which ones were not (and why) the last part of
the evidence gathering and assessment is to look at the individual applications of technology in
Portsmouth Dockyard for inter-actions, mutual exploitation and the pattern of them as a whole.
A particularly good example of a sensible and very beneficial interaction was that a pump
installed for driving machinery in one of the new mills during the day was used at night to pump
water out of the dry dock reservoir. There are also a range of innovations where the introduction
of one had a "cascade" effect and forced others - the dry dock complex is a good example of
this where the greatly improved dry dock structure immediately caused the need for an advance
in lock gates and a much quicker clearance of mud from the approaches to them.
1.3.8. Conclusions. (Chapter 8): The thesis is completed with the conclusions drawn from
Chapters Two to Seven which together form the total picture of Portsmouth Dockyard's technical
innovations between 1790 and 1815. The scope of those innovations stretches from steam
powered comprehensive metal mills on the one hand, through a range of powered wood working
machinery to the pumps for the dry docks and steam powered dredger to clear the approaches
to them - all this in less than 20 years. As to the prime reason why the Dockyard achieved this
position it is difficult to avoid the deduction that the rate and scale of development owed most
to the vision and energy of a very small and select band of individuals of energy and vision. To
them is due as much credit as to any of Nelson's "band of brothers" and the many Flag Officers
whose names are firmly set in the history of the Navy and the Napoleonic Wars. The
inescapable conclusion is that Portsmouth Dockyard does indeed rank amongst the most
technically innovative sites in the country at that time and is entitled to a place in the Nation's
history of technology.
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CHAFFER TWO
POLITICS. GOVERNMENT AND NAVAL ADMINISTRATION
2.1 General. In Britain the scale of investment in any of the Armed Services is dictated, in the
first instance, by the immediacy of the threat perceived by the politicians of the day to the
continuance, or advancement, of the Nations's prosperity and secondly by both the fears and
aspirations of commerce - be that in terms of the protection of specific trades and/or the
development of particular technologies which are dependent on the Government for funding.
At the start of the 1790s political fear was undoubtedly growing over the intentions of
Revolutionary France. Commercial concerns were also rising rapidly over the potential threats
to the expanding export trade with the developing British Empire and lastly there was a small
body of technical innovators who saw an armed conflict as the basis of potential funding for
their various technological ambitions. The first two of these groupings were infinitely more
powerful than the third although the influence of this third grouping cannot be ignored as far
as the development of technology in the Royal Dockyards is concerned.This Chapter briefly
reviews these considerations as a prerequisite to later discussions on the Royal Navy, its
infrastructure and Portsmouth Dockyard in particular.
2.2 Politics. The British National Legislature consisted of three elements, the King, the Lords
and the Commons. The crown was the pivot of authority for alt governmental actions with the
King as Head of State and George III took seriously the fact that his actions were constrained
by the law and his actions were on behalf of his subjects. George III had genuine authority over
central Government and ministers felt they were the King's servants in fact as well as in name'.
The traditional pattern of eighteenth century British politics consisted of a stable administration,
albeit with changing personalities of the same political persuasion, and an impotent minority in
opposition. In spite of the terms 'Whig' and 'Tory' there were no political parties in the sense
in which the twentieth century understands them, and the fundamental reason for this was that
authority resided in a relatively small and tight-knit group separated from the rest of society
which had the real power and influence in late eighteenth century Britain. A.D.Harvey describes
it as " . . .a hereditary social group, difficult if not impossible for non-members to join and
distinguished from the rest of society for reasons not purely economic, and in that its members
had a sense of equality amongst themselves 2 ." Many but by no means all of this ruling group
were inter-related, and for most young men there was a member of the family already
established who would use influence on their behalf3 . This influence, as well as applying to
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political careers also extended to the Church and the Army, where promotion was by purchase
rather than by ability and experience. However the upper echelons of the Royal Navy were
more open to men of ability rising within the service and it is reasonable to deduce that this
arose from the fact that maritime environment was a harsh task master for the men in command
of ships and there was no way that influence - political, social or economic - could readily
disguise incompetence in the face of the power of wind and sea. The result was that
professional competence was appreciated for what it was.
Eighteenth century Parliamentary groupings were organized on a 'patron and client' basis
and small groups held personal loyalties to particular ministers or prominent men in opposition.
Men with national or local power also had supporters who voted for them in Parliament, and
in elections whilst they in turn fostered the careers of those who supported them. However if
a minister left office, his supporters could lose their positions as well.
2.3 Government. The Government of late eighteenth century Britain dealt with the
administration of diplomacy, regulation of foreign trade, revenue, defence, and law and order.
The machinery of Government was small, with a handful of ministers presiding over
departmental offices4 . The leader of the government, as Prime Minister, also held office as
First Lord of the Treasury but if the holder of this post sat in the House of Lords, there was
a Chancellor of the Exchequer who was a member of the Commons. William Pitt, because he
sat in the Commons, actually held both these posts and Table 2.1 lists the seven holders of the
office of Prime Minster during the period5.
The Home Office and Foreign Office had become separate departments in 1782 but the
affairs of the colonies, which were of less importance after the loss of the American colonies,
were administered firstly by the Home Office and later by the Secretary for War. The Secretary
for War was established in 17946 and his office was responsible for the policies which were
executed by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Master-
General of Ordnance all of whom, at one time or another, had seats in the Cabinet. The three
great officers of state, Lord President of the Council, Lord Privy Seal and Lord Chancellor also
sat in the Cabinet, as did the President of the Board of Trade, Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster, Lord Steward of the Household and Lord Chamberlain7.
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TABLE 2.1 - PRIME MINISTERS ACROSS THE PERIOD
From	 To	 Prime Minister
1783	 1801	 William Pitt the Younger
1801	 1804	 Henry Addington, 1st Viscount Sidmouth
(son of the 1st Earl of Chatham's
physician whose political career was
sponsored by the Chatham (Pitt) family)
1804	 1805	 William Pitt the Younger (died in Office)
1806	 1807	 William Wyndham, Lord Grenvile
(Ministry of all the Talents)
1807	 1809	 William Cavendish-Bentinck, 3rd Duke of
Portland
1809	 1812	 Hon Spencer Perceval, (died in Office -
assassinated)
1812	 1827	 Robert Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of Liverpool
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Other posts of importance which were outside the Cabinet included the Paymasters of the Army
and Navy, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and the Attorney and Solicitor General. 8 By the late
eighteenth century the public service was becoming more professional and all Government
departments had administrative staffs whilst Clerks were becoming salaried servants of the
Crown, rather than assistants to a minister. Reforms to the existing administration had been
initiated by Lord North in 1776, in a Treasury minute on the training of departmental clerks
and their promotion with reference to their ability not just their seniority. Later, in 178010, the
Board of Commissioners, set up by Lord North, to examine the whole field of public
expenditure and accounting was particularly critical of the fee system. Subsequently payment
of clerks by salaries rather than by fees spread from the Treasury to the other main government
departments.
2.4 The Admiralty Board. The chain of command between the Crown and the Royal Dockyards
passed through the Admiralty Board and its sub-boards. The Admiralty board were ".. . .the
Lords Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain"," and
was led by the First Lord (see Table 2.2 for the holders of this post during the period), a
politician, or a senior admiral with a seat in Parliament, or the House of Lords, although the
First Lord's post was always a political appointment. The Board was responsible for naval
strategy and tactics, the movements of fleets and individual ships, allocation of resources and
the appointment and promotion of all commissioned officers. They supervised the activities of
the sub-boards (shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.1) who were the Navy, Victualling,
Transport and Sick and Hurt. In the period 1790- 1816 there were no less than nine First Lords
of whom only two were Naval officers and Admirals - John Jervis, Earl St.Vincent and
Charles Middleton, Lord Barham' 2 . Furthermore Table 2.3 shows that between 1801 and 1812
only two men held the office for more than two years and hence it would seem that they were
not as influential in the long term development of the Royal Navy and its infrastructure as the
popular history books might lead one to believe. However there were other personalities who
held office within the Admiralty who undoubtedly had a profound affect on the shape and
development of the dockyards and Samuel Bentham comes immediately to mind. The Admiralty
Board was based in Whitehall. In 1795, a new office that of the Inspector General of Naval
Works was created and its purpose was to address improvements in the construction and fitting
Out of ships, the buildings within the Dockyards, the introduction of new machinery to them
and improvements to the existing machinery and tools.
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TABLE 2.2 - FIRST LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY
ACROSS THE PERIOD
From	 To	
J 
First Lord
1788	 1794	 John Pitt, 2nd Earl of Chatham
(Elder brother of the Prime Minister)
1794	 1801	 2nd Earl Spencer
1801	 1804	 1st Earl St Vincent (previously Admiral
Sir John Jervis)
1804	 1805	 Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville
1805	 1806	 Lord Barham (Admiral Sir Charles
Middleton - ex Controller of the Navy)
Feb 1806	 Sept 1806	 Charles Grey, 2nd Earl Grey
1806	 1807	 Thomas Grenville
(brother of the Prhne Minister)
1807	 1810	 Henry Phipps, 3rd Earl of Muigrave
1810	 1812	 Charles Yorke
1812	 1827	 Robert Saunders Dundas, 2nd Viscount
Melville
TABLE 2.3 - CONTROLLERS OF THE NAVY
ACROSS THE PERIOD
From	 To	 Controller of the Navy
1778	 1790	 Sir Charles Middleton
1790	 1794	 Sir Henry Martin
1794	 1806	 Sir Andrew Hammond
1806	 1806	 Henry Nichols
1806	 1816	 Sir Thomas Thompson
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Originally planned to have a staff of 15 including posts for an Architect and Civil Engineer,
Mechanist and Chemist as well as the Inspector General'3 and Samuel Bentham, who had
proposed this organisation to the Admiralty Board, was invited to become the Inspector
General'4, a post he held until 1812.
Early in life Bentham had been apprenticed to the Master Shipwright at Chatham' 5 and
quickly showed a positive affmity with technical matters but being unable to obtain a suitable
post in the Dockyards due to his lack of experience, Bentham decided to travel and broaden his
experience. Between 1780 and 1791, he served in Russia' 6 , organizing and supervising
manufacturies of rope, canvas and iron products for Prince Potemkin, a leading member of the
Russian Court. However, after the death of his father in 1791, Bentham did not return to Russia
but instead visited manufacturies to keep himself abreast of the latest technical developments
in Britain. It is something of a puzzle as to the means by which a man who had been abroad
for eleven years could so readily become part of the governmental circle. Perhaps, his half-
brother Charles Abbot who was Speaker of the House of Commons' 7 promoted the interests of
a family member and this may well explain this anomaly. Another example of this use of
connections to further a career is that of Marc Brunel, one of the engineers associated with
Bentham on Dockyard projects, who obtained an introduction through his brother-in-law, Roger
Kingdom who was a Navy Board clerk'8.
2.4.1. Navy Board: The most senior and important of the Admiralty sub-boards was the
Navy Board, an essential part of the chain of command between the Admiralty Board and
the dockyards. Although it worked closely with the Admiralty Board, it had considerable
independence and it consisted of a combination of naval officers, shipwright officers and
civilian administrators. As its members were civil servants not politicians, they were more
permanent than the members of the Admiralty Board who were political appointees. The
head of the Navy Board called the Controller was a Senior Naval Officer but he was
expected to sit in the House of Commons as the representative of a naval town or port -
Table 2.3 shows the five holders of this post between 1778 and 1816' s . At any one time,
there were two or three surveyors who were Master Shipwrights of long experience and
who were responsible for ship design, building and maintenance. On the purely
administrative side, the Clerk of the Acts, served as the Board Secretary and there were
three Controllers of the Storekeepers, Victualling and Treasurers accounts. Commissioners
of the Royal Dockyards were also members of the Board. The Navy Board was charged
with building, equipping and maintaining the ships of the Royal Navy and its
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responsibilities included all the technical and financial administration associated with that.
The Board examined and appointed warrant officers such as boatswains, carpenters, and
cooks and appointed warrant officers examined by other bodies such as ship's masters and
surgeons. It is more significant from the viewpoint of this thesis that it oversaw the Royal
Dockyards, and the provision of new building as well as maintenance of existing buildings,
whilst it also provided advice and guidance on professional matters to the dockyard
officers. Lastly, using information provided by the Dockyards, the Navy Board prepared
the Annual Estimates for the Admiralty Board to present to Parliament. The annual
Estimates were in three parts; 2' the Ordinary estimate which was a specific amount for
maintenance of ships and dockyard facilities, second was the Extra estimate used for the
building of new ships and the reduction of the backlog of maintenance and debt, and
thirdly the estimate for the number of seamen and marines voted in any year which
determined the size of the Operational Fleet.
2.4.2. Victualling Board: The next most important sub-board was that of Victuallingn
which had close working relations with the Navy Board and consisted of seven
commissioners who were based at Somerset House in London. Although its main supply
depot was at Deptford, there were depots in all the major dockyards. The duties of this
board included supplying fresh food, drink and water to all ships in harbour and at sea,
and it discharged these through its appointed agents and by negotiating contracts with
suppliers. The Board ran the victualling depots which included bakeries, breweries and
facilities for slaughtering and salting meat as well as cooperages to manufacture casks for
the storage of foodstuffs and water on board ship. It also appointed and regulated the
pursers of the Fleet, who were responsible for administering food supplies on board ship
and were empowered to purchase fresh food in foreign ports. Before its abolition in 1832
the Victualling Board pioneered improvements in diet including the introduction of canned
food.
2.4.3. Transport Board: Between 1690 and 1724, when its responsibilities were transferred
to the Dockyards, a Transport Board had existed to hire and equip ships for the
transportation of troops. As the result of criticism of the amounts of time dockyard
officials has spent surveying ships to be used as transports during the American War of
Independence, the Board was re-created in 1794 at the outbreak of the French Wars. It
consisted of three senior naval officers with agents and surveying staff and in 1796, it
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assumed responsibility for the care of prisoners of war, previously undertaken by the Sick
and Hurt Board.
2.4.4. Sick and Hurt Board: The Sick and Hurt Board was primarily responsible for the
appointment of ship's surgeons, the provision of their supplies and the running of naval
hospitals although it had been responsible for prisoners of war until 1796. A
Parliamentary enquiry of 1804, into debts incurred by the Board recommended its merger
with the Transport Board which at that point had a reputation for efficiency and this was
implemented in I 806.
2.4.5. The Impress Service: This Service was managed from within the Admiralty as
distinct from being a separate and subordinate Board. It dealt with all forms of recruitment
and had three functions of roughly equal iinportance. The first was the recruitment of
volunteers and the second was the acquisition of non-volunteers or "pressed men" (hence
the term press gangs) who ideally were trained seamen from the merchant fleet but in
times of war the Impress Service took whoever they could get - including jail prisoners.
Lastly the Service acted as a police force for the apprehension of stragglers who were
seamen allowed ashore but who failed to return to their ships on time or before sailing and
for deserters who were men who did not intend to return to their ships at all.
All the fighting equipment from ships guns to cutlasses used by the Royal Navy was
the property of the Ordnance Board which was independent of the Admiralty Board and of
similar status27. It was led by the Master-General of Ordnance who like the First Sea Lord, had
a seat in the Cabinet. The Ordnance Board maintained depots and magazines in major
dockyards, so that fighting equipment and stores were issued to ships before sailing and
returned when a ship went into refit or Ordinary.
2.5 Influential National Bodies. It was possible and indeed accepted practice, for bodies of
national standing to influence Parliament's decision making. Prime examples in the maritime
sphere were Lloyds of London and the great overseas trading companies such as the East India
Company.
2.5.1. Lloyds: The Admiralty worked closely with Lloyds; a world centre of marine
intelligenceand insurance, consequently, Lloyds recommendations on trade protection were
given careful consideration by the government and were influential in ensuring the success
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of the Admiralty's convoy system with merchant shipping since Lloyds was in a position
to ensure that merchants ships complied with the convoy system because, if they did not,
their insurance premiums rose. With the introduction of the Convoy Act of 1793 and the
Compulsory Convoy Act of 1798, convoying became obligatory for all foreign-going
merchant ships and heavy fines were imposed on convoy breakers. After 1806, Lloyds co-
operated with the Admiralty and the merchant fleet to devise new convoy routes, establish
entrepots and maintain the flow of exports into the European markets closed under
Napoleon's Continental blockade.
2.5.2. Trading Companies: had their origins in the custom of medieval merchants bonding
together for mutual protection and profit. Groups of merchants with particular trade
interests were able to put pressure on the Government for preferential treatment in defence
of that trade. Furthermore the companies had direct influence in the City as their trade
produced a large proportion of the Government's revenue through duties and excises. One
of the most important trading companies from the point of view of this thesis was the East
India Company, which was formed in 1600 to trade in pepper, spices, tea, muslins,
calicoes, silks and porcelain. By the late eighteenth century, the Company, which
dominated the Indian and Far Eastern trades, had been drawn into activities beyond the
normal scope of trading companies with its acquisition and administration of territory on
the Indian sub-continent. The Company supported the Royal Navy by allowing ships to
use their facilities in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta and additionally it was a source of
ships; either by building warships on the Navy's behalf2
 or by the sale to the Navy of East
Indiamen which were used as storeships or transports 30 . East Indiamen were larger than
the average merchantmen since they were designed to carry large cargoes for long
distances.
2.6 Government Overseas Foreign Policy. The vital elements in British foreign policy were the
defence of the realm and the promotion and protection of its trade. A dislike and distrust of the
French had been general since the time of Louis XIV 3' and to this was added, by the end of the
eighteenth century, a dread of the new French revolutionary political ideas which France was
trying to spread throughout Europe. The British Government was particularly fearful of the
export of France's increasing internal violence which lead to the overthrow and subsequent
execution of the French monarch and his family as well as the larger September massacres. By
1792, the British Government was deeply concerned also by growing French aggression to her
neighbours such as the Low Countries since it was believed that this could lead to an upset in
21
the European balance of power32. In 1793 France declared war on Britain and Pitt saw his
Nation's aim for the war not as prejudice or fear but as " .....security - security against a danger
the greatest that ever threatened the world 33". Nevertheless, once the war had started, Britain
was prepared to use the situation to her commercial advantage. Extension, as well as security,
of trade had been a major objective in every war since the seventeenth century and in this area
Britain's aims were not simply limited to a response to a French threat to the country's
increased trade and the exportation of the manufactured products of the Industrial Revolution.
During the eighteenth century trading rights were at the heart of the five wars fought between
Britain and France. These were the wars of Spanish (1702-1713) and Austrian Successions
(1740-1748), the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the war for American Independence (1775-
1783) and the war against Revolutionary France (1793-1802) which was to continue against
Napoleonic France from 1803 to 1815. In the first three of these wars; those of Spanish and
Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, Britain's commerce gained at the expense of
both her enemies France and Spain, and her ally Holland'. The war of 1740 to 1748, began
as a war with Spain over trading rights in the Spanish Indies but it broadened into a conflict
with France whilst the main objective of the Seven Years War (1756-1763) was to protect
Britain's lucrative trade with her American colonies from the same country.
Britain was defeated in the American War of Independence, and her colonies were lost but
contrary to the fears of British politicians and merchants, there was no great loss of trade and
America continued to import British manufactures in large quantities and export raw materials
to her35 . Indeed, the Jay Treaty signed by America and Britain in 1795, conferred most-
favoured nation status on this trade. However there were two problems in the relationship which
were not resolved and these were to result in America declaring war on Britain in 1812. Firstly
Britain did not recognize the American laws of naturalization, so American seamen were liable
to impressment into the Royal Navy and secondly Britain's policy of stopping and searching
neutral shipping for goods likely to aid her enemies was strongly objected to by Americans. The
war closed a lucrative market to British goods and caused fluctuations in the supplies of
American raw materials such as cotton to Britain, although fortunately American corn, on
which the Peninsular army depended, continued to be shipped into Spain.
2.7 Government European Foreign Policy . British European foreign policy was shaped by
Britain's need for allies to fight against France. In earlier eighteenth century wars, especially
the Seven Years War, Britain had frustrated France's European objectives by providing
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subsidies to her continental allies to pay for their armies to undertake the land war on Britain's
behalf. At the same time, Britain disrupted French commerce by defeating her at sea, and using
small armies to seize her colonies. From 1793 to 1802, what had been a successful policy in
earlier wars, had failed to check the French advance across Europe. The subsidy policy's
ineffectiveness was made worse by Britain's poor relations with her allies as a consequence of
a division of their individual war aims. From 1793 to 1800, Prussia, Russia and Austria were
more interested in possible gains of territory in Poland, than in the war against France; they
were prepared to accept destruction of their large armies in order to achieve their long-term
goals. Although Britain's strong and increasing trading base made it possible for her to pay
subsidies in gold to her allies, there were great risks. With the renewal of war between Britain
and France in 1803, security and trade remained the principal concerns of the British
government and the growing size of the manufacturing sector with its economic vulnerability
meant that with Napoleon's efforts to isolate and destroy British commerce, security of the
realm and security of trade became synonymous. By 1807 Napoleon's continental power had
increased to the extent that he had virtually isolated Britain who was not able to gain a foothold
on European soil until an expeditionary force was sent to the Iberian Peninsular in support of
the Spanish army in 1808. There Britain's involvement slowly became a growing commitment
which eventually turned into a major land campaign and naval logistic operation. Ultimately the
Peninsular war was to prove fundamental to Napoleon's defeat and the ending of the war.
2.8 Government Financial Policy . Probably the second major preoccupation for the British
government during the wars against France from 1793 to 1815, was the cost of the war, and
raising sufficient revenue to meet that cost. Indeed it was to be the most costly and the longest
war that Britain had ever fought but most significantly, it was one of the few wars in which the
British Government accepted that it would have to pay its debts at the time rather deferring
them to a later date. Despite the fact that the Navy was permanently in debt and the need for
fmancial economy was pressing, the Royal Navy substantially received the funding it sought
from Parliament to prosecute the war and that funding included the fmance required to operate
Portsmouth Dockyard. It is worth noting that at the height of the war between 1807 and 1813,
the Naval estimates were running at an annual level of around 19 million pounds.
The Bank of England had to have sufficient gold to cover all promissory notes and the
export of large quantities of gold to Britain's Continental Allies in 1797, created a shortage. A
number of small banks collapsed and there was a loss of confidence which was only stemmed
when William Pitt stopped the Bank of England honouring its notes in cash and paying with
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banknotes instead. This was a revolutionary new departure in economic terms since, effectively,
Britain's internal trade came off the gold standard. No attempt was made by the government
or banks to regulate the issue of banknotes and this created sufficient inflation to stimulate trade
by creating a monetary situation where commercial expansion was possible in spite of heavy
taxation and the disruptions in trade due to the war 37 . The real benefits of the war were derived
from this suspension of cash payments - an emergency expedient - and the traditional policy,
going back to the time of Queen Elizabeth I, of systematic interference with enemy trade.
Interestingly, the phenomenal cost of the war in 1811 amounted to no less than 16% of the
gross national income. Just over one hundred years later in 1915 the cost of the war was an
identical percentage.
2.9 Industrial Development. Despite the massive diversion of labour from agriculture and
industry into both full-time service in the Army and Navy and part-time service in the Militia
and Volunteers, trade and industry continued to expand. Industrialization across Europe and
America had gathered speed from the 1750's and Great Britain led the way with developments
in the cotton, iron and mining industries and the large-scale manufacture of chemicals. Many
were based on the application of steam power and between 1750 and 1780, the number of new
inventions patented each year multiplied by six 39. The use of machinery and the application of
steam power created a need for a building designed to accommodate them and changed the
working structure from domestic-based industries to those of the factories. However, on the
negative side, the war induced fluctuations in trade and brought stagnation in some sectors as
well as a decline in real earnings for the workers which led to food riots and industrial unrest40.
Table 2.4 attempts to illustrate the general level of technology in Great Britain by 1790 and this
is expanded on in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 discusses the specific technical advances made in Portsmouth Dockyard.
Primarily these were applications of new technologies rather than outright new inventions and
came about as a consequence of the Office of the Inspector General of Naval Works
investigating the various advances being made in commercial industry with a view to identifying
those of potential value to the Royal Navy. Thus it was Samuel Bentham and his small team
who effectively constituted the interface between the Service and Industry and it was this
organisation that then went on to obtain approval and funding to procure the necessary
equipment. Subsequently they then managed its development and installation in the Royal
Dockyards.
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TABLE 2.4 - STATE OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
Date	 INVENTION	 PERSON
1745-50	 Manufacture of crucible Steel	 Benjamin Huntsman
1760's	 Developments in cotton spinning 	 Arkwright &
machinery	 Hargreaves
1761	 Manchester-Worsley Canal opens 	 James Brindley
1770	 Screw-cutting Lathe 	 Jesse Ramsden
1776	 Steam engines used commercially
1781	 First rotative steam engine 	 James Watt
1784	 Puddling process for making Iron	 Henry Cort
1790	 Civil engineers using iron components
2.10 Government Defence Policy. If the British Government's two principal aims in the
conduct of the war against France were defence of the realm by the overthrow of France and
the security and extension of Britain's trade, the instruments to carry out this strategy were her
armed forces.
2.10.1 .Army: With a comparatively small population, Britain could not, and would not,
carry out the large-scale mobilisations seen on the Continent especially as there was a
deep-seated dislike of standing armies in Britain caused by distrust of the expansion of
military force under the Crown's control. As it bad an enduring preoccupation with
commerce and the colonies, the British Government tried to fight Revolutionary France
with the methods which had proved successful against Bourbon France in the 1750's and
1760's. Firstly large-scale land warfare on the Continent was to he conducted by our allies
supported by British subsidies and secondly the Government looked to small-scale
expeditions by the British Army against French (and her allies) colonies, which when
captured, could be used as bargaining counters in the subsequent peace negotiations. What
the British Government was unable to understand was the fact that in this war France had
no limits to her war objectives or to the scale of military resources she was prepared to
commit. As a result the British Government singularly failed, until almost when success
in the Iberian Peninsula was looking them in the face, to devise suitable land warfare
strategies on the European Continent to combat Napoleon.
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2.10.2. The Royal Navy: The strategic choices for the use of the Royal Navy were more
straight forward than those surrounding land forces. Firstly, if the Royal Navy could
destroy the enemy's fleet, this would have two consequences - it would make the invasion
of Britain impossible and secondly it would remove the protection from the French
overseas merchant trade, which would then be unable to perform its function of creating
wealth for the French state. Secondly there was the well proven use of the Royal Navy to
attack French overseas trade thus profiting our own and helping to destroy the enemy's
economy. Thirdly the wars of the eighteenth century had shown that British merchant
shipping, and hence trade, was vulnerable to "raiders" and "privateers" and therefore both
that shipping and the countries and islands with which trade was conducted needed to be
protected. As that trade, and the revenues which flowed from it, expanded around the
world the protection requirement grew and the City of London and the National Institutions
were quick to ensure that the Government did not forget this.
However naval activity on its own did not weaken the French hold on the Continent
and it increased rather than decreased Napoleon's commitment to war with Britain. By
1805, the situation had been reached in which a sea power was trying to defeat a land
power, and it was not until the Navy was used to put in place, and sustain on the
continent, a sizeable army which could oppose and defeat any of those of France, that the
war as a whole turned in favour of Britain and her allies.
What can be said with certainty is that Britain's success in its long fight against
Napoleonic France was built on three pillars. The first was the country's financial strength,
arising from its position as the world leader in the technological sphere. Second, the Royal
Navy's capability to project, protect and sustain the country's interests across the globe and
third, the ability of the British Army and Navy acting together to exploit the benefits that
maritime superiority gave them against a purely land based force, no matter what its size
was.
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CHAPTER THREE
NAVAL REQUIREMENT - FLEET OPERATIONS &
COMPOSITION
3.1. General. To meet the dictates of the Government, and the pressures on that from influential
sections of Commerce and Society, the Royal Navy had developed, by the mid eighteenth
century, into a highly complex organisation with two major interdependent, but markedly
different, structures. On the one hand there was the shore infrastructure, without which the
Navy would not have existed at all, and on the other there was a range of different tasks which
gave rise to a number of discrete ship types with varying but complementary operational
capabilities. This Chapter looks firstly at the Shore Infrastructure and then at the tasks of the
Fleet before moving on to the operational purposes of the ship types and thence the size and
composition of the Fleet as a whole from 1790 to 1815. Thereafter Chapter Four examines the
actual work done in Portsmouth Dockyard on individual ships in those years.
3.2. Royal Dockyards and Naval Bases. By the start of the Revolutionary War against France
in 1793, the Royal Navy was operating across the globe. There were British ships on foreign
stations in the Mediterranean, West Indies, North America and the Indian Ocean. At the same
time, voyages of exploration were taking place to Australia, New Zealand and through the
Pacific Ocean'. These deployments were only made possible as a result of the work done by
the Royal Dockyards, for unless wooden ships were maintained and repaired regularly they
quickly suffered from rot and decay and become useless for the tasks they were required to
undertake. The functions of the Royal Dockyards were to build, or supervise the building of,
all new ships for the Royal Navy and concurrently to refit/repair the existing ships. In addition
the Royal dockyards maintained the Reserve Fleet, or Ships in Ordinary as they were called at
that time.
The locations of the Royal Dockyards had evolved over three centuries of maritime
warfare, and by the late eighteenth century there were six major dockyards (see Figure 3.1)
serving the needs of the Royal Navy and located on the River Thames or the South Coast of
Britain2 where Portsmouth (see Figure 3.2) was.
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Each dockyard was a complex site embracing such facilities as the rope-house, sail-loft,
building slips, smithies and many small workshops as well as large areas taken up with storing
and seasoning timber and the associated saw-pits. Furthermore, as the dockyards had to supply
all items needed to keep the ships of the fleet operational, parts of them were devoted to
manufacture as well as storage of purchased items. Close to the Dockyard were other essential
establishments such as the Victualling and Ordnance Depots, Marine Barracks and Hospitals
for the sick and injured. Associated with the Royal Dockyards there were Fleet Anchorages
(Figure 3.1) an inshore sheltered sea area where the ships of the Fleet could be safely anchored,
in some numbers, even in the worst of weather. Here there was sufficient space between the
anchored vessels so that they could swing with the tide without the risk of entanglement, whilst
being sufficiently close to shore for support craft from the nearest Royal Dockyard/Depot to
reach them readily with water, food, maintenance personnel and other necessities but without
the problems of their crews deserting. Some anchorages had local depots specially set up for
this purpose, thus ships in the Downs off the Kent coast were supplied from a depot at Deal,
and those in Tor Bay were supplied from Brixham3.
3.2.1. Royal Dockyards in Britain: The Dockyard closest to London, centre of naval
administration and principal market for naval stores was Deptford - see Figure 3.1. This
was the main victualling yard and centre for distributing naval stores and other items
required by the Dockyards, although by the late eighteenth century, the Thames was too
silted up for the largest ships to enter Deptford Yard 4 . The next yard down river was
Woolwich, a small yard on a confined site which was a long way from the sea and already
beginning to decline.
Chatham, the most important of the Thames yards, was actually situated on the
River Medway and, having good access to the North Sea, it had been the premier base for
the fleet in the wars against the Dutch. Although there was ample room to expand the site,
the Medway needed regular dredging to remove the accumulation of silt which made entry
to and exit from the yard difficult. The Dockyard's importance began to decline as the
principal theatre of naval operations moved westwards but it remained the 'home' of the
North Sea Squadron with it s fleet anchorage at the Nore5 . Sheerness, which originated as
an extension to Chatham, was nearer the mouth of the river and the fleet anchorage but
the site was small and exposed to the prevailing south westerly winds so that ships at
anchor were subject to damage in heavy seas6.
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As the Royal Navy's main theatre of operations changed from maritime wars
against Holland to war against France on a global scale, coupled with operations across
the Atlantic, the importance of the two South Coast dockyards at Portsmouth and Plymouth
increased. By the end of the American War of Independence, (1774-1783), these two South
Coast dockyards had taken precedence over the Thames yards in the day to day
maintenance of the fleet.
For the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793 to 1815,
Portsmouth's primary role was that of refitting and repairing ships. There were actually
five building slips available7 but the Dockyard undertook very little building work during
these years. Plymouth acted as support base for ships blockading the Northern French
ports and also undertook refit and repair work whilst the dockyards on the River Thames
progressively became more concerned with the provision of supplies to the Fleet and
building new ships for the Navy than they did with refit and repair work.
3.2.2. Portsmouth Dockyard: Portsmouth had been a naval base since the end of the
fifteenth century, and had always been used as a point of departure and base in wars
against France. It has a good sheltered harbour and anchorage which had double high tides
due to the flow up the English Channel first entering Portsmouth from the West of the Isle
of Wight and then, some one hour later, from the East of the Island. The actual fleet
anchorage at Spithead lay between Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight and was sheltered
from the prevailing westerly winds. It was close enough to Portsmouth Dockyard for ships
to be readily watered, victualled and stored from there. There was an additional anchorage
in St Helens Roads, well sheltered from the South since it was close in to the Isle of Wight
but it was further from the Dockyard than was Spithead.
Portsmouth Dockyard lies to the North of Portsmouth Town (Figure 3.3) from
which it was separated by the Hard. The Victualling and Ordnance Boards had depots in
Portsmouth and access to the harbour. The Ordnance Yard or Gun Wharf lay to the south
of the dockyard with the length of the Hard between them8. Until the 1760's all their
facilities had been on the Portsmouth side of the harbour, including the fifteenth century
Square Tower at the west end of High Street which was the principal powder magazine.
However in the interests of safety, the magazine was relocated on the western side of the
harbour to a site called Priddy's Hard9.
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3.2.3. Overseas Bases and Dockyards: Wherever there was an important trading area
overseas the Royal Navy tended to establish an Operational Area/Station within which
ships were deployed, under a Commander in Chief whose task it was to operate those
vessels as effectively as he could in the light of the circumstances he found confronting
him. Invariably Commanders in Chief complained of having inadequate ships, usually in
terms of numbers, types and material state, and being grossly under resourced in terms of
Base and Dockyard facilities, for all the tasks placed upon them which, broadly speaking,
were to protect British merchant ships in the area and to render aid to British colonists as
and when it was needed. It was not unknown for naval officers to act in a quasi-diplomatic
role and assist British traders in foreign ports in their negotiations with the local authorities
- sometimes quite forcibly! As can be seen from the map (Figure 3.4), which shows the
positions of the more important overseas dockyards and naval bases of the period, the
Navy's support organisation covered, with the exception of the Pacific, virtually the world
and its operation must have been a highly complex business.
3.3. The Tasks of The Royal Navy. Tasks undertaken by the Royal Navy to implement the
Government's strategy for defence had implications for the dockyards in their responsibilities
for support and maintenance of the Fleet. The most important task for the Navy was the
defence of the realm, which involved fighting the enemy at sea in every size of conflict from
minor skirmishes to major fleet engagements, and blockading enemy ports to prevent the
invasion of Britai&°. Blockading would also damage enemy trade and thus her ability to create
wealth. A second equally important task was the defence of British trade and it was in the best
interests of the Navy to support and protect a thriving merchant fleet since that was considered
to be the Royal Navy's primary source of trained seamen". A third, and perhaps under-rated
task, was that of joint-operations with the British Army. As Britain is an island, her Army has
to be transported to the areas of warfare and if necessary evacuated from them, and the Navy
was able to provide additional support by its ability to land naval guns and men in support of
the Army.
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The Navy interpreted the task of defence of the realm proactively and aimed to seek out
and destroy the enemy. The destruction of the enemy's battle fleet would remove the risk of
invasion and at the same time it would eliminate a major hazard to Britain's merchant shipping.
However it was not French policy to seek major fleet engagements in the same way that the
Royal Navy did. Rather than deliberately seeking out the enemy, the French fleet tended to
make sorties from port for specific purposes, such as supporting the expedition to Ireland in
December 1796 or the planned invasions of Britain in 1801 and 180512.
3.3.1. Fleet Engagements. When it was possible the classic battle tactic was to move the
line of ships across the line of the approaching enemy; each ship fired a broadside as it
crossed the enemy's line thus raking the length of the enemy ship, which could only reply
with the two to four guns pointing ahead in the bows 13 . The most common scenario was
when ships of both fleets in line, passed and repassed on opposite tacks and exchanged
broadsides until the line was reduced to disorder, when the signal for a 'general chase' was
given by the side whose line had not broken. Small engagements could be between two or
three ships and range from a skirmish to a running battle over several days and many of
these actions took place between frigates rather than ships-of-the-line.
Engagements large and small took place all over the world, but between 1793 and
1815, there were only five occasions on which the ships of the Royal Navy and those of
France and her allies fought a major "Fleet" action (battle) at sea (see Figure 3.5.1). The
last major fleet engagement on 21st October 1805, saw the destruction of the French and
Spanish fleets off Cape Trafalgar' 4 . A sixth major engagement fought by the Royal Navy
was not against the French fleet but against the defences of the city of Copenhagen, which
included the Trekronor shore battery and floating forts made from armed hulks.
3.3.2. Blockades: Blockading was the tactic used to keep the enemy fleet confined to their
bases (Figure 3.5.2.). France and her principal ally Spain suffered from shortages of
essential foodstuffs and raw materials as a result of the lack of protection available to their
merchant ships due to the French and Spanish warships being blockaded into their harbours
by the Royal Navy.
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There were two types of blockade, the open and the closed. The open blockade
consisted of using frigates to maintain a watch on the enemy ports while the main fleet was
at sea during the summertime. In winter or in poor weather, the fleet went to an anchorage
protected from westerly gales. However an open blockade, when the British fleet was not
readily to hand, could allow the French fleet to slip out of harbour because weather
conditions which hindered one side could be of advantage to the other, to prevent this
eventuality a closed blockade system was used's.
During the campaign of 1759, in the Seven Years War, the Western Squadron
commanded by Sir Edward Hawke successfully maintained a close blockade of the French
Atlantic ports'6 and this idea was revived by Admiral Earl St. Vincent from 1800'. Using
frigates and other small ships to patrol close inshore and report any French fleet
movements, the ships of the line remained out at sea but within easy reach of the
blockaded ports regardless of the season or weather. When blockading the French ports
of Brest, L'Onent, La Rochelle and Rochefort, (see Figure 3.5.2) the fleet lay off Ushant.
Any necessary refitting and repairs needing a dockyard or naval base took place either at
Plymouth or in Tor Bay and special permission from St. Vincent or the Admiralty was
needed for ships to go to Portsmouth for docking. The Breton coast around Brest is rocky
and exposed. So when the weather became too wild to allow the Fleet to maintain its
station off Ushant it would run for cover in either Cawsands or Tor Bay whilst hoping that
the severe conditions would deter the French fleet from attempting to put to sea'8.
Toulon, the major French port on the Mediterranean coast was also closely
blockaded with the Royal Navy using the coast of Sardinia as a haven, and source of
water' 9, although from 1800, Malta was used as a stores base and dockyard although its
distance from Toulon did present a major problem. In a letter of 1803 to Admiral Pasley,
Nelson wrote "...Admiral Campbell was very well when we parted. He is gone to look for
water in Sardinia; for Malta is such an immense distance that I can send nothing there that
I may want under 6 or 7 weeks.... "20
The shallower waters of the North Sea, although not subject to the long Atlantic
swell, made blockade duty particularly arduous in winter when sleet, snow and frost were
added to the problems facing naval operations. It fell to the North Sea Fleet to blockade
the Dutch coast (see Figure 3.5.2) and keep the Dutch fleet incarcerated in the Texel. In
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1797, at the time of the Nore mutiny, the Texel channel was blockaded by Admiral
Duncan with just two ships21.
3.3.3. Convoys: In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Britain became
increasingly bent on selling goods to world-wide markets and part of this trade paid for the
Royal Navy which protected the merchant shipping. Trade could be divided into three
elements, imports, exports and re-exports. Imports included raw materials like timber,
iron, cotton and foodstuffs; particularly grain or produce which could not be grown in the
British climate like sugar, tea and tobacco. Goods made in Britain such as woollens, cotton
goods, cutlery and hardware were exported around the world. Re-exports were the produce
of Britain's colonies like tea and sugar, which under the Navigation Laws were landed in
Britain before re-export to another destination such as Continental Europe.
During successive wars against other maritime powers, the Royal Navy had evolved
a two-pronged system for the protection of the merchant fleet at sea, by the use of
convoys, and of patrolled areas. The idea of gathering a number of ships together into a
convoy went back to medieval times; merchant ships gathered at an agreed port or
anchorage and with a comparatively small number of armed escorts sailed together for
their destination. Protection was gained from the numbers involved as large-scale
destructive raids on convoys were exceptional. 'Hit and run' attacks by a single or small
numbers of aggressors were the most likely. If a single aggressor came upon a convoy,
even an unescorted one, it could only attack one ship at a time, so the rest had a
reasonable chance of escape. The majority of losses occurred from the 'cutting out' of
weak or slow ships or if a convoy became scattered in bad weather. Convoys sailed on
well-ordered routes at regular intervals, often fortnightly, or monthly. The convoy escorts
were drawn from the Navy's smaller ships, but ships of the line going to or returning from
foreign stations would travel with a convoy to give it additional protection when the
opportunity arose or when a convoy was particularly important - such as when a new
Colonial Governor was taking passage within it.
The Royal Navy and Lloyds jointly organised the convoy system and the common
practise of breaking away from a convoy early, as the port of arrival was approached, in
order to gain an advantage over trading rivalsu was effectively stopped when convoy
breakers were subjected to heavy fines.
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Some ships were exempt from the convoy system if they so wished and those of the
East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company were sufficiently large and well armed
to be able to defend themselves; as could some other fast and well-armed ships referred
to as 'runners'. Although the Royal Navy did arrange regular convoys for the coastal
trade, including ships calling at Irish ports, there was no compulsion to join them as there
was for the long distance traffic. As coastal traffic worked to very narrow time limits for
deliveries, and the ships concerned visited many small ports, it was more practical for
them to move singly rather than in convoys.
3.3.4. Patrolled Areas: Patrolled areas arose to protect convoys and single ships in places
where the trade routes were heaviest and where ships were especially vulnerable to attack
by the enemy's fleet or more particularly from privateers - for example in the Channel
where a great number of routes converge particularly those for the Port of London.
Patrolled areas were also used overseas close to terminal ports in the West Indies, around
the coast of India and from 1808 to 1812 in the Baltic, when the hostile or neutral coast
had extended to Denmark, Prussia and Scandinavian.
As the French Fleet became unable; and certainly unwilling, to continue to dispute
control of the seas with Britain, French seamen resorted to the traditional strategy of the
'guerre de course' and "Privateering" became the main occupation of the French seafaring
communities as her merchant fleet declined. Small, fast and heavily manned ships issuing
from the French ports could attack British shipping and return swiftly to their home ports.
Indeed they became sufficiently bold to take ships within sight of the British coast in
daylight. As the French sphere of influence spread along the Northern European coast, so
did the ports used by privateers, ranging from Brittany to Denmark and Norway and a
prime duty of patrolling ships was to destroy or capture these "nuisances".
Shipping in the Caribbean was likewise at risk where a Royal Naval presence was
especially welcomed by the British colonists. So anxious were these British colonists in the
Leeward and Windward Islands, to retain this protection against French and Spanish
privateers operating from islands in the immediate area that the colonists on Antigua
bought the site for a permanent naval base and presented it to the Navy'. In the Indian
Ocean the island of Mauritius had served as a French privateering base for generations and
its capture therefore diminished losses. A joint venture by the East India Company and
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the Royal Navy secured Dutch bases in the East Indies in 1797 and prevented them falling
into French hands which secured the safety of merchant vessels sailing to the Far East.
Anti-privateer work continued up to the end of the war against France. When the
United States of America declared war against Britain in 1812, there were initially
insufficient ships to reinforce the North American station due to the continuing war in
Europe and American privateers from ports like Baltimore threatened British trade in the
Caribbean and North Atlantic 3° but by the following year, 1813, the Royal Navy was able
to blockade American naval and commercial ports and virtually brought the eastern
seaboard trade to a standstill 31 . This only ceased with the signing of a peace treaty between
Britain and the United States on 24th December 181432.
3.3.5. Joint Army/Navy
 Operations: The British Army needed the assistance of the Royal
Navy in any of its ventures outside the United Kingdom and the Transport Board,
subordinate to the Admiralty, arranged the ships which carried men, horses, equipment and
supplies for the Army. In the European theatre of war, British military expeditions were
small-scale compared to those of our allies who could put major armies in the field.
Nevertheless, considering they involved a landing from the sea, and all too frequently, a
hasty withdrawal back across it, they were substantial joint service operations. 1809 started
with the withdrawal of the 26,000 survivors of Sir John Moore's force of 35,000 from
Corunna in January. For this operation about 200 transports and 12 ships of the line were
assembled 33
 and in September, troops, ordnance and stores involved in the abortive
Waicheren landing on the Dutch coast were safely withdrawn by sea'.
Not all landings were unsuccessful. The raid on Helder in 1799, captured the port,
naval base and Dutch fleet, many of which were added to the British fleet, and that by the
Royal Navy and 25,000 troops on Copenhagen in 1807 captured 15 Danish ships-of-the-
line. This successful joint-operation prevented Napoleon from combining the fleets of
Denmark, Sweden, Russia and Holland which would have posed a considerable threat to
the realm and the Royal Navy, as well as seriously endangering the vital supply of naval
stores from the Baltic which were so important the Navy.
Wellington's Peninsular campaigns are arguably one of the finest examples of
British joint naval-military operations. The Army's demands for manpower and stores were
enormous since all its requirements had to be purchased, transported to Portugal and then
42
moved over land to where they were needed. Through the war the Army's strength
progressively increased until over 80,000 British and allied Portuguese and Spanish troops
were armed, fed and maintained by Britain. This posed major problems for the Navy in
terms of protected sea-borne transport and its organization into convoys which sailed
monthly from Britain for Lisbon and Oporto 37 . However in 1813 Wellington was able to
shorten his land supply lines by moving his ports of supply from Lisbon and Oporto to
Santander and Bilbao. On top of the convoy shipping Wellington had felt compelled in
1810-1811 to persuade the British Government to maintain transports in the River Tagus
so that in the event of a heavy reinforcement of French troops, the British Army, having
withdrawn to the Lines of Tories Vedras, could be safely evacuated but the maintenance
of these ships and their crews was an additional, and sustained, demand on the Navy's
resources. Lastly, the Navy played its part in enabling diversionary landings and guerilla
raids along the Spanish coast behind the French lines. For example, during the protracted
seige of Cadiz by the French from February 1810 to August 1812, as well as British ships
supplying the city from the sea, naval personnel assisted the Spanish in manning floating
batteries.
Joint operations took place world-wide, with the Army and Navy working together
in expeditions to capture or eliminate privateering bases in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean
and East Indies. The expeditions to capture the Dutch base at the Cape of Good Hope in
1795, and that against Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807 which was mounted from the Cape
of Good Hope were good examples. Indeed that against Buenos Aires was planned and
executed without Governmental approval, although politicians were quick to see the trading
advantages while deploring the expedition. The capture of the last French Caribbean
island in February 18 iO° not only increased the flow of British Trade in that part of the
world but also allowed British garrisons to be released for service elsewhere. By 1810
Senegal, Cayenne, the Seychelles, the Isle de Bourbon 41 , Amboina42 and Banda Neira43 had
all fallen to British expeditions and the foundations of a new Commonwealth in the Far
East had been laid with the establishment of Sydney.
Just as the Army needed the Royal Navy for transportation and protection, so the
Navy needed the Army. Naval bases overseas, especially those in the Mediterranean and
West Indies, had permanent military garrisons to protect the naval installations and harbour
from attack by France or her allies. At Earl St. Vincent's suggestion, the victualling base
43
on Gibraltar was re-sited so that not only did it have an enlarged capacity, but it was no
longer in the reach of artillery on mainland Spain.
3.4. Types of Ships in The Fleet. The tasks which the Royal Navy undertook on behalf of the
Government dictated the size and shape of the fleet which in 1793 consisted of 411 vessels
which could roughly be divided into three broad types, within which there were different ship
classes with differing roles. The three broad types were capital ships, cruisers and minor
warships.
3.4.1. Capital Ships: The task of engaging and destroying the enemy was the role of the
capital ships of eighteenth century which were called "Line of Battle" ships or more often
"Ships of the Line". They carried 60 to 100 guns on either two or three gundecks
depending on the size of the ship. To carry this weight of big guns they had to be both
strong and large as well as capable of accommodating the large crew necessary to man
them. The largest of the ships of the line were used as flagships, and with their large and
imposing presence, were suitable for diplomatic missions when Britain's prestige and
standing needed to be displayed. Ships of the line were required to be capable of
withstanding the pounding of enemy guns in a line of battle engagement or from a shore
bombardment while maintaining their own ability to engage the enemy regardless of their
own state of damage. Their role of engaging enemy ships took precedence over blockade
or convoying duties.
3.4.2. Cruisers: The cruisers of this period, like those of today, were the Frigates which
carried from 20 to 50 guns on one gundeck and were used as fleet escorts as well as for
patrolling, blockading and convoy protection duties where their firepower, good sailing
qualities and ability to be away from a shore base for at least six months at a time, made
them so invaluable. To quote a traditional Naval saying, famously used by "Jackie"
Fishe?5 .....they were faster than anything bigger and bigger than anything faster.
When frigates were in company with a fleet of ships of the line, they acted as
scouts, working ahead of the main formation and reporting sightings of enemy vessels.
Although frigates were not considered to be a real opponent for a ship of the line with its
superior firepower, it was by no means uncommon for Royal Naval frigates to engage in
single ship combat with a French or Spanish Line of Battle ship. On these occasions the
frigate's best tactic was to exploit its greater agility to keep out of as much harm as
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possible whilst attacking the enemy's vulnerable stem. On 28th February 1797 the 32 gun
Terpsichore fought the 120 gun Santissinia Trinidad off Cape Spartel on the Moroccan
coast and survived.
Frigates were also widely used also for patrolling the shipping lanes and protecting
merchant shipping from attacks by enemy warships and privateers. At the same time they
looked to capture the enemy warships and merchant ships whenever possible. On blockade
duties, frigates were able to operate closer inshore than the bigger and deeper ships of the
line and, with their superior sailing abilities, they could gather intelligence by approaching
enemy harbours to see what was there. If the circumstances were right they were also
quick to seize the opportunity to cut out enemy ships as prizes. Lastly, Frigates, were
used to support combined operations with the Army, including special missions like coastal
gueriula raids. Their combination of speed, fire power and a considerable number of boats
made them a natural choice for this type of operation.
3.4.3. Minor War Vessels: Within this heading were a range of different classes of
vessels, the largest of which were the sloops carrying from 14 to 18 guns. Like the frigates
they could work as information gatherers but their small size and shallow draught allowed
them to work even closer into the coast. As well as collecting intelligence, sloops carried
dispatches, letters, orders, stores and people. As such they were a vital communication link
between the Admiralty and the overseas stations as well as within the areas covered by
those stations. Sloops also took their part in blockade duties, protecting convoys and the
search for and destruction of privateers.
Among the other classes there were two specialist ones - the Fireships and Bombs.
Fireships were a traditional naval weapon of war for destroying enemy ships in harbour.
Bombs were used exclusively for shore bombardments (including harbours) - they had no
place in sea battles. They had a mortar resting on a platform in the centre of the vessel,
and a specially strengthened hull to withstand the recoil of a projectile weighing up to 195
pounds which could be fired to a range of 4,000 yards. The really significant thing about
them was that the flight of the projectile was very much "up and over" and therefore they
could attack targets hidden behind fortifications whilst themselves being outside the range
of the conventional guns of the period.
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3.5. Fleet Size. As the war progressed so did the total number of ships in the Royal Navy.
Figures 3.6 and 3.6.1, together with Table show that from a low of 390 in 1793 it
reached a peak of 979 in 1809. However by no means all ships were available for sea service
at any one time as can be seen, in percentage terms, in Figure 3.6.2. In addition to those ships
which were in the operational sea going fleet there were some held in reserve for operational
service, some used only for service in harbour and even a number held in reserve for harbour
service - Table 3.1.1 shows the spread of these statuses for the period 1793 - 1816 and this is
illustrated in Figures 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 respectively for the Line of Battle and Frigates and below.
However, whether ships were operational or not they all had to be maintained - albeit at
differing levels of readiness and periodicity.
3.6. Fleet Losses. Frequent mention has been made in this chapter of "weather", "operating
close in shore" etc and collectively these are all part of the Navy's primary battle which was
the constant struggle by its ships to survive in the face of the maritime environment. During the
course of the French wars, the Royal Navy lost 482 ships of all classes and sizes. Of the 482
ships lost between February 1793 and July 1815, 125 were captured, 16 were destroyed in
action and of the rest, 251 were wrecked, 75 foundered49
 and the remaining 15 were lost due
to fire.5° Figure 3.7, supported by Table 3.2 , shows the Navy's year on year losses due to
these causes across the period. For those who have been brought up to believe that the Royal
Navy was largely invincible during the Napoleonic war these figures may come as something
of a surprise. However little further thought is needed to realise that if the environment caused
so many ships to be wrecked or founder then how much larger must have been the number of
ships requiring unprorammed repair and maintenance work to make good the beating they
were continually taking from the elements. it is certainly a fair deduction that the Royal Navy's
main contest across the period was against the weather rather than against the ships of the
enemy. This leads in turn to the conclusion that the Dockyard managers were inevitably
operating, for much of the time, in a short term, or crisis, mode.

46
cl
—
__	
Yr	 'I
'1	 1
_
-- %	 !
F	 11	 1	
!	
:
§
wI-4
'U)
I
--J
U)Ocl)
LLW
Cl)
LU
I-U)4w
z0I
ULI
(flU,
ww
I-I-
44
U)
SU3OVIIflN
47
Sfl8VIflN
4:
w
C))
I-
4:
A
C))
w
I-
4:
0
LL
4:
w
C,)
H
4:
U)
4	 -J
uJ
>-i
4:
w
C))
H
4:
U)
-J
4:
I-0
H
U-
I
(1)

48
4
LU
Cl)
I-
-J
4
z
0
I-4
0.
0
U)
LU
4
I-
z
LU
C)
LU
Cl)
LU
>.
0
-J
LU
Cl)
w
0
U-
)
LU
-J
Cu
U-
0
LU
z
ji
SV.LN33H3d
49
Co
a-
Co
-J
U-
Z I
-ii
U-
o
U)
I-i
Cn
cI
(0
LUI
01
cc
I
cc
0U-
a
cc
0
CI)
cc
0U-
a
cr
-j
z
0
I-
cc
w
0
I
U)
4
'U
-
SH38WflN
50
m
I
0
LI..
0I0-j
LU
Cl)
LU
L&
w
0
>
w
C,)
cc
cc
I
-j
4:
z0
I-
4:
cc
wI
SU3SIñIflN


CHAPTER THREE - REFERENCES & NOTES 	 52
1. Judith Blow Williams, British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion 1750-1850, Oxford
University Press, London, 1972, pages 427-433.
2. Jonathan COaLI, The Royal Dockyards 1690-1850, Scolar Press, Aldershot, 1989, page 2.
3. Roger Morriss, The Royal Dockyards during the Revoluzionay and Napoleonic Wars, Leicester
University Press, Leicester, 1983, pages 3-5.
4. Ibid., p.143.
5. The Nore is a sandbank between Shoeburyness and Sheerness.
6. Morriss, op. cit. n.3, p.2.
7. ADM/140/555/14 to 18, Maps of Portsmouth Dockyard dated 1790,1793, 1796, Unknown and
1810.
8. Map of Old Portsmouth and the Dockyard, c. 1835, Local Maps Collection No 5382, Portsmouth
Library.
9. Coad, op. cit. n.2, p.257.
10. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Fontana Press, London, 1991, 3rd
edition, pages 146-147.
11. C.P.Hill, British Economic and Social History 1700-1982, Edward Arnold, Bath, 1985, 5th
edition, page 61.
12. Brian Lavery, Nelson's Ntny, the ships, men and organization 1793-1815, Conway Maritime
Press, London, 1989, pages 295-300.
13. James Henderson, The Frigates, Adlard Coles, London, 1970, page 23.
14. Kennedy, op. cit. n.10, pp.146-147..
15. G.J.Marcus, A Naval History of England - The age of Nelson, Allen and Unwin, London, 1971,
page 153.
16. Details of this campaign can be found in G.J.Marcus Quiberon Bay, the campaign in home
waters, 1759, Hollis and Carter, London, 1960.
17. Marcus, op. cit. n.15, p.153.
18. Lavery, op. cit. n.12, p.280.
19. Ibid., p.280.
20. Sir N.H.Nicholas G.C.M.G. (ed), The Despatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount
Nelson, London, 1855, Volume 5, page 244.
21. Marcus, op. cit., n.15, p.154.
22. Hill, op. cit. n.11, p.154.
23. Kennedy, op. cit. n.10, p.155.
24. Ibid., p.156.
CHAPTER THREE - REFERENCES & NOTES 	 53
25. Marcus, op. cit. n.15, pp.107-108.
26. Ibid., p.370.
27. Coad, op. cit. n.2, pp.355-360.
28. W. Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy, a history from the Earliest Times to 1900, William Clowes,
London, 1900, Volume 5, pages 293-295.
29. Ibid., pp.290-293.
30. Marcus, op. cit. n.15, p.453.
31. Laird Clowes, op. cit. n.28, pp.63-65.
32. Ian R. Christie, Wars and Revolutions, Britain 1 760-1815, The New History of England,
Edward Arnold, London, 1982, Volume 7, pages 319-320.
33. Christopher Hall, 'The Royal Navy and the Peninsular War', The Mariner's Mirror, (1993), 79,
pp. 409-410.
34. Despatches from Rear Admiral Otway, Commodore Owen and Lieutenant General Don, Naval
Chronicle, Joyce Gold, London, 1809, Volume XXII, pages 77-84.
35. Christie, op. cit. n.32, p.248.
36. Ibid., p.307.
37. Hall, op. cit. n.33, pp.404-407.
38. Ibid., p.413.
39. John D.Grainger, 'The Navy in the River Plate 1806-1808', The Mariner's Mirror, (1995), 81,
pp. 287-299.
40. Despatches relating to the capture of Guadeloupe, op. cit. n.34, v.XXIII, pp.339-345.
41. Despatches relating to the capture of Isle de Bourbon, op. cit. n.34, v.XXIV, pp.426-431.
42. Despatches relating to the expedition to Amboina and conditions for the Dutch surrender, Ibid.,
pp.335-343.
43. Laird Clowes, op. cit. n.28, v.5, pp.292-293.
44. Coad, op. cit. n.2, pp.316-317.
45. Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Arbuthnot (Jackie) Fisher GCB 4 OM,GCVO was First Sea Lord
from 1904 to 1910. Undoubtedly the expression was made famous by his use of it but it may
well have originated earlier in the context of frigates. Regrettably the available evidence does not
support a definitive attribution.
46. Lieutenant Commander R.E.A. Shrubb, Royal Navy and Captain A.B. Sainsbury, VRD, Royal
Naval Reserve, (eds), The Royal Navy day by day, Centaur Press, London, 1979, page 52.
47. William James, The Naval History of Great Britain, edited by Captain Chamier Royal Navy,
Richard Bentley, London, 1847, 6 volumes, Abstracts of ships and vessels belonging to the Royal
Navy, Nos 1 to 25 from 1793 to 1817.
CHAPTER THREE - REFERENCES & NOTES 	 54
48. Ibid., Information taken from tables of losses in Volumes 1-6.
49. Foundering- to sink at sea, as being rendered by the violence and continuation of a storm and
the excess of leaks, unable to keep the ship afloat above the water. William Falconer's Marine
Dicrionary. T. Cadell, London 1769.
50. James, op. cit. n.47, v.6, p.507, Abstract No. 17.
55
CHAPTER FOUR
THE FLEET - MAINTENANCE OF ITS SHIPS
BY PORTSMOUTH DOCKYARD
4.1 General. The previous Chapters on Politics and Maritime Activities discussed the policies
and imperatives which generated the requirement for, and operation of, the Fleet and the
different ship types. This Chapter examines the individual ship classes (more than one class
made up a type) in material terms and thereafter it examines, in the detail relevant to this thesis,
the generic nature of the construction of those vessels before moving on to discuss, and then
enumerate, Portsmouth Dockyard's contribution to keeping those warships at sea. That
enumeration leads to an analysis of Portsmouth Dockyard's output since it is against that output
that the value of introducing new technology into the Dockyard must ultimately be judged. It
must be borne in mind however that the nature of the Dockyard's output had to respond to the
political, financial and strategic imperatives of the period as well as to the state of the ships
both at the start of the period and throughout it. This state varied as the wear levels on the ships
changed with the changing pattern of their operational utilisation. Furthermore there was a very
considerable variation in the standards of the ships at the time they joined the fleet. Some were
built in Royal Dockyards, others in commercial yards under contract and yet others came from
continental dockyards having been captured and then "bought in" to the Royal Navy.
In 1783, the Admiralty Board estimated that the Royal Navy needed about 100 ships of the
line and about twice this number of frigates to be available at all times, some in commission
at sea and the rest in a state of readiness from which they could be got to sea as quickly as
possible. It was accepted that a shortage of seamen to man the ships was more likely to delay
the deployment of ships at sea rather than dilatoriness on the part of the dockyards, which in
the case of ships of the line, repaired about 10 ships per year' between 1783 and 1793.
However this was at the expense of the frigates and when these were urgently needed, work on
ships of the line had to stop in order to work on the frigates. As it turned out, at the declaration
of the Revolutionary War in 1793, the Royal Navy was in a good state of repair with 113 ships
of the line and 126 frigates either at sea or in Ordinary 2 , in addition there were about 65 smaller
ships, mainly sloops and brigs.
Subsequently, as Table 3.1.1 showed, the number of ships in commission rose steadily
throughout the war apart from a dip in the years 1803 and 1804 to a peak of 709 (out of a total
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of 979) in 1809 before beginning to decline towards the end of the war. - Details of the total
numbers of ships the Navy had at any one time was shown in the previous Chapter in Figure
3.6 and Table 3.1.
4.2 Ship Classes. By the middle of the seventeenth century all British warships were classified
under a rating system which was related to the number of guns carried. From the 1680's the
rates were in six divisions and the numbers of guns within each rate were revised in 1716,
1740, 1757 and 1790. The figures for the years 1790 to 1817 are shown below4,
First Rate
	
100 to 120 guns
Second Rate
	
90 to 98 guns
Third Rate
	
64 to 80 guns
Fourth Rate	 50 to 60 guns
Fifth Rate	 32 to 44 guns
Sixth Rate
	
20 to 28 guns
Over and above this logical system the Royal Navy, for reasons of deep-set culture, added
two other classification terms. Firstly all "rated" ships were also called "post" ships due to the
fact they were commanded by confirmed Captains whose promotion to their rank had been
"posted" in official documents and secondly, First, Second, Third and, at the start of the
period, Fourth Rates were collectively referred to as "Ships of the Line" because they fought
in the "Line of Battle".
4.2.1. Ships of the Line: The largest warships of the First and Second Rates, had increased
in size from the 1750's so as to be able to carry larger and heavier guns, and to be capable
of remaining at sea for longer periods of time. By the end of the eighteenth century,
wooden construction for hulls was reaching the limit of the number and weight of guns that
could be carried. First and Second Rates had three gundecks (Figure 4.1) and to
accommodate them were higher in the sides, had more breadth and were more rounded in
the bows than warships with two gundecks. The third deck also made them expensive to
build and more difficult to man, needing a crew of 750 to 900 men 6 compared to the 550
to 650 men needed to crew a two-decked 74 gun ship 7 . In battle, they presented a large
hull area to enemy guns and, because of their large size and large sails, sailing them in
adverse winds and heavy weather was more difficult than smaller ships. Guns were
arranged by calibre, with the largest and heaviest - 32 pounders on the lowest of the three
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decks, the main gun deck. Guns were "described" by the weight of the round solid shot
fired, thus 32 pounders fired 32 pound shot. As a general rule, the guns on any deck were
all of the same calibre to simplify the supply and storage of shot.
First rates were the smallest group of ships in the Royal Navy, and there were only
8 or 10 of them at any time 8. They needed the largest pieces of timber in their construction
and these were the most difficult to obtain. Second Rates, of which there were about twice
as many as First Rates, were somewhat smaller, making building, crewing and maintaining
them easier. Both rates owed their existence primarily to their role as flagships.
The most numerous group of ships of the line were those carrying 74 guns, (Figure
4.1 9) which made up the bulk of the battle fleet, and could be used for many other tasks
as well if necessary. In 1793, the Navy had 73 such ships, by 1803 this had risen to 96
and in 1810, the year the fleet was at its largest, there were 16010. Third rates could carry
a full battery of 32 pounders; considered at that time the most effective gun for naval
warfare on the lower of their two gundecks so that they were lighter in construction. In
addition, they had a lower centre of gravity and were both faster and easier to handle than
First or Second Rates, although they were slower and more cumbersome than frigates.
They could make 10 knots in a fair wind and were more comfortable than the smaller ships
in heavy weather. As a result, they were considered to have the optimum hull shape and
firepower, and it is no surprise that they made up some 85% or more of the battle fleet
whose prime purpose was to counter and destroy the battle fleets of Britain's enemies.
There were in addition Third Rates carrying 64 guns, but these were older
ships built before 1785 and still in service in 179011. The largest calibre gun carried
by a 64 gun ship was a 24 pounder, so these ships lacked both size and firepower
compared to the 74 gun ships.
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By the 1790's Fourth Rates, carrying 50 to 60 guns on two gundecks, constituted
a small group which was becoming obsolete, although a small number were built during
the period 1790 to 181512. They were not considered sufficiently large or robust to lie in
the line of battle and those that remained in service had been converted to other purposes,
such as troopships. Designed originally to be crewed by 350 to 42013 men, there was
plenty of space to carry troops' 4 when the guns were removed and the crew reduced in
size.
4.2.2. Frigates: were single-decked warships carrying from 20 to 44 guns, and rated as
Fifth and Sixth Rates.(Figure 4.115) As guns increased in weight and power, the smaller
more lightly-built ships were no match for the heavier guns of the bigger ships, so the
frigate developed as a type of ship which was designed for speed and independent action.
They could undertake any role except that of being in the line of battle, scouting ahead of
the battle fleet, escorting high value merchant ships and projecting Britain's maritime
power across the oceans of the world. They were able to carry sufficient stores to operate
away from major dockyards for at least six months and frequently longer' 6. Their 18
pounder guns were carried on one gundeck and the gunports were higher above the
waterline than those of the main gundecks on the ships of the line' 7. Frigates were the
Navy's cutting edge and were therefore always in short supply.
4.2.3. Minor War Vessels: Much more numerous than the First to Third Rate Ships of the
Line and the Fifth and Sixth Rate Frigates, these were ships of small size and tonnage.
Although these vessels could escort convoys, blockade or support combined operations,
they were essentially auxiliaries to the fleet, their fighting role was limited, because the
6 pounder guns they carried were no match for those of larger calibre. This group
increased most in numbers throughout the period from 99 in 1790 to a peak of 549 in 1809
(Table 3.1 & Figure 3.6).
4.2.3.1. Sloops: were divided into ship-sloops and brig-sloops' 8 , both carrying up
to 20 guns, were very manoeuvrable, and their smaller size and shallower draught
meant that they were ideal for work in inshore waters and rivers' 9 . As the ship-
sloop increased in size and became nearer in type to the "Rated" vessels, a need for
an intermediate vessel with a small crew appeared and the brig-sloop filled this
opening.
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4.2.3.2. Gunboats and Cutters: classed below the stoops, they had one or
sometimes two masts. At less than 200 tons and manned by a crew of 50 men, they
were armed with a small number of low calibre guns. Their role was that of
support - to the fleet carrying dispatches, as coastal defence vessels and in assisting
the Customs and Excise against smugglers.
4.2.3.3. Fireships: among the Minor War Vessels are two types which in the
twentieth century would be described as specialist weapons systems. The first of
these were the fireships, which were built or converted to attack moored or disabled
vessels. An enclosed deck was divided to hold explosives and combustible
materials, and their gunports were hinged at the bottom so when the fastening burnt
through, they fell open, increasing the draught and therefore the rate of combustion.
Most fireships spent their lives fitted as stoops and used as general purpose small
craft. Smaller fireships were used as 'infernal machines' and these were packed
with gunpowder and were intended to explode rather than burn21.
4.2.3.4. Bomb Vessels: these were the other specialist weapon system; they were
heavily built and strengthened to withstand the recoil from the two mortars, one of
13 ins and one of 11 ins which were mounted one behind the other on rotating
turntables on the centre line of the ship. The turntables allowed the mortars to be
elevated and swivelled like a modem gun turret. They were used for shore
bombardment, throwing heavy explosive shells on a high and variable trajectory
over a considerable range - about twice as far as 32 pound shot and when employed
correctly, they were highly effective
4.2.4. Support Craft: Support craft were of two types, those which were attached to the
fleet, and those which belonged to the dockyard. In the first category were warships
whose active career was at an end that were converted by the Dockyard for very specific
roles. Amongst these roles were those of troopships, stores ships and a few as hospital
ships, and all were called upon to support the Army as well as the Navy in campaigns
throughout the world. Other vessels, kept within the port area, were used as hulks, which
were ships of any rate which had finished their active career at sea; masts and rigging were
removed and they were put on a permanent mooringu. Some were used as receiving
ships, that is as a floating barracks for recruits or men transferring between ships, since
there were no shore-based barracks in the nineteenth century and having the men on hulks
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in the harbour made it more difficult for them to desert. Others were used as prisons, for
prisoners of war, as local slop 24 ships, hospitals (or isolation) ships, powder magazines and
floating batteries - in short they served vital functions by providing facilities that today
would be provided by buildings ashore. However, as well as dockyard effort and time
spent on converting them from fighting ships to totally different purposes, they also needed
periodic attention to keep them in good repair. These uses for old ships were not confined
to vessels from the Royal Navy, since prizes and captures were also used in this way; for
example several of the Danish ships taken at Copenhagen in 1807 were not fitted for
service in the Royal Navy, but were converted to other roles. The Waldemar, a Third Rate
of 80 guns, was fitted as a prison ship in 1812 and the Skiold, a Third Rate of 74 guns,
was fitted as a receiving ship in l81P.
In the second category were those small craft which moved men and materials about
Portsmouth Harbour generally referred to by various names, such as hoys, barges and
cutters. Additionally there were boats for moving bulky materials like stone for building
or mud dredged out of the harbour entrance - these are generally called lighters, some of
which had single masts while others had no motive power of their own. An important
vessel with a very specific Dockyard application was the Sheer hulk which was used to
hoist masts in and out of ships. To do this, the sheer hulk was fitted with two large spars
forming an 'A' frame from which was suspended the requisite blocks and tackles. An
interesting example is the Prince William a Third Rate of 64 guns which had been
captured from the Spanish in 1780, and later fitted as a sheer hulk by the dockyard in
1791.
4.3. Ship Construction. This brief description of how a warship was built in the eighteenth
century is only intended to show the nature and scale of the tasks undertaken by the dockyard.
It is fair to say that all the tasks and techniques which were used to build a new warship were
also used when they needed to be refitted or repairecP.
4.3.1. Hull: The major part of any warship is the hull, which consisted in the simplest
terms of the keel, frames and planking. It was built on a slipway which had sufficient slope
to allow the ship to slide down to the water when the time came to launch her. The
construction was mainly of oak and the craftsmen involved at this stage were shipwrights.
The timber was cut and roughly shaped with saws on a saw pit, whilst further shaping was
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done with an adze and completed with a plane. Subsequently, the timbers were fastened together
either with wooden pegs called treenails which could be up to 24 inches in length or with metal
bolts, and hand drills were used to make the holes for bolts. As most of the timbers were very
thick, this involved a great deal of work, particularly in the case of a First Rate, where the
thickest part through the bottom of the ship over the keel was about 26 inches.
The whole shape of the ship derived from its main frames which were heavily
curved and each one was a composite of precisely cut and shaped timbers joined together
(Figure 4.1 30) to form pieces weighing several tons. Therefore, sheer legs, blocks and
tackles, plus considerable human skill and effort were required to move these large pieces
into place and rigidly fix them in the correct alignment to each other and the keel.
Planking, heated in a steam kiln3' for one hour for every inch thickness (and one hour for
luck), was then sufficiently pliable to be forced into place to create the curved shape of the
hull. The hull was completed by external and internal planking which can be seen in
Figures 4.2 and 4.3, in which openings for gunports and other points of access were left.
Internally, beams and deck timbers were fitted which were supported on specially shaped
timbers called knees, since decks had to be strong enough to support the weight of the guns
and needed to be cambered to facilitate the drainage of water.
With the hull nearly finished, it was caulked. The word caulking is derived from
the French word for hemp, which gave its name to the process and to the caulkers who
performed it and its purpose was to make the ship as watertight as possible and to give it
rigidity so that the planks did not move and make the vessel difficult to sail. Oaknm,
which is old rope that has been untwisted and pulled apart, was rolled and forced into the
seams between the planks and then covered in melted pitch to prevent it rotting.
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When the hull was completed, the ship was launched and then docked so that her
hull could be covered in copper sheets to protect it against rot and the depredations of
boring molluscs. If the hull was launched with the copper already in place, there was a risk
of it being damaged, a problem which does not arise when floating a ship out of dry dock.
The hull was then towed to the sheer hulk for her masts to be fitted and then to a mooring
to complete her fitting out. Figure 4.3 is a sectional view through the hull of the First
Rate, Victory and it vividly illustrates both the scale and the complexity of the hull of a
major warship.
4.3.2. Masts & Yards: All warships of the eighteenth century had three masts and a
bowsprit made from fir33 , which was a flexible wood which would 'give' with the wind.
In order to make them to the required height, masts were made in three Sections (see
Figure 4.4) called the lower mast, topmast and topgallant mast. The lower mast was a
"made" mast consisting of several pieces of fir fitted together to the required length and
size, and slightly tapered from bottom to top. To ensure the pieces stayed tightly together
they were bound at three foot intervals with rope, or mast hoops were fitted, where a ring
of iron slightly smaller than the diameter of the mast was heated and driven onto the mast
as tightly as possible. The diameter of the lower mast of a ship-of-the-line was about three
foot, and it passed right through the ship and rested on a mast step on the keel. The centre
Section of the mast, was also a "made" mast, ie it needed several lengths of timber to get
it to the correct length and diameter. The top mast however was made from a single tree
trunk, called a "stick".
The yards, shown in Figure 4.5, crossed the masts and bowsprit, in the horizontal,
at right angles and were also made from fir with the lowest and longest on each mast being
wider than the breadth of the hull. Like the masts, they were composed of several lengths
of wood joined together and shaped so they tapered slightly at each end.
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4.3.3. Rigging & Sails: The fitting out involved the setting up of the rigging which was
done by gangs of contract riggers. The rigging was made from hemp rope, much of which
was prepared in workshops in the dockyard before being taken out to the ship. In fact there
were two types of rigging, standing and running; the function of the former was to support
the masts and bowsprit in position (see Figure 4.4), and it could not be moved. The latter
controlled the yards and hoisted and lowered the sails (see Figure 4.5), which involved the
use of many blocks which could redirect lines as well as getting extra purchase on them,
so that the sails could be moved as easily as possible.
A ship-of-the-line with three masts and their respective yards carried a set of thirty
two sails. Sails were either square (quadrilateral) or fore and aft (triangular) (Figure 4.5),
square sails were spread on the yards, and fore and aft sails were attached to the standing
rigging and were carried between the masts and as jibs. Although the Navy purchased its
canvas ready woven from flax or hemp, sails were cut and made by hand in the dockyard's
sail loft. Different weights of canvas were used for different sails and weather conditions;
the heaviest was No.1 canvas which was used for storm sails, and the lightest No.10 was
used for clothing, screens and other items which would make living conditions more
comfortable.
The whole design of masts, yards and rigging was a complicated but largely
empirical process of distributing forces, depending heavily on the expertise and co-
operation between the Master Sailmaker and Master Rigger. The masts and yards
supported the vertical forces arising from their own weight and the dynamic component
of the sail forces. Whilst the sails and rigging took the full horizontal forces which
propelled the ship, in effect they were the ship's engine.
4.3.4. Internal Fittings: The cutaway model shown in Figure 4.1 gives an idea of how the
internal layout of a warship could have looked. Included were cabins for the officers, - the
crew lived on the gun decks - storerooms and working space for the ship's specialists such
as bosun, carpenters and sailmakers and surgeon, together with lockable storage for spirits
and other precious stores, while Ordnance stores like shot and powder had their own
special stowage spaces. Ballast of iron bars and shingle was put into the bottom of the hull
and on top of this went the casks of water and provisions. There was in addition, space
to stow the anchor cables.
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The ships fittings included her steering gear, four anchors, the pumps to remove water from
the bilges under the hold, the capstans (Figure 4.6 shows these two ship's "machines"), a stove
for cooking and the ship's boats. Finally the ship would have been painted and decorated.
4.4. Dockyard Tasks. The focus of Dockyard work in peace was, and is, significantly different
from that in war. In the former, its efforts were aimed at maintaining "the Fleet in being",
bearing in mind that in the late eighteenth century more than half the ships were in reserve.
However in war, the Dockyard's efforts were totally focused on sustaining the Fleet's ability
to carry out its day to day tasks.
At the start of the American War of Independence in 1774, the fleet was in sufficient
disarray to cause the Royal Navy and the Government considerable embarrassment. When the
war ended in 1783, senior naval officers like Sir Charles Middleton, who was then Controller
of the Navy, were determined to initiate a programme of maintenance and repair for the fleet
so that the ships were better prepared in the future. This concept was supported and funded on
the Government's side by William Pitt and it is to it's credit that the Napoleonic Wars found
the British Line of Battle fleet available in relatively short order.
Over the centuries, the clerks of the Admiralty and Navy Boards devised a number of
terms to differentiate between the various Dockyard activities and means of funding them. In
the period 1790 - 1815, two of the principal categorisations were Repairs and Refits the nature
of which is discussed in some detail on pages 71 and 74 respectively. Repairs involved a range
of activities from the small scale to major rebuilds or conversions. It was the major repairs plus
refit work of a preventive nature which was abandoned in war in favour of the operational
imperatives of getting ships out to sea as quickly as possible, without regard to considerations
of the ship's long-term future. To the terms Repairs and Refitting should be added a third
expression - Fitting. This term is used to describe both the work needed for the Dockyard to
complete a new construction and a repaired or re-built hull, to the level at which they could be
sent to sea. The next few sub-paragraphs explain the basic differences between New
Construction, Repairs and Refitting and Figure 4.7 shows the percentages of Dockyard work,
measured in terms of Dock Days, devoted each year to the three different tasks whilst Figure
4.7.1 shows the spread of the actual days. The annual variations in effort assigned to each of
these task areas are important because they reflect how the Dockyard Management adjusted
their work load to meet the priorities of keeping the operational Fleet at sea.
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In peacetime particularly it was more than likely that ships being built or undergoing major
repairs were not worked on for all their time on the slipway or indeed when in dock. Certainly
it can be suggested that both building and repair work was used by the Master Shipwright as
a source of ready effort to resource emergency or more urgent tasks. This all too often applied
in peacetime when financial resources were inadequate to match the total work in hand. In part
this was due to the fact that the Admiralty used its money in peacetime to pay off debts incurred
during past periods of war.
4.4.1. New Construction: As a matter of policy the Admiralty Board preferred to build
their ships in the Royal Dockyards as they felt that the standards of materials and
workmanship were superior to those of ships built on contract in merchant yards, and they
also found it easier to monitor the construction process in the Royal Yards. However in
the period 1793 to 1815 only 41 of the 78 Line of Battle Ships and 60 of the 627 Frigates
and below built for the Royal Navy were constructed in the Royal Dockyards. Figure 4.8
(and Tables 4.1) show that shipbuilding effectively stopped in Portsmouth when war started
and indeed only four ships, started before the war, were completed prior to 1806.
Thereafter, there was a modest output in every year up to 1814 except 1812. Certainly
Figure 4.8 shows that with 5 building slips available, there was ample capacity to build the
Caissons and Dredger discussed in Chapter 7.
Portsmouth also docked, coppered and fitted out the ships built in local
merchant yards of which there were some 14 within 20 miles of Portsmouth (Figure
4.9) and one of these, Bucklers Hard, built one Third Rate, three Fifth Rates, two
sloops and a stores ship between 1793 and 1801.
4.4.2. Repairs: The clerks of the Admiralty and Navy Board designated repairs as small,
middling or medium, middling-large and large or great, depending on the amount of work
to be undertaken and thus the length of time a ship would occupy a dock. Large repairs
were frequently in the nature of a re-build and were accordingly nearly as expensive as
building a new ship. Indeed it was suggested on several occasions that it was more
desirable to start a new ship than rebuild an old one as it was not always possible to be
completely accurate in estimating the extent of repairs needed until an old ship was
docked, opened and the inner timbers surveyed.
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A better reason for doing extensive repairs on old ships was often the shortage of the large
and specific shapes of timber needed for ship building. Obviously an old ship already had
all the necessary timbers even if some had to be repaired or replaced, while for a new ship
a great deal of properly seasoned timber of the right sizes and shapes had to be found.
As with new builds, Portsmouth did not do any extensive repairs to Royal Navy
ships from completing Triumph in October 1794 until Elephant was docked in August
1799, although Impetueuse, a captured French ship was repaired from July 1795 to
September 1796. During the Peace of Amiens the Repair load again rose but reduced
steadily thereafter until 1808. However from 1809 it increased sharply as the effects of the
long war could no longer be ignored and by 1814 it was back to pre-war levels (Figure
4.10) with ships docked for large-scale work as the war drew to a close.
4.4.3. Refitting : This process fonned the main task of Portsmouth dockyard during the war
and for which New Construction and Repair work was sacrificed. This was not surprising
since Portsmouth undertook by far greatest number of refits compared to the other Yards.
In the period 15 May - 26 December 1805, for ships bigger than gunboats, Deptford and
Chatham did no refits whilst Woolwich undertook 4, Sheerness 37, Plymouth 24 and
Portsmouth 48". Essentially Refits involved the regular maintenance of the ships, without
which they would have become non-operational. The work included docking to clean the
hull of weed and debris and any necessary work on the sheathing. This had been done
roughly every three years during the eighteenth century and was known as a "triennial
trimming". However the introduction of copper sheathing for hulls during the American
War of Independence (1774-1783) increased the interval needed between dockings as the
hull remained free of weed for somewhat longer - four years or so all other factors being
equal.
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4.5. The Purpose and Basis of The Dockyard Output Analysis. In terms of identifying the
opportunities for, and the value of, introducing new technology into Portsmouth Dockyard, it
was considered necessary to attempt a degree of quantification of the Dockyard's work load.
This quantification can best be described as an output analysis in terms of the identifiable work
output from the Dockyard which was firstly limited by the availability of data some two
hundred years on and secondly was firmly constrained to the aim of giving both substance and
authority to subsequent assessments of the value/effectiveness of the available new technology
which was/was not applied in Portsmouth Dockyard. In pursuit of this aim the analysis was
confined in scope to two areas of the "Yard's" activities which, collectively, could reasonably
be taken to be representative (from the standpoint of this thesis) of the yard's activities as a
whole. The same principle was also firmly applied to the resource, or input, analysis which is
discussed in the next chapter. Additionally the processing of the collected data was restricted
to that required to illuminate the pattern of change, or changes, across the period. Hence the
detailed analysis of particular year on year changes which departed from the general pattern was
only pursued if that departure was assessed as being germane to the examination of the effect
of new technology on the yard.
In these circumstances it would be surprising if all readers, from widely different
backgrounds and experiences, were to agree in toto on what should/should not have been
explored in either greater or lesser detail. The author merely claims to have tried to include
what is relevant and avoid irrelevant points however interesting. Undoubtedly a number of
seemingly fruitful areas for further detailed studies of the management and work of Portsmouth
Dockyard around, and immediately after, the Napoleonic wars are clearly identifiable from the
work presented in this thesis.
Later Chapters draw significantly on the analysis in this and the following chapter and it
is true to say that without these analyses it would have been impossible to pursue reasoned
discussion, and certainly to offer "value judgements" on many of the technological advances
which were available to Portsmouth Dockyard in the period but which apparently were not
exploited. More importantly it would not have been possible to demonstrate a positive value for
many of those advances which were exploited. That said it must never be forgotten that the
output of these analyses is based on selected and representative data - not complete data - thus
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the reader is presented with evidence in support of an assessment rather than evidence which
proves an assessment.
The veracity of this analysis depends from the outset on a comprehensive listing of the
ships which were docked in Portsmouth, what was done to them and when. The details of 532
gunboats, cutters and other small craft were not included as their records were too sketchy to
be certain if they were docked or not. The source of the material used is the Admiralty
Progress Books, which were a compilation of returns by the Royal Dockyards to the Admiralty
Board of work in progress. The data covers the dates of arriving in harbour, docking,
undocking and sailing, type of work done during docking and the nature of repair, plus costs.
Most of the information for the years 1790 to 1802 is contained in the Progress Books
ADM/180/4 to 9 and those for 1803 to 1815 in ADM/180/10 to 13.
Inevitably not all the individual records are complete and there are a number of apparent
inconsistencies. However the basic details of ships entering the Dockyard, the dry docks and
when they sailed to rejoin the fleet are well over 75% complete and this is more than adequate
to support this study especially as the "gaps" in the data relating to dry docking could safely
be completed by using class averages for the year(s) concerned. Unfortunately the data for costs
across the period was less than 50% complete and was presented in such a way that it was not
possible to separate readily the dockyard materials, manpower and stores elements. Fortunately
shortcomings in this area, whilst regrettable, are not a serious constraint as detailed analysis of
the economics of the Dockyard's work are not germane to this thesis.
The data relating to "dockings" is particularly significant in that it is generally true to say
that the dry docks were the "choke point" in the operation of the Dockyard and consequently
ships did not often lie unavoidably idle in dry dock. The word "unavoidable" is deliberate in
as much as there was inevitably a significant amount of "waiting time" when a ship entered or
left the dry docks as those facilities were emptied or flooded and whilst ships waited for the tide
to reach a level at which they could move in/out. The reduction of this was very much part of
the driving force behind the development of the Portsmouth Dry Docks in the late 1790s and
these re-structured facilities were supplemented with technological advances to the extent that
this "waiting time" was subsequently appreciably reduced.
All the evidence suggests that it was only a few big ships (mostly in peace time) which
were kept in dry dock for longer than necessary and where this did happen it is not difficult to
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identify. For the remainder of the time the docking data provides a remarkably illuminating
measure of dockyard work and has a surprising correlation with the size of the fleet, the
number of sailings from the dockyard and, as will be seen later, the size of the dockyard work
force. On the other hand data relating to the periods spent in the dockyard before and after
docking is much less reliable. There was often considerable "slack time" between ships entering
the dockyard and moving into the dry docks and, from the figures, it is hard to avoid the belief
that quite often ships spent considerable time lying idle. Once out of dry dock ships again
appeared to face periods of idleness especially if they were being kept in reserve or used as
"hulks" for accommodation, prison or hospital purposes. For these reasons data relating to these
two periods has not been examined in any detail.
As long as there has been a Royal Navy - certainly since the time of Henry VIII, and up
to the 1990s - the standard of workmanship of the Royal Dockyards has always been the subject
of adverse criticism. Even as late as 1993 when the Dockyards were transferred to commercial
management the Officers and ratings of the fleet lost no opportunity to point out the Royal
Yard's inadequate workmanship. The period of the Napoleonic wars was no exception.
Undoubtedly there were management inadequacies and restrictive working practices and it is
no doubt also true that there were serious shortcomings in the standards of some of the material
the Dockyards bought in from contractors. Some of these shortcomings could be attributed to
genuine shortages and inadequate sources of alternative supplies; some involved outright "war
profiting". However, as the recent commercialisation of the dockyards has shown, a major
factor has always been the lack of defmition of the work to be done before a ship was "taken
in hand". Here Ships' Officers have invariably been guilty in that they have traditionally
attempted to include in refits their private "top priorities" regardless of anything the Dockyard
might have said about the lack of available resources. The major problem has therefore always
been that it is not until a ship is docked down and she is opened up to inspection that the true
amount of unavoidable work could be determined. As a result - given the dictates of refit time
and resource budgets - history has shown that there has always been a gap between expectations
from and achievements out of, a refit. On occasions, as the Dockyard sought to "balance the
Books", a degree of lower standards of workmanship than the Fleet expected was inevitable.
It has therefore been important to construct any assessment or analysis of the dockyard
work load around "quantity" and avoid the whole question of "quality". Quantity is measurable
to a reasonable degree whilst quality is most certainly not. Even less can shortcomings in
quality be confidently attributed to particular causes. All these factors were borne in mind when
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developing the database which was used for this analysis. For the period 1790 to 1815 some
one thousand eight hundred and ten individual records each containing the following original
data were collected:
1 - Name	 2. - Rate	 3.- Guns	 4.- Arrived
Dockyard
5. - Docked	 6. - Undocked	 7.- Sailed	 8. - Tonnage
9. - Built at	 10.- Date	 11. Classification	 12.- Work
Completed	 of Dockyard Wk. 	 done in dock
13 - Cost of hull	 14.- Cost of	 15. Remarks
mast & yards.	 rigging & stores
Over and above these 15 "original" fields there are 16 "calculated" fields which are derived
from the original data and generate the figures used in the numerical analysis. Some of these
are presented in Figures 4.11 to 4.17.1 and their associated tables (Tables 4.2 - 4.9) from
which the graphs are generated.
4.6. Detail of The "Output" Analysis. This paragraph explains the key figure types which were
used in the analysis. These were:
4.6.1. Dockings: The number of ships per year which were in or passed through the dry
dock complex - by rate and in total for each year. Ships entering the dockyard were
actually dry docked on some 80% + of their periods in the Yard and the occasions when
they were not were invariably associated with minimal demands for dockyard effort. It is
reasonable therefore to use the number of Dockings per year as an initial indicator of
increases and decreases in the overall dockyard's workload. It cannot be used as anything
other than as an initial indicator since it neither reflects any measure of the time involved
with a particular docking nor does it involve any indication of the scale of work involved
on any day of the docking.
4.6.2. Dock Days: The number of days (calculated by subtracting the undocking date from
the docking date) a ship spent in a year in the dry dock complex - by rate and in total for
each year. Using days in dock rather than dockings themselves overcomes the problem of
accounting for time in dock whilst still not addressing the problem of taking account of the
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scale of daily work on a particular ship. As has already been stated, it is known that time
in Dry Dock was at a premium during times of high Dockyard work loading and hence it
seemed reasonable to assume that "slack time" (as distinct from unavoidable waiting time)
in the dry docks was kept to a minimum - certainly in war time. During Refits, and indeed
during Repairs, a significant amount of the work which had to be done on the ship was
done whilst it was in dry dock. The more work that had to be done; the longer the ship
was in dry dock. Time in dry dock has therefore been taken as the first part of the
"Representative" figure of the work on a ship's hull.
Additionally, it should be noted that the average length of time it took to
copper a new ship, which did not involve taking off the old copper, was slightly less
than 5 days and as such the resultant Dockyard work load was relatively insignificant.
Thus, the dock days involved with coppering new ships built outside Portsmouth has
not, in the analysis, been separately identified from those involved with coppering any
other ship which enters the yard from sea.
4.6.3. Ton Dock Days: A figure combining the days a ship spent in a year in dock with
its tonnage - by rate and in total for each year. The tonnage was an Admiralty calculated
figure which gave a measure of burden, that is the volume of the hull, not of displacement
which is a measure of weight. This formula could be applied to all ships, including those
which had been captured and was calculated by multiplying the length of keel for tonnage
x breadth x depth in hold and dividing by 94. For example, the Mars, a Third Rate had
a keel length for tonnage of 144 feet 3 ins, breadth of 49 feet and depth in hold of 20
feet. Her tonnage was:
144' 3" x 49' x 20'	 = 1842 & 24/94ths tons4°
94
Figures were rounded up or down for the purposes of calculation. Use of this
"derived" figure allowed all ships to be measured on a common scale. This in turn permits
the use of the figure in a representation of the daily work load in the Dockyard. This is
done by multiplying the tonnage by the time in Dock and the resultant figure gives the first
full "Representative" figure for dockyard work and is called "Ton Dock Days"
4.6.4. Sailings: The number of ships sailing per year from Portsmouth Dockyard - by rate
and in total per year. It can be argued that the number of ships sailing from the Dockyard
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is the one true output measurement in that it is the only one the Operational Commanders
were interested in. Their attitude was summed up by the following - Never mind the
dockyard's problems - get us the ships we need to fight the war.
There is invariably a difference between Sailing and Docking figures and this is as
it should be because whilst all ships including harbour service vessels such as prison ships,
hospital ships, accommodation vessels, dockyard hulks, and of course ships in
Ordinary/Reserve routinely went through the dry docks, only those ships deploying to the
fleet are actually counted under the sailing numbers. The significance of this is whilst
Dockings provide a sound basis for assessing hull and timber work, Sailings provide a
much more appropriate basis for assessing work on sails and rigging since, particularly the
former, were little involved in the refit of harbour service and ships in Ordinary.
4.6.5. Ton Sailings: The problem of Sailings not taking account of the size of individual
ships (and hence their sail and rigging demands) has been overcome by again employing
the ship's tonnage and equating it with sailings to give "Ton Sailings". This gives the
second "Representative" measurement of Dockyard work output. Like Dock Days, and Ton
Dock Days it is rightly dominated by the bigger ships.
There is no equivalent figure to Ton Dock Days since it is quite impossible to get
a feel, let alone quantify, the time devoted to work on sails and rigging particularly as so
much of the manufacture of rope and all the manufacture of canvas was done on contract
or in other Royal Dockyards.
4.6.6. Average Time In Dock: There has always been considerable support for the
hypothesis that the Controller of the Navy (and hence Dockyard Management), faced with
severe resource limitations, met his top operational priorities by progressively reducing the
work done on ships to a level matched to only essential work necessary to get ships back
to sea without regard to longer term needs to sustain the expected life of the hulls
concerned. By the start of the 1800s this management practice steadily became impractical
and a return to a degree of "duality" (both short and long term work) was unavoidable.
Calculation of "Average Time in Dock" was looked at as a means illustrating the degree
of these changes.
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The remainder of this chapter concentrates on what can be learnt from this analysis. In
general the "trends" across successive years are of more significance than the absolute figures
in any one year particularly because there is no way of preventing the presence of just one First
or Second Rate in dock for an extended period dominating the total dock days figures for that
year. Many might well suggest that this domination of the dockyard's work by a very small
number of the Navy's major capital ships is unrealistic. In fact the reverse is true and the
situation continues to this day whereby the presence of an Aircraft Carrier in a Dockyard for
major refit dominates the utilisation of Dockyard effort for that year.
4.7. Outcome of Output Analysis. The principle output of the analysis are the figures (graphs)
and tables. These will become more significant when they are used in conjunction with the
figures and tables in chapter 5 (input analysis - Dockyard personnel). Figures 4.11 to 4.17.1
and their associated Tables show the outcome of the Analysis of Portsmouth Dockyard's output.
It is helpful to look at the chapter 4 Figures and Tables against Figures 3.6 - 3.6.4, supported
by Tables 3.1 and 3.1.1, in Chapter 3. Those figures and tables show the composition of the
Fleet as a whole and the percentages and numbers of each major ship group that were in Fleet
(operational) service, were used for Harbour Duties or were in Ordinary (Reserve).
4.7.1. Dockings (Number of): These figures are best read in conjunction with those for
Dock Days. However, on their own Figure 4.11 and Table 4.2 show the pattern and
numbers of dockings per class of ship per year across the period. 1792 - 94 was a period
of getting ships out from "Ordinary" to the Fleet but the relative "flatness" of pattern from
1794 - 1800 gives some support to the statement that the Dry Docks were very much a
"choke" point in the Dockyard process and the Yard was "resource limited" in the
availability of dry docks until improvements were made in that area. Reference back to
Figures 4.7 and 4.7.1 show that in this period the use of the dry docks was over 80%
devoted to Refit work. The growth in the number of dockings after 1804 owes most to the
minor vessels and that accords with the increase of those ships in the fleet as a whole.
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4.7.2. Dock Days: Figure 4.12 and Table 4.3 show the pattern of dock days per class of
ship per year across the period. The relatively low number of Dock Days in the period
1794 - 1800 has to be read in conjunction with the growth in the actual number of
dockings and this gives weight to the assertion that the Dockyard was only doing the bare
minimum of work necessary to get ships out to sea. Indeed the peak in dockings prior to
1803 occurred in 1794 which was when the number of dock days was less than in any
other year except 1796. Interestingly, reference to Figure 3.6.2 shows that Line of battle
ships reached their highest operational availability level (63% +) between 1795 and 1798
whilst it is significant that the number of dock days did not actually peak until 1814 -
some four years after the Fleet numbers peaked in 1809 (Figure 3.6).
4.7.3. Ton Dock Days: Figure 4.13 and Table 4.4 show the pattern of ton dock days per
class of ship per year across the period. The dominance by the First, Second and Third
Rates of the Dockyard work load is clearly revealed. The growth in the load involved with
frigates is greater than that which could be expected from the increase in their actual
numbers thus adding weight to the view that as the ships grew older and were worked
consistently hard their maintenance needs rose.
It could be expected that a more typical figure for the period 1790-1793 would have
been 1.6 million rather than 2.05 million Ton Dock Days shown in Table 4.4 but this
period is dominated by two ships with unusually prolonged times in dock. The "Queen" -
a second rate actually entered dock on 7 August 1789 for a large repair and did not undock
until 1st October 1792, and the Barfieur entered dock for a Middling/Large Repair on 28
September 1792 and did not leave it until 18 November 1793. Whilst Barfleur's docking
time is long (for that scale of repair) the Queen's is unique - being nearly twice the length
of any other ship's in the period.
At the other end of the scale Victory (First Rate) entered dock on 26th March 1814
for a Middling/Large Repair and did not undock until 15 January 1816. Given that she
was built in 1765 and had been in near continuous commission as a Fleet Flag Ship until
the end of 1812 it is not surprising that she needed extensive work.
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Nevertheless, looking at the growth trend across the period as a whole it is reasonable to
conclude that the Ton Dock Day peak, in 1814/1815, would be better represented as 3.3M
rather than the 4.O1M figure shown in Figure 4.13 and Table 4.4.
The use of these figures actually decreases very slightly the range between the
lowest and highest figures but otherwise does not change the pattern of figures between
1791 and 1813 at all. What it does do however is make it easier to see, in percentage
terms, the true changes across the period and gives an overall increase of around 107%
from a baseline of zero in 1790. This is shown later in Figure 4.17.1, immediately after
Figure 4.17.
4.7.4. Sailings: The figures for sailings, shown in Figure 4.14 and Table 4.5, are
undoubtedly distorted in 1793 - 1795 as a consequence of ships in Ordinary (Reserve)
being taken out of Reserve and sent to sea just as soon as crews could be found to man
them. As with Dockings the absolute number of sailings is of limited value as a measure
of Dockyard output as it takes no account of the variation in size, and hence work on the
differing ship classes.
4.7.5. Correlation of Dockings with Sailings: Examination of the relevant Figures and
Tables for dockings and sailings demonstrates a strong correlation. On the basis that 80%
of ships entering the Dockyard were docked at some time during their stay in the Yard one
could initially have expected a ratio of around 100 sailings to 80 + dockings. However,
when it is remembered that sailings, unlike dockings do not include ships in Harbour
Service or Ordinary/Reserve (albeit these ships were docked at a lesser frequency than
operational ships) a ratio much closer to parity could be looked for given that through
much of the war only 70% of the Fleet was operational (Figure 3.6.2).
Table 4.6 takes four three year periods across the war and shows that within three
of them the ratio of sailings to dockings was actually around 100 to 103 but by the end of
the war the ratio changed to 100 to 92. However this figure disguises a significant increase
in the number of dockings compared with sailings for Line (Third Rates and above). In
1795 - 97 the ratio for these ships was 100 dockings to 88 sailings and by 1812 - 1814
it had changed to 100 to 67. Most interestingly, Figure 3.6.2 (Percentages of Ships
Operational at Sea) shows a figure of around 70% for Line of Battle Ships being
operational in the early period and with a figure of just less than 50% in the later period.
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This demonstrates two things - firstly the Portsmouth figures accord with those for the Fleet
overall and secondly Portsmouth, with its 100 to 67 ratio would appear to be less involved with
ships in Ordinary/Reserve than most other Yards - this is what one would expect to find in the
Navy's primary refitting Dockyard.
4.7.6. Ton Sailings: The pattern of sailings shown in Figure 4.15 and Table 4.7 is
distorted in 1793 and 1795 in particular by Third and Fifth Rates being taken out of
Ordinary or Reserve and sent to sea with little more work being done on them, other than
to put their copper on and store them, and this is supported by Figure 4.11 where the
number of dockings of these classes of ship were particularly high in these years. In the
second half of the war the increase in Ton Sailings owes most to the minor vessels.
There is an overall increase of 117% in Ton Sailings again from a baseline of zero
in 1790, with the peak being achieved in 1810 - in line with the peak in the Fleet size and
some 3 - 4 years ahead of the peak in Ton Dock Days. In looking at the Figure and
Tables, from the standpoint of dockyard work load, it is only sensible to disregard the
distortions in 1793 and 1795 due to ships coming out of Reserve. Overall Ton Sailings
increased from 33,803 in 1790 to 73,633 in 1810 before steadying at around 63,000 for
1812 - 1814. The 10% difference between the Dockyard Output as measured by Ton Dock
Days and Ton Sailings is more than accounted for by the fact that Ton Sailings, unlike Ton
Dock Days, does not include any measure of time and as ships grew older their hulls
needed more work.
4.7.7. Average Time in Dock: Figure 4.16 shows the average time of all Ships in Dry
Dock year on year during the war and the value of the figure is in considerations of the
use of the dry dock complex. The extraordinary peak in 1792 is due to just two ships - the
Queen and Barfleur. These were discussed under Ton Dock Days and they can be
discarded as major distortions. The peaks in 1802 - 1804 again arise from Second Rates
"taking root" in dry dock during peace (the Peace of Amiens) whilst waiting to be worked
on whilst the 1806 figures can only be described as a "freak" or non- representative. With
these distortions accounted for there is a quite remarkable consistency across all the other
years with the low figures in 1794 - 1800 being due in the first two years to mobilisation
and thereafter to resource shortages - principally dry dock availability whilst the dry dock
complex was being re-built. Table 4.8 shows the average dry dock times by type of ship
and the large effect the few First and Second Rate ships had on the overall time in dock
average.
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4.8. Overview and Implications for the Use of Technology in the Dockyard. Figure 4.17
attempts to bring together in the one graph the yearly percentage changes, with respect to a
baseline of 1790, between 1790 and 1814 in Dockings, Dock Days, Ton Dock Days, Sailings,
Ton Sailings and Fleet Numbers.
The key line is that representing the growth in the fleet and if the distortions arising from
the mobilisation and Peace of Amiens years are treated with some reserve it is interesting to see
that the mean patterns of all the other lines generally follow that of the Fleet although they
constantly lagged behind them. The Fleet figures peaked in 1810/1811 but those for Dockings,
Dock Days and Ton Dock Days did not peak until 1814 - some four years later. Figure 4.17.1
is Figure 4.17 with the adjustments discussed earlier having been made in 1790 and 1813-15 -
both Figures are supported by Table 4.9. Since Ton Dock Days is by far and a way the more
Representative figure of the two, as far as Dockyard Work Load is concerned, a figure of 107%
is used hereafter in this thesis.
The evidence from Figures 4.12 (Dock Days), 4.13 (Ton Dock Days), 4.16 (Average Time
in Dock) is strong that Portsmouth Dockyard's output in the first half of the war was limited
by the availability of Dry Docks and this was particularly true in the period 1795/6 - 1800 when
the dry dock complex was being modernised and some docks actually had to be taken out of
service for part of the period to allow this work to be completed. This view is reinforced by
Figure 4.17, which shows a positive percentage increase in dockings for this period whilst Ton
Dock Days shows a negative percentage change. Undoubtedly the need to restrict the work done
on ships whilst they were in there in order to get ships through was a driving factor not only
behind the decision to change the dry dock complex from 4 single and one double dock to 8
single docks but it also brought with it a greatly increased need for developments in
filling/emptying the docks and keeping the depth of the approaches to docks adequate for the
passage of ships in and out.
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Inspection of the one thousand, eight hundred and ten individual ship records show that on
the great majority of times that a ship entered dry dock her copper was taken off and replaced -
of the fifty one Third & Fourth Rates who were docked between 1 January 1807 and 1 January
1810, forty nine had their copper taken off and replaced41 . The resultant increase in the demand
for copper sheeting, both new and re-processed can safely be assessed as around 100%. This
meant that the Navy Board had to have a thoroughly reliable supply system for their copper
sheathing or risk ships remaining in dry dock unnecessarily until further supplies arrived. It is
less easy to identify the degree to which ships rigging was replaced before they sailed from the
Yard but given that much of the rope and many of the blocks used were "lifed" it is reasonable
to conclude that the increase in requirement in this area was not much less than 90% - again
with implications for resources and manufacturing processes.
It is impossible unfortunately to enumerate the demands the refitting of ships made for new
timber simply because so much timberwork was repaired rather than replaced. Few ships would
not have been re-caulked to some degree or other. What can be seen from the individual records
is that up to 1810 no ships were taken to pieces at the end of their service lives. They were
either hulked, sold or otherwise disposed of. However from 1810 onwards the records show
ships being taken to pieces so that the good timbers - particularly compass timbers could be re-
used. From 1810 to 1817 the numbers of ships taken to pieces in successive years were
2,2,2,2,2,1,2 and 5. The deductions are that by this time the Dockyard had enough people
available to do this work and secondly the shortages of prime timber were sufficiently acute to
justify it.
What does emerge from the records is that the nature of so much of the timber work was
such that it would have had to be undertaken "in situ" on the ships concerned. Either in the dry
docks or at an alongside berth and much of that work was "skilled". In terms of introducing
steam power to assist in this work the Dockyard was thus in a very different situation to say
a cotton mill where the work could be taken to the power source.
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CHAFFER FIVE
PORTSMOUTH DOCKYARD -RESOURCES
5.1. General. This chapter entitled RESOURCES examines the types and numbers of people in
Portsmouth Dockyard together with the range of materials they worked with. It is therefore a
review of the "inputs" to the dockyard work processes and as such it complements both the
previous chapter which addressed the "output" of the Yard and the chapters which follow which
explore the technologies which became available and the ways in which the Yard organised itself
and used some of them in its work.
The key resources, or inputs were Money, Manpower, Materials and the Dockyard fixed
facilities, especially the dry docks. As was stated earlier the first of these, Money, is a subject
in its own right and is outside the scope of this thesis. In any case a study of it in this period
would be made particularly difficult by the inflation which Napoleon managed to engender in the
British economy with the Continental Decrees. It should however be noted that this Chapter when
quoting pay or prices uses pre-decimalisation conventions with 1/3d to indicate one shilling and
three pence.
In the period from 1807 the service manpower of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines
reached a figure of 130,000. This, added to a front line (Regular) Army strength of around
220,000 meant that 350,000 - or ten per cent - of the Nation's young, able bodied, male
population of around three and a half million' were under arms at any one time and since
recruiting for the Navy generally took place not that far distant from the major dockyard ports
it is fair to assume that in the Portsmouth area, the figure for those under arms would have
reached 20% or more. However, as Royal Dockyard personnel were considered to be an
important and essential element in the defence of the Realm, under Acts of 1718 and 1750 they
were forbidden to emigrate2 , and they were protected from the depredations of the Press Gang.
Taken in combination the manpower of the sea-going Navy and the dockyard and its
infrastructure undoubtedly made major demands on the local population.
5.2. Dockyard Labour Force. The Royal Dockyards were employers on a large scale by the
standards of the eighteenth century. Portsmouth's prewar establishment of labour was about 2400
but this rose to over 4600 by 1813. Successive paragraphs attempt to illuminate, and
subsequently enumerate, the various crafts and employment groupings in the Dockyard where
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there were five departments. Of these, three were very small, albeit powerful, and two were
large and contained the vast majority of the workforce. The three small ones were what would
today be called the Finance Department under the Clerk of the Cheque, the Audit Department,
under the Clerk of the Survey and the third was the Stores Department under the Storekeeper.
All three were staffed by clerks and since technology did not enter into their work they are not
discussed further in this thesis. The two large Departments were what could be called the
technical and manufacturing ones and came under the Master Shipwright and the Master
Attendant respectively and this Chapter is concerned with how they were manned and the nature
of the work they undertook.
Table 5.1 shows the Departmental Heads and Officers, all of whom were paid on an annual
basis. Also shown are the principal grades and crafts working under the Master Shipwright and
Master Attendant and paid on a daily basis. The pay rates shown were for the Midsummer
quarter of 1790g . By uprating the £200 per year paid to the Principal Officers to approximate
1999 rates, and then applying the same conversion factor to all rates of pay, the differentials
between the various grades and crafts are illustrated in modern currency. As can be seen there
was a sharply divided hierarchy starting with the Dockyard Commissioner, stretching down
through the Principal and other Dockyard Officers to the lesser Masters of Crafts and thence to
the workforce as a whole.
As in any modern working environment, there were different levels of skills needed within
the workforce. The skilled men served an apprenticeship of 7 years and worked as shipwrights,
caulkers, joiners, house carpenters, smiths, ropemakers and sailmakers. Next there were those
men who had not been apprenticed but needed precision of hand and eye and training for their
jobs. They would have considerable knowledge and skill within their own jobs; an example of
this type of worker was the sawyers. Finally, there were manual workers, with little or no skill,
but valued for their muscle power and ability to turn their hands to all the multifarious jobs
involved in getting ships in and out of dock and materials moved around the yard.
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TABLE 5.1 - WORK FORCE - 1790 - (WiTH PAY RATES)
	
YEARLY DAILY	 =	 ToDAY'S
Job	 No	 !&	 P/YR !OUIVALEP4T
DOCKYARD COMMISSIONER	 1 £500.O.0	 £110,000
ADMIN & CLERICAL
torekeeper	 1	 £200.0.0	 £44,000
lerk of the Cheque	 1	 £200.0.0	 £44,000
lerk of the Survey	 1 £2000.0	 £44,000
METAL TRADES
4aster Smith	 1	 3$ Gd £63.87	 £14,061
lumbers	 3	 2$ Gd £45.63	 £10,039
Irazier	 I	 2$ Gd £45.63	 £10,039
ounder	 1	 2$ Gd £45.63	 £10,039
mitlis	 75	 1$ 8d £30.30	 £6,668
SAIL MAKERS
4aster Sailmaker	 I	 3$ Od £54.75	 £12,045
allmakers	 47	 1$ lOd £33.58	 £7,388
Uggers	 148	 1$ Gd £27.38	 £6,024
Uggers Labourers 	 81	 1$ Id £19.71	 £4,338
WOOl) TRADES
laster Shlpwrlght	 1	 £200.00	 £44,000
4asler Caulker	 1 £ 100.0.0	 £22,000
mislant toM ShIpwi	 2 £100.0.0	 £22,000
4asterMas*maker	 1	 3* Gd £54.75	 £12,045
4aster Boatbullder 	 1	 3. Gd £54.75	 £12,045
4asterJolner	 I	 23 Gd £45.63	 £10,039
4asler House Carpenter 	 I	 2. Gd £45.63	 £10,039
hlpwright	 796	 2$ id £37.96	 £9,351
aulkers	 133	 2$ Id £37.96	 £8351
tiockmakem	 4	 2$ Id £37.96	 £8,351
lolners	 57	 2* Gd £36.50	 £8,030
louse Carpenters	 80	 1s lOd £33.58	 £7,388
Vheelwrlghts	 2	 1$ lOd £33.58	 £7,388
awyers-.Topmen	 68	 1. Gd £30.30	 £6,668
awyers.Pltmen	 68	 1$ 4d £24.46	 £5,381
'ftch Heaters	 2	 1$ 3d £23.00	 £5,060
?uarier Boys	 13	 Gd £13.87	 £3,061
)akum Boys	 35	 Gd	 £9.13	 £2,009
MISCELLANEOUS
4sster Attendant	 1	 £200.0.0	 £44,000
ieeiswaln	 I	 £ 90.0.0	 £17,600
.ocksmlths	 2	 2* Gd £45.63	 £10,039
4asons	 6	 2* Gd £45.63	 £10,039
irlcklayers	 22	 is ad £30.30	 £6,666
cavelmen	 76	 is Gd £27.38	 £6,024
;rebous. ibour	 29	 is Gd £27.38	 £8,024
.abourers	 290	 15 Id £19.71	 £4,336
hIcklayers Labourers	 21	 ii Id £1971	 £4,338
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Most of the workforce of the Yard lived locally and Sons followed fathers into the Yard.
Recruits had to be under the specified age limit set by the Admiralty, which settled at about 35
years4
 for most of the war. In addition, they had to be passed fit and healthy by the Yard
surgeon. As there were few chances to recruit shipwrights or caulkers locally, boys were
apprenticed to these crafts in the Yard. Until 1802, shipwrights were apprenticed at two levels -
firstly there were those boys who were apprenticed to any suitable and deserving shipwright in
the Yard and secondly boys with a reasonable standard of education whose parents could afford
the necessary premiums to indenture them to the Master Shipwright. This gave them a greater
level of opportunity for further advancement as the Master Shipwrights led the largest department
within the Dockyard, purchased timber for the Navy and worked as draughtsmen, thus designing
as well as constructing ships. Those men who subsequently became Master Shipwrights had
invariably been apprenticed to Master Shipwrights themselves and had the chance to acquire the
necessary wider skills. After 1802 the system changed and all boys were apprenticed to the
Master Shipwright, or the Master of a Craft whilst suitable craftsmen acted as their instructors.
This was because the Admiralty increased the scope of apprenticeships within the yard, to cover
other crafts which had previously been able to recruit skilled men locally but could now no
longer obtain the requisite numbers. As will be seen, this change of policy resulted in a major
increase in apprentice numbers in the second half of the period.
In merchant yards, employment was generally for the contract in hand, and the pay was
better, sometimes two to three times as much as that in the Royal yards where the labour force
was paid quarterly in arrears and the men were probably permanently in debt. However, their
employment was comparatively secure and many men would have been on the Dockyard strength
for all their working lives. Furthermore, for men with ambition and ability there was the chance
of promotion and for all the labour force there was a possibility of a small pension at the end
of their working life. Most men had some kind of 'perk' particular to their craft, for example,
men in the wood-based crafts were allowed to take bundles of 'chips' out of the yard. 'Chips'
were pieces of wood less than 3 feet long and this practice was open to abuse. It was eventually
abolished and the men received a small cash sum instead as part of their pay.
At the start of the second phase of the French Wars in 1803, recruiting to the Yard was
particularly difficult as the merchant yards were offering much better pay. In addition, changes
to the indenturing of apprentices meant a loss of money to many men, and the labour force had
lost the right to 'chips'. Later in the war, the situation improved with changes in the
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administration of the Yard, one of which was to pay the labour force weekly instead of quarterly
and there were much needed increases in wages, as pay scales in force at the start of the war in
1793, dated from the early eighteenth century5.
Skilled men, particularly shipwrights and caulkers, were moved between the Yards if men
were urgently needed and if it was impossible to recruit sufficient locally or if there was a short
term need for more labour. For example, in 1797, 59 shipwrights from Chatham, 40 from
Woolwich, 20 from Chatham and 76 from Plymouth were working in Portsmouth6 . Similarly in
1799, 20 caulkers from Deptford and 10 from Woolwich were working in Portsmouth7.
Surprisingly, the maritime based businesses 8 in the area such as shipbuilding and ropemaking
were on a small scale, even though Portsmouth was a port of call for East Indiamen 9, and
merchant convoys since it was the last practical place to put men, goods or letters from London
aboard an outward bound ship.
Promotion to more responsible posts occurred within the craft structure. Master craftsmen
of most crafts rose within their local Yard and they stayed at the head of their craft until they
retired. However promotion to the senior position in a Yard, that of Master Shipwright, was the
preserve of shipwrights and caulkers alone. On promotion to a Master Shipwright's Assistant,
one of whom was also the Master Caulker, men moved between the Yards on the Thames,
Portsmouth and Plymouth until their seniority and suitability made them eligible for promotion
to Master Shipwright. Thereafter they moved up through the lesser to the more important Yards
and for one there would be the ultimate promotion to the Navy Board and Surveyor of the Navy.
The fact that many men within a particular Yard had served apprenticeships to their
particular crafts there gave rise to craft solidarity and this allowed them to delay or block
changes to working practices if they so wished. It also meant that they were in a position to help
and protect the weaker or older members of their craft and on occasions to demand the release
of members who had been pressed into the Navy.
5.3. Contract Labour Force. A large number of the small specialist tasks like making treenails
were undertaken by workers on running contracts which were renewed as necessary by warrants
signed by the Dockyard Commissioner. Many of these contractors worked within the Dockyard
and they were paid for goods produced rather than by the day and they also received some of
the Yard 'perks' or payments in lieu like 'chip' money. For example, John Chainey who was
a Treenail Mooter'°, had his warrant of 15 August 1781 renewed on 23 August 1803"; he finally
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retired in August 1814 after 41 years service when a machine for making treenails was ready to
start work'2 . He was paid by the hundred foot for treenails but later he also received payment
in lieu of 'chips'. The paybooks' 3 record the details of payment made to the holder of the
contract, but it is quite possible that these were not all one-man operations. As some may have
been small businesses in their own right with several people involved. Among the contracted
workers are the only two examples found of women working in the Yard. One held the contract
for washing the towels used by the smiths and the other was named on the contract for making
and repairing oars' 4 . The biggest contracts were for the horse teams each of which consisted of
four horses and one man; even at the start of the war in 1793, there were 18 on the Yard
strength and by 1813 there were 39 but it must be remembered that they were used for transport
and as a source of mechanical "power".
5.4. Crafts and Trades within The Dock yard. The different craft areas within the Yard can be
loosely divided into those using metals, fibre, wood, and miscellaneous materials under which
heading are included those involved in general labouring and the erection of buildings.
5.4.1. Metal: The largest group among the metal workers were the smiths who worked
wrought iron in a forge. They were sub-divided into those who were employed in making
all the small iron items used in the Yard like nails and the anchor smiths who had a more
specialized task for which they were paid a small additional amount per day. Also all smiths
were entitled to an allowance of beer per day' 5 . In addition to the smiths there were a
number of more specialist craftsmen such as plumbers, a brazier and a founder who could
cast metals. Much of the equipment used by the smiths can still be found in a blacksmith's
shop today.
Interestingly, despite the metal workers as a group being smaller in numbers than
those in the major wood crafts, most of the metal workers were paid more per day and their
numbers increased sharply as the war progressed. Metal working was a particular area
where new skills were added to the Yard strength as the Metal Mills and Millwrights shop
were introduced - this will be dealt with in more detail later in this thesis.
5.4.2. Fibre: Fibre was at the heart of the manufacture and fitting of rope, rigging and sails
and in the Ropeyard were the craftsmen who prepared the raw material, spun the rope and
finished it. Ropemaking'6 was an ancient craft where the process started with the
preparation of the raw material, hemp, by the hatchellers using steel toothed combs. It was
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then spun by twisting the vegetable fibres together to form yarn. This was done by fastening
the fibre to the hooks on a tackle board, which was then turned at a constant speed to give
it an even tension as the spinners walked backward down the yard pulling the emerging yarn
as they went. The resultant single stranded product was either used as twine (common string
as we know it today) or it was again twisted together, or spun, to form line which was the
smallest multi-stranded, or rope, product. By progressively increasing the amount of yarn
in each of the strands, bigger and bigger circumference ropes were made. At the top end
of the rope products were hawsers which were in fact produced by further re-iteration of
the process when a number of ropes (usually three) were twisted together and the biggest
of these hawsers were used as anchor cables which, in the case of a First Rate, had a
circumference of 24 inches'7 . Not surprisingly the process of spinning and twisting together
a number of discrete strands; be they yarns at the smaller end of the scale or ropes at the
cable end of the spectrum, could make considerable demands on the physical strength of the
spinners and it is noticeable from the paybooks that most of the spinners were in their
twenties or early thirties.
Rope which had been used but had life remaining was re-worked and used for
netting, strops and scaffolding ropes and was called twice-laid rope. Some rope, particularly
that used for standing rigging, was tarred to protect it against the weather and this was done
by using a capstan to pull the strands through a kettle of heated tar. Horse teams were used
to work the tar house capstan for which they were paid additional money at the rate of
fifteen pence per haul of yarn. Some 500-600 hauls 18 could be tarred in three months.
It is important to appreciate that a major problem with ropemaking was that the
material was highly inflammable and in fact the Rope House at Portsmouth was burnt down
in 1760, 1770 and again in 177619 and it is fair to deduce that this fire hazard was a major
factor in considering where and when to introduce steam driven machinery into the
ropemaking business.
Closely related to the ropemakers were the Sailmakers and Riggers who often shared
a working space or loft as a large space was necessary for spreading out canvas for cutting
which was done with a knife not shears or scissors. Sailmakers worked at a bench which
supported the lengths of canvas being sewn and served as a resting place for their tools. The
most important tools were needles but a sailmaker's palm was essential to protect their
hand and allow sufficient pressure to push the needle through the canvas. The 'palm' is a
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piece of leather with a metal 'eye' which was worn on the hand. The end of the needle
rested in the 'eye' and the muscles of the arm and shoulder were used to push it through
the layers of canvas. Other tools to be found on the sailmaker's bench would have included
twine for sewing with holders and winders, prickers, awls and fids for making boles,
mallets and stretching hooks and a horn containing wax for the twine so it passed through
the canvas easily. Riggers also used benches to prepare small pieces of rigging, such as the
rope strops for suspending blocks, and they had a windlass and rows of stout posts for
stretching the ropes whilst their tools included cutting knives, splicing spikes and mallets.
5.4.3. Wood: Workers with wood made up the greatest number of men and crafts in the
Yard. The largest group and most important in the hierarchy were the shipwrights, who
built and repaired the ships, although the paybooks 2' show that shipwrights also worked in
the masthouse, tophouse, boathouse and at making capstans and pumps. This suggests that
they all trained as shipwrights and then learnt any additional skills required for highly
specialised areas like mast-making rather than being directly apprenticed to learn mast-
making.The Shipwrights were supported by Caulkers who made the hulls watertight whilst
shipwrights who could no longer work in the gangs because of age or infirmity were
employed as 'cabin keepers' - cabins held small quantities of ready-to-use items which
were frequently required, and prevented time-wasting due to fetching items from a main
storehouse.
Superficially related, but in fact a quite separate trade from shipwrights, were the
Joiners who were responsible for much of the internal fitting of a ship and a third separate
trade were the House Carpenters who undertook the woodwork ashore in the construction
of stores, workshops, offices and the piles needed during the construction of docks - trade
deniarcations were very much a factor in the Dockyard's life! However all were hand-based
crafts and the tools they used (Figure 5.1) were very similar and included saws, axe, chisels
and gouges, augers and drills, a variety of hammers and mauls and the tool most often
identified with the shipwright - the adze, which all wood trades used to some degree
although there were different designs to suit the demands of particular trades. Additionally
there was a variety of implements to assist with moving the large pieces of timber and these
included sheers legs as well as small moveable capstans which was used for both lifting and
hauling. Since the bars of these machines went straight through the capstan head, there was
a limit to the amount of pressure which could be exerted on the bars before the head split.
There were also a simple jack and barrel screws for holding lengths of wood and wrain
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staves which were used to force the steamed planking into place on the hull so that it would
take up the required shape.
The "mechanical" trades at the start of the period were also wood workers and were
represented by the block makers, and the wheelwrights whose products could be claimed
to be the first common "engines" produced by man. Multi-sheaved blocks, when used in
combination, could achieve a sixfold mechanical advantage and some blocks were greater
than eighteen inches in length. At the start of the period, most of the blocks which passed
through, or were used, in the yard were bought from a contractor and further discussion
on this subject will be found later in the thesis. Wheelwrights were to be found in most
eighteenth and nineteenth century towns and large villages, all of which needed men to
make and repair wheels. In addition wheelwrights also worked as wainwrights - makers
of waggons, carts and wheelbarrows - and it is reasonable to suppose that the wheelwrights
in the Yard served a very similar function. Also included in the list of minor trades were
the oarmakers and the coopers who made and repaired the casks all ships carried in
considerable numbers.
Finally there were the essential sawyers who prepared and cut timber for use. They
always worked as a two man team - see Figure 5.1.1, and were paid by the hundred foot
run of timber with the money being divided between them; the more experienced topman
receiving a greater amount than the pitman. Their principal tools were their saws which
they sharpened themselves and they also used hooks called 'dogs' for moving and securing
timber. Although timber, particularly planking, was cut by water-powered mills on the
Continent, the British sawyer managed to retain his right to convert timber by hand until
well into the nineteenth century. Certainly this was true of Portsmouth Dockyard and as
Figure 5.1.1 shows the skill is still alive today.
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5.4.4. Miscellaneous and General Labourin g : The Navy Board used contractors for large
scale work to the fabric of the Dockyards, but every Yard carried on its strength men who
could carry out building work, alterations or repairs. In addition to the house carpenters
who have already been mentioned Portsmouth had stone masons and bricklayers together
with their labourers. Major alterations to the dock area began in 1801 and whilst there is
a noticeable increase in the number of stone masons employed, the numbers of bricklayers
remained more stable, probably because much of this work was being done by contractors.
The second largest group of workers within the Yard after the shipwrights were the
Labourers. Although they did not have a craft association like the shipwrights, there were
sufficient of them to achieve the equivalent benefits of craft solidarity. It is impossible to
enumerate their allocation to specific tasks which included helping to dock and undock
ships, manning a range of capstans, pumps, treadmills and cranes apart from loading,
unloading and moving all sorts of goods and equipment which passed through the Yard. It
is also possible that they manned boats to move men and materials around the harbour and
out to Spithead since there is no mention in the paybooks of any boatmen. One group of
labourers whose activities can be separately identified were the labourers who worked in
the Storehouses. They had a more responsible job than those of the general labourers and
were paid more, the rate of 1/6du a day instead of 1/ld. The other group of labourers who
were paid more than the basic 1/id per day were the scavelmen who earned 1/6d a day.
Their job was to keep the docks and slips clear of mud and rubbish. Their main tools, were
a type of rake called a 'hunimer' and a skimmer formed from an iron circle with rope-
yarn netting and a spade; in addition scavelmen were allowed £2 per year for boots.
5.5. The Purpose and Basis of the Dockyard Input (Workforce) Anal ysis. There are two reasons
for undertaking an analysis of the Dockyard Workforce. Firstly it is the obvious "Representative"
figure for use in an "Input" analysis of the Dockyard work process to complement the "Output"
analysis in the previous Chapter and it thus provides a basis for an "Input/Output" comparison.
From that it should be possible to identify areas where an increased output arises from a level
input or the same output is sustained from a reduced input. Either circumstance could suggest
the advantageous application of technology although care has to be taken to ensure that the real
reason for the change does not arise from use of contractors or just improved working practices.
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The second reason for examining the Dockyard Workforce in detail is that since
"automation" did not arrive until the twentieth century the exploitation of any particular
technology required an appropriate human contribution. Therefore the identification of the human
input should reveal the presence of the technical application. Equally, the continuation of a
manual process, despite the availability of technology, may often be revealed by payment in
terms of pence per yard, per pound, etc., Evidence of either nature provides an invaluable focus
in the research and examination of the application of those technologies in Portsmouth Dockyard.
The basis for the analysis of the Dockyard Workforce are the Yard paybooks for the years
1790 to 1813 which show annual manpower totals for each craft/trade (and within them each pay
level) in the Dockyard. Regrettably, from 1814 onwards changes in the Dockyard administration
processes resulted in these sub-totalled figures being no longer recorded and to create them today
would need the records of every individual man to be examined and then analysed. Fortunately
a peak in the level of the Dockyard labour force was reached in 1813 and therefore the work
entailed in generating the missing figures was not considered justified for the thesis. This
limitation apart the Paybook figures are remarkably complete and they can safely be treated as
"Representative" Input figures. They cannot be regarded as more than "representative" since
material resources are involved in a full "Input" analysis and secondly the paybook figures are
actually only derived from the numbers on the payroll in the second quarter of each year.
Therefore they include both "Ins" and "Outs" in that three month period and hence they
inevitably exceed the numbers actually at work on any particular day. As this inflation factor is
constant across the period it has been ignored, since it does not significantly alter the outcome
of the analysis which is primarily concerned with the pattern of year on year changes.
The Analysis addresses the manning levels in the four major work areas of Metal, Fibre,
Wood and Miscellaneous. It then moves on to an overview of the workforce as a whole and the
growth rates in the respective areas. These rates, expressed in percentage terms, are then
associated with those for the Selected Representative "Output" figures from Chapter Four (Ton
Dock Days and Ton Sailings) to permit the comparison of Output and Input growth rates. The
subsequent interpretation of this comparison under the heading of Productivity takes place at the
end of this Chapter following a discussion of the material resource inputs to the Dockyard.
5.6. Detail of Input (Workforce) Analysis. The Reader, when reading the detail of workforce
increases/decreases, is invited to bear in mind that the overall picture emerging from the
"Output" analysis was one of an increase across the period 1790 - 1815 of 107% and the overall
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pattern of change was illustrated in Figures 4.17 and 4.17.1. In the following paragraphs the
percentage rise and fall is from a baseline of zero % in 1790.
5.6.1. Metal: The Metal trades and crafts, whose numbers are shown in Figure 5.2 together
with those for their various crafts and tasks in Table 5.2, are unique amongst the Dockyard
work areas in having a sustained rise across the period (with the exception of the Peace of
Amiens) and the numbers grew from 81 in 1790 to 370 in 1813 - an increase of 357% -
250% above the increase in Output.
Three trades/crafts are responsible for this growth. Firstly the smiths who started
the period at 75 and ended at 185. All the indications are that advances in the production
of iron led to an increased use of iron products. The growing importance of the smiths was
recognised in 1811 by the introduction of apprentice smiths and just two years later there
were 25 of these trainees. Later chapters investigate this growing use of iron, and the
advances in technology it depended on. Secondly the Metal Mills and the Millwright shop
were first manned in 1806 with 6 and 5 workers respectively and by 1813 these numbers
had grown to 69 and 77. The functions of and products from these plants is examined in
more detail later. Thirdly there were increases in the manpower of more specialist areas
such as foundry men, plumbers and a modest rise in numbers of tinmen and braziers.
5.6.2. Fibre: Figure 5.3 and Table 5.3 show the numbers for the Fibre area. This area is
interesting in that the workforce suffered a sharp reduction from its 1790 numbers of 565
and, except for 1800/1801, the numbers did not return to that level until 1811 and then
peaked at 680 in 1812. An increase of just 20% across the period. At first sight there is a
remarkable increase in output per person but examination of the detail in Table 5.3 tells a
very different story. The principal skilled workers in this area were the spinners and they
started the period at 167 and finished at 201 in 1813. One of the prime supporting trades
were the Line and Twine spinners and their numbers
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actually fell from 15 to 7. There were some changes in how rope craft/trades were
organised and titled but again there is no evidence to support the concept of new technology
being introduced into the ropemaking which took place in Portsmouth. Indeed all the
evidence suggests Portsmouth increasingly relied on the other Dockyards and commercial
sources to meet its growing needs.
The Riggers started at 148 and their labourers at 81 and by 1813 these numbers
were down to 122 and 68 respectively. Given that rigging remained largely unaffected by
technology until well into this century the evidence points firmly to the use of contractors
as the reason for the drop in numbers.
On the sailmaking side numbers rose steadily (if two unusual peaks in 1791 and
1801 are ignored) from 47 in 1790 to a plateau of 99 (including 17 apprentices) in
1812 - 110% which is not far removed from the 92% for the same year in Ton
Sailings (Table 4.9). There is no evidence from the paybooks to indicate any change
in the terms and conditions of employment for these people and therefore it is
reasonable to suggest that technology was not introduced into their working practices.
5.6.3. Wood: Figure 5-4 and Table 5-4 contain the detail of the biggest work area in the
Dockyard. The Wood crafts and trades who numbered 1278 in 1790 and 2668 in 1813 - an
increase of 109%. However this figure includes within it a rise in apprentice numbers from
48 to 336 and taking this into account, there is a remarkable correlation between the
increase in Ton Dock Days (defined in Chapter 4 on page 80) and the wood workers. By
far the biggest group in the wood area were the shipwrights and their numbers changed
from 796 to 1428 + 210 apprentices. In total, their percentage rise was 105% and the great
majority of their work was undertaken on and within ships. It comes as no surprise that
there is no evidence that new technology brought a change to their working practices in the
period.
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In 1805 the Wood Mills started work with a workforce of 44 which rose to 100+
for 1808 - 1810 before dropping to 80 for the two successive years. These Mills, like the
Metal Mills and the Millwright's Shop, are looked at in depth in a later Chapter. There
were two groups of workers whose numbers might have been expected to be affected by
the introduction of the Wood Mills. Firstly there were the sawyers who cut trees into
planking and there were 68 pairs of them in 1790 and 95 in 1811 but there was a major
rise to around 120 for the following two years. Given that the sawyers were paid by the
foot of timber cut the evidence appears to point strongly towards power not having been
brought into this area on a large scale during the period.
The second group whose workload might have been affected by the start up of the
Wood Mills were the house carpenters and joiners who together numbered 137 in 1790 and
404 in 1813 - an increase of 195%. The cynic might be forgiven for suggesting that the
apparent doubling of these people above the apparent needs of the ships was due to a major
expansion in shore infrastructure like Dockyard offices, official Residences etc. However
the real point is these numbers were in no way apparently reduced by products coming from
the Wood Mills.
There were two very small wood crafts/trades which had a direct technical linkage.
The first was that of the blockrnakers who numbered just 4 in 1790 and only 7 at the end
of the period and this despite the establishment of the block mills which had an eventual
output of 150,000 blocks a yearn. Morriss, in his work on The Royal Doc/cyards? suggest
that this apparent anomaly is explained by the fact that the mills were designed not to need
specialist craftsmen and they were in fact manned by using both house carpenters and
labourers who, once they acquired the necessary skill to operate the machines, were paid
extra allowances on top of their basic pay instead of being re-graded. The second small
craft was that of the wheelwrights of whom Portsmouth Dockyard employed just two in
1790 and three in 1813. From this tiny set of records nothing emerges to suggest any
change in their employment.
5.6.4. Miscellaneous: Figure 5-5 and Table 5-5 cover the Miscellaneous workforce which
it is difficult to align with any one particular aspect of the work on ships. However within
the area are four groups of workers who could be considerably affected by new technology.
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The first of these groups are the Horse Teams who were used not only for transport
but also to "power" various machines and would be in competition with the emerging steam
powered devices. In 1790 there were 17 horse teams and by 1813 this number had risen to
39; an increase of 130% which appears consistent with the growth in the Dockyard's Output
and the development of its infrastructure. At least it suggests that the introduction of steam
power into the Dockyard was an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process and that
its introduction was not seen as substitute for horse numbers.
In 1790 there were just 6 masons and 21 bricklayer's labourers on the Dockyard
payroll. By 1813 these numbers had risen to 20 and 47 respectively giving a combined
increase of 148% which supports the concept of the house carpenters and joiners increasing
so much due to infrastructure development. The scavelmen were responsible for clearing
the slips, the docks and the approaches to the docks and in 1790 there were 76 of them. As
late as 1810 there were still only 88 of them although they, like so many other trades had
a big rise in 1811 - 1813 to 122. Nevertheless the percentage rise was only 60% and this
despite an increase in the number of docks from 5 (4 single, 1 double) to 8 between 1795
and 1803. It is fair therefore to suggest that this is one trade where technology did make
a major difference to its manpower levels.
The last group which could have been directly affected by the introduction of
technology were the general labourers who provided the "muscle" power for so much of
the heaving, hauling and pumping around the yard. Their numbers in 1790 were 290 and
by 1813 this had risen to 537 - a rise of 85% which is again broadly in line with the
increase in dockyard output. As with the horse teams, this increase again suggests that the
introduction of steam power into the Dockyard was an evolutionary rather than a
revolutionary process and it was not seen as part of a deliberate policy for reducing
manpower numbers.
5.6.5. The Dockyard Workforce - As a whole: Table 5.6 brings together the growth of the
workforce between 1790 and 1813 under the headings of Metal, Fibre, Wood and
Miscellaneous. Within these areas, the spread of skilled, semi-skilled, manual and
apprentice workers are shown. Figure 5.6 illustrates the absolute growth across the work
areas whilst Figure 5.6.1 shows the rate of growth in percentage terms. Well over 50% of
the total workforce was employed in the Wood area which grew by some 109% - just 2%
more than the overall increase in output which was assessed in Chapter 4 as 107%.
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However, in percentage terms the biggest growth was in the area of metalwork where the
numbers rose from 81 to 370 or a rise of 356%. The Miscellaneous area which accounted for
about 20% of the workforce increased by 95% whilst the Fibre area only increased 19%.
Overall the workforce grew by 93% although the skilled and semi-skilled workers
(Table 5.6.1) who made up around 75% of the total actually increased by just under 80%.
It was left to the easier to recruit manual workers to increase by 99% and for the
apprentices to rise from 48 to 390 - a huge rise of 713%. Much of the dramatic increase
was due to re-organisation of the arrangements for such trainees in 1802 although a
substantial part of the increase was also due to the acceptance that the Dockyard should
train its own personnel rather than seek to attract them already trained from outside industry
- a policy which had not been successful.
5.6.6. Input and Output Analysis Comparison: The principal manpower or representative
input figures become more significant when viewed alongside the key figures for the Output
Analysis of Chapter 4. Table 5.7 shows that by 1802, the Workforce had increased 23%
and the Ton Dock Days had risen by 28% whilst the corresponding figures in 1813 were
93% and 107% which suggests a productivity increase of some 14%. Such a figure is
undoubtedly an underestimate since it takes no account of the fact that by 1813, Portsmouth
was producing 100% of the Navy's blocks and 66% of the total requirement for copper
sheathing. This claim for increased productivity is more easily seen in Figures 5.7 and
5.7.1 where the slopes for Manpower and Ton Dock Days/Modified Ton Dock Days show
the former rising more slowly than the latter and neither rising as fast as the growth in the
Fleet.
5.7. Supply of Raw Materials. Regular supplies of timber and other stores were essential to the
Royal Navy's existence. By the end of the eighteenth century, these supplies were purchased in
both the domestic and international markets, mostly through contractors, and were consumed in
huge quantities. With this duality of supply and the complexity of resource transfers between the
Royal Dockyards, it has proved quite impossible, in the timescales of this thesis, to enumerate
the annual rate of consumption, by Portsmouth Dockyard, of raw or indeed manufactured
materials. Furthermore, given the high quality of information input on the prime Representative
Input Resource - The Dockyard Workforce, it is doubtful if the quantification of material
resources would add greatly to the thesis. In either event it has not been attempted.
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The eighteenth century had seen four wars before 1793, with the subsequent need for
repairs and rebuilding at the close of each war. From 1740 onwards Royal Navy ships had
increased in number, size and tonnage, causing ever increasing demands on the amount of timber
and supplies needed. In wartime, domestic sources of timber and naval stores were protected
from export by Orders in Council and the Navy Board had the first option to acquire neutral or
captured cargoes as well. However, during this period of time the Merchant Fleet was also
increasing in size and tonnage and was therefore in direct competition with the Royal Navy for
timber and naval stores.
Subsequent paragraphs follow the pattern established earlier in this chapter of considering
raw materials under the headings of Metal, Fibre, Wood and Miscellaneous.
5.7.1. Metals: The United Kingdom's principal metal based industries (Iron, Copper, Lead,
Tin and Brass) were largely supplied from national mining sources and this greatly reduced
the need for overseas expenditure in this area. Only iron was "bought-in" in any quantity
and that was because the naturally rich ores from Spain and Sweden had a low sulphur and
phosphorus content thus making them easier for smiths to use in wrought iron work.
However by the early nineteenth century British technological advances in the commercial
production of both wrought and cast iron meant that the Navy became progressively less
dependent on foreign supplies of iron ore.
The Royal Navy began to use Copper in increasing quantities from 1776 onwards
as the fleet had sheathing fitted to its hulls. Copper ore was mined in Anglesey 3° and in
Cornwall and the metal was then produced by a series of refining operations, which took
place at Swansea in South Wales and in Lancashire (in both these places there were
abundant wood supplies needed to fuel the refining process). The Navy purchased its copper
in an already manufactured form but with the establishment of the Metal Mills the Navy
Board progressively became able to re-process its old copper thus reducing its need to
purchase new copper by as much as two thirds.
Other metals used in smaller quantities included Lead, which was used for the roofs
and floors of the stern galleries of the bigger ships and in all warships to line the inside of
the ship's magazines. Also used were Tin and Brass, the latter being an alloy of copper and
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zinc. Naval brass 3 ' was composed of 62% copper, 37% zinc and 1% tin and this mixture
made the brass very resistant to corrosion from sea water.
5.7.2. Fibre: The Navy bought Hemp and Flax, which were naturally occurring large grass
type plants for the manufacture of rope and canvas. By the nineteenth century, British
sources of Hemp could no longer match the demands of the ropemaking and sailmaking
industries and the Royal Navy resorted to importing its Hemp, often through third parties,
from Russia via the ports of Riga and St. Petersburgn despite the edicts of Napoleon's
Continental Blockade. During that Blockade, the Navy Board sought alternative sources
of supply and trials were done on Hemp from Malabar 33 , although there does not appear
to be have been any significant contract placed in that country as a result.
5.7.3. Wood: Timber was by far the largest of the Navy's material purchases and the
maintenance of adequate supplies of it was always a matter of great concern to both the
Admiralty Board and the Government of the day - to build just one 74 gun ship 60 acres
of one hundred year old timber was neededM. The Navy's position was not helped by the
fact that it was in growing competition for timber with the civilian population on three
fronts. Firstly, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, timber was the main
constructional material for buildings and the increasing population created a demand for
more houses. Secondly until coal completely replaced wood or charcoal as a fuel source,
which did not happen until well after the period of this thesis, timber was a primary fuel
for both the domestic and the rapidly expanding British industrial market. The industrial
uses of wood and charcoal included the manufacture of glass and soap and as wood ash in
the manufacture of alkali by the emerging chemical industry. From the 1750s, iron
smelting, formerly a large user of wood and charcoal for fuel, had been using coke instead.
Thirdly, just to make the problem even worse, the best timber came from good land where
as a long term crop, it faced increasing competition from annual cash food crops which
were needed more and more to feed the growing populations of the towns and cities35.
Timber was bought by the Load which was 50 cubic feet, and about half was lost
when the timber was trimmed and cut to useable sizes. For every one ton of timber in a
ship one and a half to two loads of timber needed to be bought. Timber sources, as well
as having to have large quantities of suitable trees, needed to be close to water for ease of
transportation to the Royal Yards. Trees were felled and transported as trimmed logs with
the bark being removed and used by the tanning industry. Once cut there was a significant
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rejection level of processed timber due to natural flaws and poor storage. There were
differing views on the best ways to season timber but an accepted practice with new ships
was to frame up in green wood (usually oak) and leave the ship to season on the stocks.
However this assumed that it was possible to keep a building slip non-productive for a
considerable time and it is relevant that Oak needs at least three years to season, for it
tends to rot if not seasoned properly.
Timbers were known under different names 37 according to their size and purpose.
Compass timber was naturally curved and was used to make the frames of the ships whilst
smaller pieces were used to make knees. Compass timber occurred naturally but it was also
induced by deliberately bending young trees as they grew. Planking came in different sizes:
thick stuff was over 4 inches thick and 12 inches wide, plank was one and a half to four
inches thick and board was less than one and a half inches thick, while deals were 2-3
inches thick and only 7 inches wide.
The main types of timber used were oak, elm, and pine. Oak was considered the
most suitable wood for ships hulls, as its slow growth makes it tough and durable, the best
timber being between eighty and one hundred and twenty years old at felling. But oak had
one major disadvantage which was that, in time, wet oak would destroy any iron bolts used
to secure it. Other woodsy, red and white Pine, Teak and Pencil Cedar, were tried for
ships hulls but none were particularly successful. Most of those remaining at the end of the
war were taken out of service and either sold or broken up by the early 1820's. Ships'
keels, stem and sternpost were made from Elm which has a close twisted grain that holds
bolts well and does not rot on immersion in water. Elm was also used to make ships
pumps, the shells of pulley blocks, and because it does not splinter readily, gun carriages.
All the major powers had representatives in the Baltic to buy timber and there was
competition for the best stocks, as this area was considered the prime source of mast poles
and deals. However, Baltic timber was expensive because of the length and cost of the
journey from forest to Royal yard. Britain did have alternative sources of supply in Canada
and, depending on the state of its relations with its erstwhile colony, particularly fine timber
was be obtained from the New England coast of America.
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5.7.4. Other Materials: Chief among the other raw materials purchased by the Navy Board
were the by-products of the Scandinavian forestry industry, which included tar, turpentine,
resin and pitch. Resin is the gummy extract from pine and fir and if this extract is distilled,
turpentine is the result. This was used as a thinner for wax and tar and as a liniment for
sprains and bruises. A by-product of the distillation process was tar, often referred to as
Stockholm tar and it was used as a general preservative for both wood and rope being
supplied in 32 gallon barrels called Lasts39. Other purchases included tallow to treat timber,
wax, brimstone used in the cleaning of ships hulls and train oil made from whale, seal and
fish oils.
5.7.5. Material Resource Summary: Table 5-8, which follows this page, summarises the
sources of the Navy's key raw materials. The quantities of timber, hemp and other naval
stores which originated from Scandinavia and the Baltic countries help to explain the
importance attached to the sustained effort spent on keeping the trade routes to the Baltic
open during the Continental blockade of 1806 to 1811.
5.8. Supply of Manufactured Materials. In addition to purchasing large quantities of raw
materials the Royal Dockyards also procured a range of manufactured articles for use in the fleet.
The biggest and most important of these were ships themselves whilst the vast majority of the
other items fell under the title of Naval Stores although the dockyards also bought many items
for use in their own facilities' construction and maintenance programmes.
5.8.1. Ships: As was explained in 4.4.1, under Dockyard Tasks, New Construction, it was
the Admiralty Board's policy to build its ships in the Royal Dockyards where it could
directly control the standards of workmanship and the quality of timber used. This policy
might have been feasible in extended periods of peace, when the Navy was small and its
active "at-sea" element was even smaller but it was impracticable in times of war when the
size of the Fleet was greatly increased and every effort was needed to keep the maximum
number of vessels at sea. In these circumstances the Admiralty was forced increasingly to
turn to contract builders and outright purchase.
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Contract building in civilian yards had been a tried and tested method since the early
eighteenth century. Potential suppliers were invited to bid for contracts to build the new
hulls and these contracts laid down not only the design detail but also the quantities and the
quality of materials to be used. Time limits were usually specified for contract completion -
the hull of a 74 could be built in three years and if the time limits were exceeded without
Navy Board permission the contractor was fmed. Once launched the hull was towed to the
nearest Royal Yard (Portsmouth's area stretched from Exeter in the West to Hastings in the
East40) to be coppered and fitted out. A problem with contract built ships, which became
progressively worse as the war progressed and inflation set in, was that few commercial
yards had sufficient capital to maintain large stocks of seasoned timber and they had to buy
what was available at the time they were awarded a contract. Inevitably this led to more and
more "green timber" being used in ship's hulls and some of these soon needed repair after
entering service. However this was the price the Navy Board had to pay for obtaining hulls
this way.
The third source of additional hulls for the Royal Navy was the "secondhand"
market. The Navy purchased a number of ships originally built for the merchant fleet
although these purchases tended to be concentrated on sloops, brigs and other small craft.
Nevertheless they did buy several East Indiamen for use as frigates. However by far the
greater number of secondhand ships were those which the previous owners lost without
agreement, or payment, when they were captured and taken as prizes by the Royal Navy.
After being seized, such ships were surveyed and those considered suitable for use in the
fleet were bought for the Navy by the Admiralty's agents. Only if the Admiralty did not
wish to purchase these vessels were they offered on the open market. There was a strong
body of opinion amongst the professional officers of the Royal Navy that French built ships
were actually superior as fighting ships to British ones both because they tended to be
stronger round the bows and also because they were often faster that their British
equivalents. Certainly many ex-French ships served in the British Fleet with real distinction
and at one stage nearly a quarter of the Royal Navy's ships had been foreign built. It is
worth noting in passing that this is why, even as late as the last world war, many ships of
the Royal Navy, which tended to use ship's names passed down from one generation to
another, had names of French origin.
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5.8.2. Naval Stores: Many of the items used to fit out ships were bought ready for use. In
this section just a few of such major "bought in" items are discussed and these examples
have been selected because they were prime contenders for the application of new
technologies which are discussed in the next chapter. Again the order in which items are
considered is metal, fibre, wood and miscellaneous.
5.8.2.1. Metal: - Copper sheet was used in the Dockyard and carried in ships. The
standard sheet of copper4' was four feet long and fourteen inches wide, and there
were three different weights, 32 oz, 28 oz and 18 oz per square foot. The different
weights were used on particular positions on the hull, the thickest which was 32
oz/sq ft was used on the bows which took the greatest wear and behind that was a
section of medium weight sheets and the hull was completed with the lightest sheets
of 18 oz/sq ft. The keel was not covered in copper sheathing as that was too
vulnerable to damage in that position. Instead the keel was studded or 'filled' with
copper nails set very close together.
5.8.2.2. Fibre: - The process of ropemaking in the yard and the people involved
have been discussed earlier in this Chapter but it is not possible to establish how
much of the rope used in Portsmouth Dockyard was made there. Whilst some was
procured on civil contract, a considerable amount came from within the Royal
Dockyards as a whole. This is borne out by the requests for further supplies to be
found in the POR\D series of letters from Portsmouth Dockyard to the Navy Board.
In the year 1805, a total of 14,577 tons of rope and other cordage were received
into store, 6881 tons produced by the Royal Dockyards and 7696 tons from
contractors. In this year - 1805 - which saw 62 dockings (Table 4.2) Portsmouth
made only 1633 tons, less than either Chatham (1938 tons) or Plymouth (2120
tons)42.
All canvas was bought as woven bolts of cloth which were twenty four
inches wide and thirty eight yards long. Made with a warp of 560 double threads,
it came in different weights depending on its use. No. 1 canvas43 was the heaviest
at forty four pounds to the bolt and was made from hemp whilst the lightest was
No. 10 at fifteen pounds/bolt and was made from flax. Canvas was used to make
sails, hammocks, screens, awnings, covers for boats and 'bolsters' which were used
to prevent wood or rope chafing against each other.
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5.8.2.3. Wood: - In the wood area the major bought-in items were pulley blocks
although the Dockyards did make some themselves; principally the very big ones
and of course the Yards inevitably undertook some repair work, where this made
economic sense. Blocks consisted of an outer shell with a circular pulley or sheave
which rotated round a pin or coak and deadeyes were blocks without a sheave which
were used to secure the standing rigging.
Taylors of Southampton had held the contract to supply blocks to the
Dockyard since 1770 when all Portsmouth's reserve supply of blocks had been
destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the contract of 8 April 1791 gave Taylors a
monopoly with an annual turnover of 100,000 blocks although by 1806 the Navy's
annual consumption of blocks had risen to 138,019. Urged on by Bentham, the
Admiralty was persuaded to invest in the development of the Navy's own
blockmaking machinery at Portsmouth which first started work in 1803. However,
as we have seen, 1803 to 1807 was a period of severe manpower problems in
Portsmouth. At the same time, there was a shortage of certain raw materials such
as lignum vitae for sheaves and delays to the production of iron pins and brass
coaks by Portsmouth's own Metal Mills. The net result was that the mill did not
achieve its full output until 1808 by which time it was producing 150,000 blocks of
assorted types annually. These mills, like the Metal Mills are discussed in more
detail in later Chapters.
Other major bought-in wood items were treenails which were purchased in
large quantities as well as being made in the Yard. To ensure a straight grain,
treenails were split rather than being cut from oak and then rounded and finished
by a treenail mooter - a moot being the special tool they used to round the wood.
Treenails came in assorted sizes from half to two inches in diameter and twelve to
thirty six inches long and their manufacture represented one use for waste wood in
the Yard. Another use for waste wood was to make wedges which were used to
force planks into place during ship construction.
5.8.2.4. Miscellaneous: - Under this heading, one of the largest purchases was
ballast, either as shingle or more and more, as time progressed, in the form of iron
bars. While shingle could be obtained from any suitable local source, iron ballast4
was bought in bars weighing 56 lbs and measuring 12 ins by 4 ins by 4 ins, with
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holes cast into the metal to allow them to be moved and secured easily. Other items
were provided as a matter of course by one of the Royal Yards to the others. For
example, ships' ensigns and signal flags, which were made from a fine woollen
material called bunting, were made exclusively in the Colours loft at Chatham.
5.8.3. Non Navy Board Stores: No ship was complete without the materials for conducting
her own maintenance when away from port and these included mast sticks, canvas, rope and
other items such as blocks. There were also the stores provided by the Ordnance Board
such as shot, powder and small arms as well as the Master Gunners stores. Last but not
least were food, drink and clothing provided by the Victualling Board for the maintenance
of the ships company.
5.8.4. Infrastructure Items: In addition to those items needed for building or repairing ships,
the Navy Board purchased all the materials for maintenance or improvement of the fabric
of the Dockyard although Portsmouth Dockyard had its own Lime Kiln for making mortar.
As buildings were more and more being built in stone or brick, to minimise the fire risk
within the Yard, greater quantities of stone, mainly from Portland, and bricks were needed.
Wood was also needed for the internal fitting of buildings such as stores and offices and for
the rafters and tiles for the roofs. Glass was bought for windows of buildings and for those
in the quarter galleries on ships' sterns. From the 1790's, ships' sides and boats were
painted and paint was needed for these as well as the yard buildings.
5.9. Dockyard Productivity - Overview. These few paragraphs bring together the salient features
of the Output Analysis from Chapter Four, the Dockyard Workforce Analysis and the review of
Material Inputs. As has already been shown in the comparison of the Output/Input analysis, there
was an apparent increase in productivity of at least 14% across the period and this figure is
almost certainly an understatement of the Dockyard's achievements. However, these were not
achieved uniformly across the years between 1790 and 1815 which is best considered in three
discrete sub-periods.
5.9.1. 1790 - 1800. "Years of Expediency": In these years output to the Fleet (Tons
Sailing) dominated the management of the Royal Dockyards considerations. In Portsmouth
even the medium, and certainly the longer term, considerations were subordinated to the
short term imperative of despatching ships to sea for immediate operations. In these
circumstances it would be churlish not applaud the decision to reduce the dry dock capacity
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between 1795 and 1803, in order to expand and enhance that capability for the future.
Courageous it certainly was; far-sighted it probably was, particularly as the decision was
taken at a time when the primary input of Dockyard personnel was proving particularly
difficult to sustain let alone increase.
5.9.2. 1801 - 1807. "Years of Uncertainty and Confusion": Output to the Fleet fluctuated
widely as peace followed war and war followed peace. As importantly, the manpower
situation, which was already bad, deteriorated still more as the Admiralty stubbornly
resisted demands for a long overdue review of the pay scales and pay arrangements for
Royal Dockyard personnel. Fortunately the improvements to the dry dock facilities in
Portsmouth, which are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, had been completed by the start
of this period and thus a primary constraint on increases in "Output" had largely been
removed. Indeed the peaks in "output", as represented by Ton Dock Days, in 1803 and
1806 probably owe more to spare dry dock capacity and the ability of management to
exploit it than it does to outright increases in productivity given that the manning levels in
1803 were the worst of the whole war period and they were not much better in 1806.
5.9.3. 1808 - 1813 onwards. "Years in Balance": By this time the management of the
Royal Dockyards was beginning to benefit from a number of hard learnt lessons and the
initiatives started in the earlier periods. In Portsmouth they had a good dry dock complex,
the manpower problems had been brought under control and a range of technical
innovations were coming on stream - the metal mills and blockmaking machinery; to
mention but two of the new facilities, were beginning to prove their worth. Parallel
investments in technology in other yards such as Chatham with its introduction of machinery
into ropemaking, were also improving the Royal Dockyards' ability as a whole to meet the
Fleet's requirements.
By 1813, Output, in terms of Ton Dock Days, at Portmouth had increased by
around 107% whilst Input, in terms of the Dockyard workforce had only increased by a
maximum of 93%. How much of the consequential 14% + efficiency improvement was due
to the introduction of new technology and how much was due to administrative advances
such as "out-sourcing" the manufacture of some products such as rope is an open question.
Undoubtedly the lack of growth in the fibre workforce numbers at Portsmouth was due to
a greater reliance on rope made in other yards or by sub contractors. Against this it must
be remembered that Portsmouth's copper sheathing and block making facilities were serving
the Dockyards as a whole and not just Portsmouth.
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5.10. Overview of Portsmouth Dockyard Resources. It can be concluded that by 1808 the
management of Portsmouth Dockyard as a whole had got the work of that yard well under
control with changes in output and input being very closely correlated. As so often in the past,
before the Napoleonic Wars and several times since that conflict, the management and
infrastructure of the Royal Navy had been found wanting when war broke out but by the end of
the fighting it had evolved into an impressive machine with a war winning capability based on
evolution rather than revolution. Undoubtedly the Royal Dockyards' management had
demonstrated a willingness and ability to invest in new technology but it had also shown that it
was not going to be driven into a race for new technology for new technology's sake. The
Input/Output analysis goes a long way to demonstrate that new technologies did indeed increase
Portsmouth Dockyard productivity and thus were of real practical benefit.
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CHAPTER SIX
AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY WITH DOCKYARD POTENTIAL
6.1. Available Technology with Potential for Application in Portsmouth Dockyard. Chapter Six
explores the advances and changes in technology that could potentially have been applied in
Portsmouth Dockyard between 1790 and 1815. To do this it examines the history of technology
in relation to the review of the Dockyard workforce; their craft and trade skills and associated
tools and raw materials, contained in Chapter Five and the earlier chapters. It is often forgotten
that "natural powered engines", sometimes quite sophisticated, existed for hundreds of years
before man discovered how to "generate" steam power on a commercially viable scale. Certainly
in the late 1700s Portsmouth Dockyard was totally reliant on muscle powered "lift and shift"
engines for many of the activities it undertook and would continue to rely on them for many
more years.
This Chapter starts therefore by examining those natural power sources used in dockyards
and those "engines" common across all their activities/areas. It then moves on to consider the
technical advances which were potentially available in each of the four "Resource" areas - Metal,
Fibre, Wood and Miscellaneous - used in earlier Chapters. The consideration of the
"miscellaneous" area in this chapter is principally focused on "structural" matters and "afloat"
aspects. Each area ends with a table which attempts to illustrate, on one page, the relevant
advances which were available and those which were exploited by Portsmouth Dockyard in that
area. The selection of items for inclusion in these tables makes no attempt to be a comprehensive
listing of all developments - rather, it represents the Author's attempt to assist the Reader in
establishing an "Overview" of the area. Where a particular advance was exploited in
Portsmouth and where it is not discussed further in later Chapters, the rationale for that lack of
exploitation is considered before moving on to the next "Resource" Area.
The application of specific advances in Portsmouth Dockyard between 1790 and 1815 is
examined in more detail in Chapter Seven where each advance is examined in relation to the
"Requirement" (Chapter Four), The Workforce (Chapter Five), the layout of the Dockyard itself
and each other.
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6.2. Power Sources, pre- 1790's Origin: By the start of the sixteenth century, three natural power
sources had become established. They were the muscles of humans and animals, wind and water.
These supplied the day to day needs of industry and agriculture until the advent of steam power
in the early eighteenth century. However this did not cause the immediate demise of earlier
power sources, indeed all existed side by side for the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth
centuries until steam was in its turn overtaken by other power sources, such as the internal
combustion engine and electricity.
6.2.1. Human Power: The muscles of humans and animals have been used as a power
source since the dawn of history but even with the aid of mechanical devices like the lever
or the pulley, man could not produce large amounts of power, although he was versatile and
flexible. In the context of Portsmouth's role as a repair yard man's greatest advantage as
a power source was being able to move to the work site, however cramped or spacious that
site might be. Whereas, when a large power plant like a windmill, waterwheel or steam
engine was used, the work was taken to the power supply. It would not be until near the end
of the nineteenth century that a suitable portable power supply would be developed that
could be moved around easily for use in confined spaces.
6.2.2. Animal Power. Although several different types of animals had been used for a
variety of tasks, by the late eighteenth century, the horse either singly or in teams was the
most highly regarded in Britain. Horse power was limited by the number of horses which
could be used simultaneously and many devices like horse gins were generally designed to
be operated by one horse only, although some could be operated by teams of two, four or
even six animals. In common with all forms of muscle power there were problems in
operating animal power, since to maintain the power supply, tired horses needed to be
replaced by fresh animals at regular intervals. There was also the cost of their maintenance
and the periodic purchase of replacement animals. Like humans, horses were a flexible
power source which could be deployed to the work in hand, whether it was moving carts
and timber waggons or as the power supply for a fixed installation like a horse gin.
6.2.3. Wind power: Wind power operated through the medium of the windmill which had
been widely used for centuries to grind corn or pump water but windmills can only operate
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when the wind is blowing, since there was no means of storing the wind energy for use
later.
6.2.4. Water Power: By the late eighteenth century the waterwheel had become a significant
source of power for industry. Water gave a steady even turning power and 'fuel' was
readily available, cost nothing and in the event of a machine breakdown or a failure of the
fuel supply, the system tended to come slowly to a halt without damage to any machinery
which it was driving - what is today called 'graceful degradation'. However, to install a
waterwheel needed considerable capital investment in the wheel itself and the associated
structures such as a holding pond to maintain the head of water and leats to carry water to
and from the wheel. There was also the building containing the machinery that the wheel
would power and any gearing to connect one to the other. The real problem with water
powered machines was of course that they had to be built where there was an adequate
water supply such as a stream or river. Bentham did propose to use an overshot waterwheel
to act as a power source for the Carpenters and Joiners shops at Plymouth in 1796, but the
idea was not adopted'.
A variant of the waterwheel was the tide mill. These were generally sited on
sheltered tidal creeks and the wheel was driven by sea water which was stored in a holding
pond at high tide. There were a number of tide mills in the neighbourhood of Portsmouth,
for example at Fareham, Hayling Island and Emsworth, which has a mill pond of 10 acres2.
Although a tide mill might well have supplied Portsmouth Dockyard with an adequate
power source, there were disadvantages which would have made it an unlikely choice. A
mill pond of 10 acres placed within the then existing dockyard limits of 82 acres 3 would
have removed one eighth of the useable ground. Unlike a tidal creek site where it was
comparatively simple to construct a holding pond, to build such a structure adjacent to the
Dockyard would have needed extensive and expensive walling. Also a structure of any size
encroaching onto the harbour would have affected the amount of silt deposited in it which
was already a problem. In 1801, Samuel Bentham considered an apparatus to work a tide
mill designed by a Mr Johnson. It was an interesting concept as it was designed to work on
both an ebb and a flow tide not just the ebb tide generally used. Bentham felt that although
the method was feasible, neither the Royal Dockyards not the Victualling Board had an
immediate use for it4.
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Although the Dockyards did not have either wind or watermills, the Victualling
Board did use them. The Weevil Yard at Gosport had a windmill as part of the brewing
operations5 and there was a cornmill driven by water in Portsmouth. Indeed from 1781, the
main Victualling Yard at Deptford had a cornniill capable of grinding 400 quarters of grain
per week, powered by a water wheel built by John Smeaton. The wheel had a diameter of
thirty feet and was seven foot six inches wide. Smeaton sets out his reasons for using a
water wheel rather than driving the mill machinery directly by steam in a letter to the
Victualling Board Commissioners in November 17816.
In summary, both wind and water powered machines were dependent on the elements for
their 'fuel' supply and if this ceased, they could not operate. Both needed considerable capital
expenditure to set them up, and because of the size of the structures involved, - the tide mill at
Woodbridge in Sussex had a waterwheel of 23 feet diameter and 6 foot 6 inches wide 7 - they
were static power supplies more suitable for repetitive tasks such as grinding or pumping where
the work could be brought to them. They were not sufficiently flexible or regular for many of
the tasks within Portsmouth Dockyard, and would have taken up valuable space on a site which
could not be endlessly expanded.
Table 6.1 summarises the general advantages and disadvantages of employing the various
available power sources in and around a dockyard. From this it can be seen that the introduction
of steam power was by no means a panacea for overcoming the disadvantages of the established
power sources on such a site. Indeed, it can be said that the value of introducing steam was
initially limited to use in the workshops (factories) and to those situations where the work could
be brought to a statically positioned machine which could be operated for considerable periods
at a time. The one obvious example of such a situation was that concerned with the pumping of
fluids. However, "power" on its own was only half the problem and the other was the machinery
to exploit it. As will be seen it was frequently the development of the machinery, which in turn
depended on advances in both mechanical engineering and, as if not more importantly, on
advances in metallurgy, rather than advances in the generation of steam power itself which was
to be the deciding factor in dictating where and when this new source of power could be
exploited.
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6.3. Lift and Shift Engines - pre-1790's: Of all the activities which occurred around a Dockyard,
two were conmion to all work areas and they were "lift" and "shift". Therefore these are
addressed now as a prelude to discussion of the use of steam and the application of new
technology in the areas of metal, fibre, wood and miscellaneous work.
In the first eentury AD, Hero of Alexandria said that five simple machines could be used
to move the world; they were the lever, wedge, screw, compound pulley and wheel with axle.
Either on their own, or combined together in a machine, they were the basis of all machines
many of which were built of wood with metal being used in small quantities either for specific
parts which took a great deal of wear or for strengthening high stress joins in the woodwork. The
wood used was frequently of any type which came to hand and the resultant machines were often
of crude construction. In general, although, large and solid, they could be erected as and when
required. Certainly they were less likely than later machines to be permanent structures; even
where a combination of machines were sited together.
6.3.1. Levers: Leverage would have been used for many tasks in a Dockyard such as
moving timber into piles for seasoning, stone for building or, with the addition of rollers,
positioning large weights of any type. Furthermore, leverage could be applied to move a
load either horizontally or vertically or in both planes simultaneously. At their smallest and
simplest, they could be seen in devices like the crowbar and timber hooks and more
sophisticated examples are shears for cutting metal or wheelbarrows.
6.3.2. Sheerlegs: A simple lifting device could be assembled by using a combination of
single and double pulleys slung from the end of a yard on board a ship and operated by men
pulling on the rope to raise the load. Sheerlegs were, and are, a machine using two long
straight timbers lashed together at one end with the other ends braced and lashed at ground
level so that they formed an A frame with the pulleys suspended from the apex.
Alternatively a set of sheerlegs could take the form of a free standing triangle with a third
leg added to give stability. The great attraction of sheerlegs was that they could be erected
anywhere they were needed; on board ships, on the building slips, and around the dockyard.
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As was mentioned in Section 4.2.4, the Royal Dockyards used old warships cut down
and fitted with permanent sheerlegs for the purpose of removing old masts and putting in
new ones. This use of hulks had the additional advantage that the large heavy mainmasts
could be floated out to the hulk from the mast house where they were made, rather than
trying to manoeuvre them around the Yard, although the East India Company, at their dock
at Blackwall on the River Thames, had a specially built masting house 8 which included
facilities for removing and fitting masts in ships.
6.3.3. Small Cranes: Commercial ports and docks used small cranes fixed to the gables of
warehouses for lifting and lowering goods. It is reasonable to suppose that the eighteenth
century Royal Dockyards had similar wooden structures because the storehouses were three
stories high and without them items stored on the top floor would have had to be carried up
and down manually. This would have used a considerable amount of manpower whereas
fewer men could move the same amount with a small crane. This conjecture is supported
by evidence from among a series of sketches made by Goodrich in October 1813, which
shows a small crane for manual operation for the new Millwrights shop which was to be at
first floor level above a coalyard°.
For unloading on quays, the treadwheel crane, which was a fixed structure, was used
and the earliest surviving example is the single wheel crane at Harwich'°. Maps 1 ' of
Portsmouth Dockyard show that among others, there were three treadwheel' 2 cranes
positioned on the Camber Quay for unloading stores from ships. Each crane had two human
operated treadwheels with one on either side of the crane housing - this made a more stable
structure than the one wheel arrangement.
6.3.4. Ground tackles: Sheerlegs and cranes both move loads vertically, whilst loads were
moved horizontally along the quayside, or up a slipway or inclined plane with tackles,
which were a system of pulleys and ropes attached to a fixed point. Tackles could control
downwards as well as upward movement so they were used to lower heavy loads and put
boats back into the water as well as get them out.
6.3.5. Windlasses: The windlass and the capstan are two machines which came in a range
of sizes and were based on the wheel and axle which acted as force multipliers relative to
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the handles/bars on which the operators pushed. The principal difference between the two
was that in a windlass the axle was horizontal and in the capstan it was vertical.
The windlass was a relatively simple device with its axle often being formed crudely
from little more than a trimmed tree trunk. This was positioned between two uprights and
was fitted with long handles at each end which were operated by a number of men. An
alternative design had two sets of bars, set at ninety degrees to each other, at one side of
the axle only. The windlasses fitted in ships were used for the general handling of ropes and
in the dockyards their numerous applications included being used by the riggers to stretch
rope under constant tension for a number of hours at a time.
6.3.6. Capstans: The capstan, unlike the windlass, was one of the most sophisticated of the
lift and shift devices and certainly one of the most powerfuP 3 . It basically had three parts -
a fixed toothed path and pawls at the bottom, the drum around which the rope was endlessly
rove in the middle and the head at the top through which the power was applied. The pawls
were small metal 'bars' which were fitted on hinges on the drum and engaged with a
toothed path on the fixed structure. As the pawls were longer than the distance between their
hinges and the teeth, they trailed over the latter at an angle of around 45 degrees when the
drum turned in one direction. As soon as the drum tried to turn in the opposite direction,
the pawls immediately dropped down into the gaps between the teeth and thus prevented any
movement in that direction. This effectively stopped the load taking charge and spinning
backwards if for any reason the power being applied was inadequate to sustain the
movement in the required direction or if the capstan was being used to establish a particular
tension on a rope or cable. To allow the capstan to run backwards, the pawls were rotated
on their hinges through 180 degrees.
The drum, which was mounted on a spindle, was made in the form of a waisted
cylinder so that the rope going round it, often three or more turns, always tended to ride
into its centre. At the top of the capstan was the head into which four slots, or recesses,
were built on a dockyard capstan and up to twelve slots on a First Rate's main capstan. Into
these went the capstan bars on which the operators pushed with all their strength. On the
bigger ships, a double capstan was fitted with drums and bars on two decks. Not only did
this arrangement allow cables to be worked on both decks but it also doubled the manpower
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that could be applied. In Victory for example, 260 men, who could together exert a force
of 10 tons, were used when weighing anchor. Such power was needed in the first place to
haul the ship up to the anchor against wind and tide, both of which could exert great
pressure on a ship of that size. Then, once the ship was directly over the anchor, it and its
cable had to be weighed and the anchor alone was 3.75 tons'4
 and to that had to be added,
at any given moment, and depending on the depth of water, some 200 feet or more of
sodden 24 inch circumference' s
 hawser-laid rope cable.
Within the Dockyard capstans were used for warping (pulling) ships into their berths,
into and out of dry dock and operating lock gates as well as moving caissons into position.
Also numerous capstans were fitted strategically around building slips for moving and lifting
timber frames into place. The capstan had the great advantage that since the rope was
wound round it, rather than being fixed to it, there was no limit to how long the rope was
and indeed, if required, successive ropes could be joined together, with suitable 'bends and
hitches' which themselves could pass round the drum. As well as installed machines the
Dockyard also used small moveable capstans called 'crabs' which had two long bars going
right through the drumhead from side to side.
Apart from the power that capstans could generate, they were inherently extremely
safe and sensitive under very heavy load conditions. Even if a capstan bar, or the actual
capstan drum head itself broke or split, the pawls would stop the load taking charge and the
weight on the rope could actually be eased by what was called 'surging' it round the drum.
'Surging' is releasing the pressure on the 'inhaul' end which reduced the friction between
the rope and the drum and allowed the load to take charge, although it was always under
control. It may be a statement of the obvious but nevertheless it is important to remember
that the greater the pull being generated the more solid had to be the arrangements for
ensuring that the machine itself did not move. Not surprisingly therefore the majority of
capstans found around a dry dock, or a refitting berth, which were used from time to time
to move ships themselves, were permanent installations and their lack of mobility was
overcome by fitting them in significant numbers - typically four (or even more) around each
dry dock.
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Both capstans and windlasses have survived the test of time. The materials from
which they are made changed from wood to metal and successively powered by man, steam,
hydraulics and electricity, they still perform the same tasks in the same way. Interestingly,
in Portsmouth Dockyard today, powered warping capstans are normally worked by running
them at constant speed and changing the pull they exert on a ship by varying the tension that
two or three men exert on the 'inhaul'.
6.3.7. Dockyard Lifting Craft: As well as those dockyard craft mentioned in Section 4.2.4
for moving men and stores around the harbours and anchorages, all the Royal Yards used
a range of specialist lifting craft'6, and Portsmouth had a number of such boats. There were
five chain boats which carried chains for the permanent moorings within the harbour and
six mooring lighters which could lay or take up the moorings. These lighters were fitted
with a simple derrick crane with a moveable boom fitted with pulleys and cables and a
capstan for lifting heavy weights. There was a buoy boat which laid or took up the buoys
used to mark navigable channels into harbour, and tank vessels which were fitted with iron
tanks and pumps so they could supply water to ships at anchor. There were also dredgers
but these are discussed later in this Chapter.
6.3.8. Pumps and Pumping : The machines discussed so far were only a practical means of
moving water in any volume if it was contained in barrels; for large quantities, pumps were
needed. This requirement was by no means unique to the seafarer since on land there were
the ever growing needs to keep mines and agricultural land free of unwanted water and this
was as important to their communities as keeping ships dry was to the maritime world. Not
surprisingly therefore many improvements to naval pumps were suggested by landsmen.
Dockyards had an additional interest in both flooding and draining because of their
use of dry docks. The earliest of these were built to discharge water, or flood, using the
tides and natural drainage. However the size of vessel a dry dock could handle was
dependent upon the height of the tide which only reached a peak, or trough, once a lunar
month. In the interests of getting ships in and out of dry dock when required some form of
simple pump was clearly needed to augment the tidal range. From the time of Dummer's
dock-building programme in the 1690's pumping was used at Portsmouth and by the 1790's,
there were three pumphouses in the Dockyard. The pumps were probably two sets of chain
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pumps for each pumphouse and were operated by a gin driven by a six horse team. These
pumps could raise seven tons of water per minute'7.
6.3.8.1. Chain pumps had been developed by William Coles and Captain John
Bentinck, Royal Navy and were brought into service in 177018 for use in ships where
they were manually operated. The Chain pump had an endless chain running over
a sprocket wheel and through two wooden tubes, one taking the chain down into the
sump and the other returning it to the pump-head. The chain consisted of iron links
and at regular intervals along the chain there were double iron discs with leather
between them which was cut to fit the tubes. As the chain was turned and moved the
discs through the up-tube, the water was trapped between them and raised to a
cistern at the pumphead from which it was discharged. The chain pumps used by
Portsmouth Dockyard (Figure 6.1) were made on exactly the same principles as
ships' pumps, but they were much bigger - their iron discs had a diameter of twenty
four inches - so more water was raised at a tim& 9. In 1798, a l2hp engine replaced
the horses used to drive the large Dockyard pumps and by 1800, plans for six chain
pumps each capable of raising ten tons per minute were being considered with power
to be supplied by a 3Ohp steam engine.
6.4. Lift and Shift Engines - Candidates for Steam Power. It can be assessed that relative to their
suitability for the application of steam power, the key requirements, or characteristics, of lift and
shift machines around a Dockyard fell into four broad groupings:
6.4.1. Docks, Building
 Slips and Fitting Out Berths: these were all large areas along and
across which, at many varying points, a "lift" could be required. Whilst the frequency of
lifts across the area as a whole might have been high the frequency at any one point was
low. The net result was that lifting (and shifting) machines were employed in large numbers
and most of the smaller ones were portable. It was not until the techniques of building
mobile cranes, with long and high jibs and using flexible wire rope for their purchases were
invented that a few powered cranes became a realistic alternative to the many purchases
hung from scaffolding, sheer legs and the ubiquitous capstans.
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6.4.2. Workshops in the workshops of this period only the Metal Mills were involved in the
production of relatively heavy products like anchors and chains and the frequency of lifting
raw materials in and fmished goods out was very low compared to the length of the
manufacturing process. Therefore the focus for investment was inevitably upon that process
and it is difficult to envisage a case for introducing powered lifting devices which were not
part of the production machinery.
6.4.3. Stores: within the dockyard there were two distinct stores types. Firstly there were
the stores within buildings. Often on several floors where sensible design would have looked
to multiple entrances and exits to reduce the length of travel within the building and hence
the requirement would have been for several lifting points per store. Whilst unskilled labour
was readily available, it is difficult to envisage an economic case being made for introducing
multiple "powered" lifts when simple tread mill cranes were perfectly adequate. The other
type of store were the external timber stowages which covered a considerable area. Again,
mobility was the dominant requirement for the lifting devices quite apart from the fact that
the frequency of lift at any one point must have been very low, so speed of re-location was
as important as mobility itself.
6.4.4. Pumps: the fourth group is concerned with the pumping of water; both to empty or
flood docks and for the distribution of water around the area of the dockyard as a whole and
in particular for fire fighting which was an ever present requirement on a site with so much
combustible material. In the case of the docks it does have to be remembered that there was
still the need to bring the water to the pumps. Hence an integral part of bringing steam
power to bear in this area was the rebuilding of the docks to introduce a sump or reservoir
into which the docks could be emptied by gravity prior to the water being pumped out into
the estuary.
6.4.5. Afloat Power: The requirement here which inevitably comes to mind first is
propulsion and tugs but there were other areas such as dredging and afloat lifting devices
such as mooring lighters. On the face of it these were all prime candidates for the
application of steam power since, relative the structure they were fitted on, steam plants and
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their associated engines were static. Also the size of these vessels limited the degree of
manpower that could be brought to bear and, because of the mobility inherent in the vessel,
the plant was mobile. Portsmouth Dockyard exploited or planned to exploit steam power in
all these cases prior to the end of the Napoleonic War and they are examined later in some
detail in Chapter Seven.
In general terms (leaving aside the special case of "afloat" requirements) it can be deduced that
in Portsmouth Dockyard, as far as solid objects were concerned, the predominant "lifting" (and
shifting) requirements were for a few sporadic lifts in any one place but with a large number
across the Yard as a whole being undertaken at any one time.
Furthermore lifting and shifting machines, driven by muscle power, could be 'stalled'
without any adverse effect on the power source and power could be provided at the point where
it was needed. Furthermore, it could be applied in any plane or combination of planes. Moreover
if the power available was inadequate for the task in hand it could, within broad limits, be
increased. It was to take the design of steam engines some time to evolve to the point where
maximum torque could be applied to a static load and evenly maintained for a considerable
period of time, with little or no movement of the load. Today, slipping clutches, safety valves
and governors are taken for granted but all these had to undergo considerable development before
steam power could be safely used in many of the 'safety critical' situations to be found in the
process of lifting/moving heavy weights very accurately, often over very small distances. In the
case of bulk fluids (primarily removing water from the dry docks) technology had already
reached the point, by 1793, where it had much to offer the Dockyard.
6.5. Steam Power - Engine Developments. Steam was the major development in mechanical
power sources during the eighteenth century and this process continued into the nineteenth
century. By then other power sources were being discovered but it would be 50 to 100 years
before most of them were in general use. They included gas, made from coke or coal and used
for lighting and hydraulic power which is a means of transmitting energy through an
incompressible liquid such as water. The hydraulic press, patented by Bramah in 1795 was the
application of a small force to a piston with a small area which was moved over a long distance
to create a large force on a large piston moving slowly over a short distanc&°. Since this was
done very smoothly it was well suited to moving heavy objects, compressing and baling light
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bulky materials such as cotton, and testing the breaking strength of materials like rope. However
the greater the mechanical advantage achieved, the slower the "power head" moved, and it would
not be until much later that the fast-acting hydraulic servo systems we know today came into use.
The history of the development of steam power is well documented and Figure 6.1.1 shows
vividly the size of engines of this period. These particular photographs are of the 31.5 hp engine
at Crofton on the Kennet and Avon Canal. Built by Boulton and Watt in 1812, it is still in
working order today.
6.5.1. Single Action, Lift En gines: The earliest steam powered machines were single-acting;
that is to say they had a powered stroke followed by a return one. The number of
applications for a steam engine of this type with a rocking motion - the reciprocating engine
- were limited to operations which could accept a uni-directional power stroke such as
pumping, blowing furnaces and hammering.
By the end of the seventeenth century as mines became deeper, there was an
increasing need for a power source which could be used to raise water more effectively than
the efforts of man or horse allowed. In 1698, Thomas Savery patented his work to produce
a suitable power source based on an engine powered by steam 21 . Savery's steam engine was
made possible by earlier work by Caus and Papin on the effects of steam pushing on a
piston and von Guericke's work on the properties of a vacuum. By condensing steam in a
receiver, Savery created a vacuum which could draw up water from below the engine and
then use the steam pressure to force it up a pipe. Lifting and forcing pumps could only raise
water a theoretical 32 feet (in practice significantly less), so a series of pumps were needed
for deep mines.
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FIGURE 6.1.1 - CROFTON PUMPING ENGINE
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A number of Savery engines were built and installed but the engine of Thomas
Newcomen, which first appeared in 1712, was to have greater commercial success. In this
a vertical cylinder, fitted with a piston, was positioned over a boiler which produced steam.
The piston was attached by a chain to the curved end of a beam (arch-head), the beam
pivoted around its centre and at the opposite end to the piston was a pump rod which was
also attached to an arch-head by a chain. The pump rod went down the mine shaft. A jet
of cold water condensed the steam in the cylinder thus allowing the piston to be pushed
down by atmospheric pressure. At the same time, the pump rod rose at the opposite end of
the beam, this in turn let water rise towards the surface. A pool of water on top of the
piston stopped unwanted air leaking into the cylinder, and there was a valve to bleed off any
which did get in. The supplies of steam and condensing water were regulated by the action
of the engine - that is it say it was self-acting and as it used low pressure steam it was both
safe and reliable and could be built with the limited engineering skills of the time.
Newcomen's engine was designed for pumping, the first being built at Dudley in the
West Midlands. By the 1780's it was widely used on the Tyne coalfields and in the Comish
mining industry. As well as the capital costs of buying and erecting steam engines, owners
also had to purchase fuel, normally coal, for them. Where Newcomen engines were erected
on or close to coalfields, they ran on the small pieces of waste coal produced during the
mining process. For the Newcomen engines erected in Cornwall, fuel had to be imported
at considerable cost, so economies in the use of fuel were important. Subsequently many
Newcomen engines were replaced by Boulton and Watt engines as these gave a
considerable saving in fuel.
Watt's patent of 1769 for a separate condenser for the steam engine was the result
of his work on a model Newcomen engine. In order to get a good vacuum and therefore
power, the cylinder of the Newcomen engine had to be cooled down for part of the working
cycle but to be economical, the cylinder should be kept hot at all times. Watt solved this
paradox by the addition of a separate cylinder which was cooled to condense the steam,
while the cylinder in which the piston worked remained hot. In order not to cool the
cylinder further, by driving the piston down with air, steam was used instead. All Watt's
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engines used low-pressure steam as he felt that the likelihood of boiler explosions from
steam at high-pressure would cause a loss of public confidence in the steam engine.
Watt's engine was manufactured in partnership with Matthew Boulton of
Birmingham. Although the firm of Boulton and Watt were the premier engine builders of
the late eighteenth century, there were other firms making steam engines for local rather
than national markets, Fenton, Murray and Woods of Leeds, Phineas Crowther of
Newcastle and Bateman and Sherratt.
The size of engine which the materials and engineering skills of the mid to late
eighteenth century could produce, detennined its power output, which in turn depended on
the diameter of the cylinder and the length of stroke of the piston rod. If the pressure of the
steam was increased the size of the engine, for the same power output, was reduced and
therefore a high pressure steam engine was smaller than the equivalent low pressure one.
There were also savings on fuel with high pressure engines and building costs were reduced
as the space needed to install the engine was less. The use of steam at high-pressure was
demonstrated by Trevithick, with his road vehicle of 1801, and the locomotive for the Pen-
y-darren Ironworks in 1804. Subsequently his work on high-pressure steam engines was to
form the basis of the development of the railway locomotive. A Trevithick engine was
proposed for the second steam dredger to be used at Woolwich but was never fitted since
a boiler explosion at Greenwich made the Admiralty decide to fit a table engine similar to
that used in the Portsmouth dredger insteacP.
Another idea for using fuel to the best advantage was the compound engine which
had two cylinders, one being a small diameter and the other a large. The steam first entered
the small diameter cylinder where it dissipated some of its energy before passing into the
large cylinder at a reduced pressure, but still sufficient to effect an energy transfer. This use
of the steam allowed a better power output for the same amount of fuel. The first compound
engines were made by HomblowerV and Son from 1781, but as they used relatively low
pressure steam there was little advantage over a single cylinder engine. The idea was
developed by WoolP from 1804, using high pressure steam and it was this that led to the
further successful developments of compound engines during the nineteenth century.
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6.5.2. Double Action, Rotary Engines: Matthew Boulton had been one of the first to
appreciate the potential of rotary motion from a steam engine and encouraged Watt to solve
the problems of producing it. There were three problems which Watt had to overcome in
producing rotary power from a steam engine. Firstly, the need to produce more power,
solved by making the engine double acting. Secondly, so the piston rod could both push the
piston down and pull it up, its linkage with the beam needed to be rigid. Thirdly, there was
the problem of transmitting the power to a drive shaft.
Watt solved the problems with the three patents 29, that of 1782 for the Double Acting
Principle, 1784 for the Parallel Motion and again in 1784 the Sun and Planet gear. The
Double Acting Principle worked by closing the top of the cylinder so that steam could be
injected on both sides of the piston rod and it could be driven up as well as down. This
produced power throughout the cycle without an increase in the cylinder's volume and it
also gave a more even motion. Any excess air and water was removed from the system by
a small pump. For the piston to be able to both push and pull, the chain connection to the
arch-head of the beam was replaced by a rigid connecting rod but this tended to induce loss
of power and vibration as it moved away from the true line of the piston. To overcome this
Watt devised his Parallel Motion which was constructed of wood with brass bearings and
flexibly linked the beam to the piston rod so that the latter always moved in a straight line.
The final problem was how to connect the drive shaft to the machine and the most
obvious way was to use a crank such as was already in use on the foot lathe and spinning
wheel. 30
 Unfortunately, this idea had been patented by Pickard in 1780, so Watt devised the
Sun and Planet gear to perform the task. These were two toothed wheels, the Sun was on
the drive shaft while the Planet wheel which was fixed to the connecting rod from the beam,
moved around it. However, after the expiry of Pickard's patent in 1794 Boulton and Watt
built engines with a crank rather than the Sun and Planet gear. A flywheel was used to even
Out the pull and push of the piston and give as smooth a power supply as possible to
working machines. Transmission of power from the power source to working machines was
done by line shafting and either gearing or belts.
It can thus be said that steam power became available for practical exploitation in the
Dockyard work shops from around 1795 but of course that still left the necessary machinary
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to be invented and, as significant, the necessary building(s) to be erected. Figure 6.1.1.
shows the size of the beam on the Crofton engine and flywheels of the engines of this time
were approaching 30 feet in diameter. To widen the potential applicability of steam power
it was obviously necessary to reduce the size of the plant and, ideally, make it re-deployable
if not outright mobile.
6.5.3. Table Engines: In fact, during the late 1790's, efforts were being made to produce
more compact engines, generally referred to as table engines. There was no beam, and the
cylinder stood on a metal table with the piston rod being connected to the drive shaft
mounted below the cylinder. Henry Maudslay patented such an engine in 1807, but
Portsmouth Dockyard had installed a table engine designed by James Sadler in 1798, and
by 1802, Fenton, Murray and Wood of Leeds were selling portable engines 3' of 1 to 6
horsepower. Undoubtedly there were other engines of this type around by this time although
their records have failed to survive.
6.5.4. Transmission Arrangements: As machines became more powerful it became
necessary to transmit power over several floors of a large building like a textile mill, so cast
iron shafting and gears were introduced instead of wood. John Rennie 32 is credited with the
first installation of cast iron shafting and gearing at the Albion Mill which opened in 1786.
Gears and flywheels were cast in iron (Figure 6.2) and the inaccuracies in the working
surfaces were removed by filing or grinding so as to avoid "chatter" and excessive
vibration. Line shafting, also made from cast iron, was mounted above the machines and
received its turning motion either by interconnecting gears or by a pulley and belt (Figure
6.2.1). Pulleys, which distributed the power to the machines, had a large flat rim on which
wide belts made of leather were fitted. In some cases a rope take-off was used and in these
circumstances the pulley rim was grooved to prevent the rope slipping off. Belts were
arranged in an open loop between two shafts rotating in the same direction or crossed when
the two shafts needed to operate in opposite directions. Both ropes and belts could be
tensioned to prevent them slipping and conversely the tension could be released to allow
machines to be disengaged from the system without stopping the prime mover.
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Table 6.1 has already outlined the key advantages and disadvantage of steam with respect
to the older established sources of power. However there were a number of significant
considerations which had to be borne in mind when assessing the value of introducing the new
energy source.
6.5.5. Benefits of Steam Power - these included:
Potentially much greater power output was available from a steam engine than from
muscles, wind or water.
Continuous operation was possible over sustained periods.
Steam powered plant was not dependent on variations in the weather or climatic
conditions as was the case with wind and water.
With a static installation power could be distributed to a range of machines within
that installation by gearing or line shafting.
6.5.6. Drawbacks with Steam Power - these included:
Work had to be moved to the steam powered machine(s) - powered machines could
not yet be moved to the work wherever that was.
New skills were required of the workforce to operate the equipment, maintain it and
repair it.
There were large "up front" capital costs involved in installing steam powered
machines. There were subsequently the running fuel costs.
Machines had to be built to higher standards than had been demanded with wind and
water power generators. This was particularly true of cylinders, pistons and seals,
and these standards rose as the power demanded was increased.
Steam power was inherently inefficient and consumed fuel that had to be brought in.
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Furthermore, for Portsmouth Dockyard, like any other Government Military organisation,
there was the problem of how Parliament (advised by the Treasury) obtained and allocated
funding. Unlike any commercial business no Government Department (other than the Treasury)
was allowed to borrow money or acquire loans. Funding was allocated strictly on an annual basis
and, as a consequence of the Civil War in the Seventeenth Century, such funding was required
to be voted on and approved by the House of Commons - that situation continues to the present
day. Hence Defence demands for capital investment in any one year were in direct competition
with the demands of on going running costs n. Where capital investment was being sought as a
basis for subsequent reductions in running costs the case made had to be sound and accepted by
a range of sometimes "jaundiced" financial officials who all too frequently found that the
promised savings failed to materialise.
With no avenue to the "city" and its investors the proposers of investment by the
Government in new technology had to have both a sound case and real "presentational" flair. To
a significant degree they had to be "lobbyists" and this was a skill which was not natural to the
culture of a disciplined service like the Royal Navy. Nevertheless this skill was probably as
important as the technical developments in achieving the introduction of what was expensive new
steam powered equipment into Portsmouth Dockyard. Time and again the introduction of new
technologies into the Navy Board's area of business were associated with just a few well known
names such as Bentham, Maudslay and Brunel.
Against this background Table 6.2 suggests that Portsmouth Dockyard's record in exploiting
the developments in Steam Power in the period 1793-1816 was impressive. Indeed the
introduction of the James Sadler l2hp Table Engine in 1798 k appears to be one of the very first
recorded instances of this type of machine. What makes Portsmouth's record in this area even
more impressive is the variety of uses to which the steam engines were put - these are reviewed
in detail in Chapter Seven.
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6.6. Metals: Since the earliest years of this millennium, Man has manufactured a range of metal
products for use in warfare. Today, museums and historic houses contain many examples of fine
steel weapons and cast iron guns dating back to Elizabethan times. In the most general terms it
could be said that the supply of the raw material kept pace with the demand for manufactured
metal articles up to the middle of the eighteenth century. However, the situation changed with
the trading opportunities opened up simultaneously by the successive wars and the Industrial
Revolution. Together these factors generated a much increased demand for metals and an
expanding range of metal products.
Portsmouth Dockyard felt the full force of these pressures since, by 1810, the size of the
wooden fleet had virtually doubled with a corresponding increase in the demand for traditional
metal products. In the same timescale advances in metallurgy and the demands of modem
warfare saw the development of new products, like chain anchor cables, which were markedly
superior in many instances to the non metallic products they replaced. Initially chain cables were
used for permanent moorings in the Dockyards but subsequently, from around 1815, they were
supplied to ships of the fleet 3 . The combined result was a major increase, across the period, in
the requirement for metal output well above the 107% figure for the period suggested in Chapter
4 and this at a time when keeping the demand for raw materials under control was a matter of
priority since most of the iron used by the Dockyards was traditionally imported from
Scandinavia.
To enhance the productivity within Portsmouth Dockyard, whose smithy had been rebuilt
in the 1790s, major new facilities were added. Starting in 1802 with the Metal Mills and later
a Millwrights Shop which was followed by a new Iron and Brass Foundry. At the same time,
all the main Royal Dockyards had alterations and improvements to their Smiths Shops. Work at
Plymouth was undertaken in the late 1790s and started at Chatham in 1806 and at Woolwich in
1810 but it was Portsmouth that led the way in this area.
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As ironmasters were able to produce greater quantities of both wrought and cast iron, it was
used for a great range of things. By 1800, machines for the textile and other industries were
being made of iron rather than wood so that they could withstand the vibration and constant use
arising from the application of water or steam power to them. As more machines were made of
metal, that was in turn used to strengthen the buildings which housed them cutting down the fire
risk and allowing the upper floors of multi-storied buildings to sustain the weight of numerous
machines with their gearing and lineshafting. This enabled a number of processes to be brought
together, with centralised power source(s), on one Site. Iron was also used to construct the water
wheels, steam engines, flywheels and shafting which were used to drive industrial machinery,
and for the machine tools like lathes which were used to make machinery for manufacturing
where the metal was able to give greater accuracy as well as greater strength. From the I 830s
the railways, which had been preceded by tram and plateways, also made increasingly large
demands on the supply of iron products. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that the war itself
generated a major increase in the demands for iron armaments - notably cannon, guns and shot.
The production of steel was still a relatively small industry geared to the production of
cutlery, other cutting tools like shears and saws and of course small arms both for the military
and the domestic markets. Huntsman's crucible process, developed between 1745 and 1750, had
improved the quality of the steel, but it would not be made in large quantities until the 1850s.
Until the 1770s, the greatest use for copper was in combination with zinc to make brass.
Brass was a staple material in the Birmingham metal trades which made a large range of items
from cooking utensils and plumbers' wares to jewellery. However in 1776, during the American
War of Independence, another demand for copper arose when the Admiralty introduced copper
sheathing for the hulls of warships. By the French Wars from 1793 to 1815, many merchant
ships were coppered as well. As the numbers of ships in both the Royal Navy and the merchant
fleet rose, so did the demand for copper.
Ores of all these metals were found in quantity within Britain and in forms which could be
refined with existing knowledge but it was the advances and innovations in smelting and refining
which made the greater production levels possible. Discussion of the acquisition of resources for
the Royal Navy in Chapter 5 highlighted the problems of timber and the demands on the
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available resources by house building and the expanding metal industries where it was used as
charcoal in the smelting processes, in particular iron ore. A number of attempts were made
during the eighteenth century to substitute coal for charcoal in the smelting processes. Although
Abraham Darby had succeeded in using coke instead of charcoal in his blast furnaces about
1712, it was not until after the middle of the century that the process began to gain acceptance
by ironmasters. The pig iron produced was used in a molten state and cast into quite elaborate
moulds but as it was brittle when hammered, it needed further heating with charcoal in a finery
forge to make it malleable. Wrought iron which could be hammered into shape, was made with
charcoal and contained far less carbon than cast iron therefore it had different properties and
different uses.
One technique which used coal to refine pig iron was the 'stamping and potting' process
patented by the Low Brothers in 1761 and 1763. The pig iron was broken up and put into clay
pots with a lime flux and heated in a reverberatory furnace of the type which had been used in
the production of copper, lead and tin since the start of the eighteenth century. Unlike in a finery
forge where the metal and fuel were mixed together, in a reverberatory furnace the coal is heated
in a separate chamber. The sulphur content of the coal cannot contaminate the iron and hot gases
oxidise the impurities like carbon and silicon as they are drawn across the metal. When the
carbon had been oxidised, the iron could be consolidated by hammering. This process was widely
used by ironmasters but it was Henry Cort's patents of 1783 and 1784 that offered an alternative
method of using coal in the refining of pig iron and a means of greatly increasing output.
Successive paragraphs discuss the nature of developments in forges, smithies, mills,
castings, machining and scrap reduction with the detail of individual installations in Portsmouth
being left to the next Chapter.
6.6.1. Forges: Portsmouth Dockyard was very much in the forefront of applying the new
developments in the processing of iron and indeed can claim to have been instrumental in
at least two of the significant developments of the period. Henry Cort's two patents came
out of his approach to the Navy Board with an offer to reprocess old wrought iron mast
hoops. Although Cort was actually a Naval Agent, he had married the niece of Mr Attwick
who ran the Fontley Forge and had a contract to supply mooring chains and other iron
objects to the Dockyards. Attwick handed control of the forge to Mr Morgan who in turn
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passed it to Cort. After an initial contract with the Navy Board in 1780, Cort enlarged the
forge and went into partnership with Samuel Jellicoe who provided additional capital.
By the early 1780's Cort was receiving quantities of old wrought iron from the
Dockyards but he could not produce new items fast enough and therefore he stood to make
a substantial loss. His experiments to surmount this problem involved the use of
reverberatory furnace with coal fuel to heat the iron which was then put under a hammer.
It was reheated to white heat and passed through grooved rolls to produce flat bars, rounds
or squares. The bars were then cut and made into mooring chains, mast hoops or barrel
hoops. Not only did the rolls produce good tough iron, but the process was much quicker
and therefore cheaper than producing the same quality iron by hammering - rolling could
produce 15 tons of iron in an hour compared with 1 ton by hammering 37 . The problems of
having sufficient metal to keep the rolls working were solved by having several furnaces to
one pair of rolls just as in the cotton industry the produce of a number of spinners supplied
one loom.
6.6.2. Henry Cort: Cort was asked by the Navy if he could reuse old ships ballast which
was made of cast, not wrought iron, and this led to his second patent of 1784 for the
puddling process which amounted to a further development of a reverberatory furnace and
a rolling plant. During 1785 and 1786, Cort conducted tests in all the Royal Yards 39 on iron
made by this process and compared his product to the Swedish iron generally used40. The
Dockyard smiths reported favourably on the quality of Coil's iron compared to the Swedish
that they were accustomed to and Cort published a report on these tests which was seen, and
taken up by Richard Crawshay of the Cyfarthfa iron works 4 ' - one of the biggest in South
Wales, and this was a turning point in Cort's efforts to get his process for puddling accepted
by iron masters.
Although there has been much debate on the validity or otherwise of Coil's patents
of 1783 and 1784 (H.W.Dickinson42, W.R.Morton and N.Mutton , R.A.Mott and during
the nineteenth century by Samuel Smiles and J. Percy in the 1 860s) no-one appears to have
queried if Cort would either have produced his dry puddling process or have had it accepted
by iron masters without the interest shown by the Royal Navy. Or indeed, if the tests
carried out in the Dockyards had shown the dry puddled iron to have been of an inferior
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quality to Swedish iron. Certainly the Fontley forge continued to receive contracts from
Portsmouth Dockyard into the 1790's. In 1796, Portsmouth suggested to the Navy Board
that some of their spare stock of iron should be sent to Jellicoe at Fontley to be made into
mooring chains and swivels 45 . This idea was accepted, as was shown in two subsequent
letters in which the Dockyard officers gave their opinion on the prices Jellicoe had asked
for his work. These were £14 per ton for mooring chain and shacUes and £25 per ton for
mooring swivels47
 which they considered reasonable having taken the prevailing level of
wages into account.
The Navy Board's decision to issue contracts to Cort and Jellicoe for recycling their
scrap iron was a pragmatic one to get the best value out of old stores; in hindsight it shows
that even in the 1780s the work and provision of resources to the Royal Dockyards has a
more influential place in the history of technology than is commonly supposed. Doubly so,
as the money advanced to Cort for enlarging the forge by his partner's father was later
found to have been embezzled from the Navy Board funds.
6.6.3. Smithies: As well as changes in the methods of smelting and refining metals, there
were advances in the apparatus used. As blast furnaces became larger and took a greater
charge of ore and coke, the air blast had to be stronger and bellows had to be larger and
more robust. A typical blacksmith's bellows used to provide a blast of air for a forge
consisted of three wooden boards joined together with a concertina of leather. However, this
became worn with working and tended to split thus requiring it to be replaced regularly.
Inside the bellows was a valve which opened and closed as the bellows were pumped up and
down and expelled air through a nozzle set just above the level of the hearth. Blast furnaces
and large metalworking establishments used bellows with cast iron boards which were
powered by a water wheel but during the eighteenth century patents were taken out for
blowing cylinders which could be driven by a steam engine. These machines consisted of
a cylinder with a piston which was operated by a reciprocating engine, and this expelled the
air from the base of the cylinder down a blast pipe into the forge hearth. Wilkinson
produced a steam powered blowing cylinder as early as 1776. A blowing engine was
included in the equipment purchased for the new Metal Mills 49 at Portsmouth in 1803,
although the Smiths continued to use bellows in their forges.
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All metals could be worked manually, but this was very strenuous and time
consuming work, even when undertaken by a team of smiths each striking the metal in turn
before it cooled too much to become unworkable. From the fifteenth century, large forges
had mechanical hammers which were driven by a waterwheel and later by a steam engine -
Wilkinson had assembled such a plant in 1782. The earliest mechanical hammers; called tilt
hammers, date back to the fifteenth century and were robust and straight forward being
based on the lever principle. A tilt hammer had its shaft pivoted halfway between the head
(hammer) and the tail, the head was heavier than the tail which was thus elevated in the
static position. In use, the tail was depressed by a projection or 'cam' on a cylindrical barrel
which was driven by the power source. As the cam moved round and out of the way it
released the tail of the hammer and the head fell onto the anvil positioned beneath it.
By the end of the eighteenth century, there were two more types of hammer which
had much heavier heads and delivered a slower more powerful blow than those of the tilt
hammer. Both hammers had their pivot at the end of the shaft, but one, the belly helve was
worked by the cams lifting a projection on the side of the shaft which raised the head and
the other was called a nose helve, where the cam barrel was directly in front of the
hammer. Again the cam raised the head of the hammer during operation. Of the three types
of hammer the nose helve was the commonest type used for 'shingling' or working the iron
as it came from the puddling furnace. The smithy built at Woolwich between 1810 and 1815
was fitted with steam powered haimners for making anchors5° but the greatest problem with
all these mechanical hammers was that of controlling the strength of the blow delivered. In
the case of Iron, the blow needed to be softer for metal straight from the furnace and harder
as it cooled. This problem was eventually solved when Nasmyth's steam hammer came into
use in 1832.
6.6.4. Metal Mills: After the initial hammering, metals could be shaped into flat thin plates
or bars by passing them through power-driven rolls. The idea of rolls goes back to the
sixteenth century and was introduced to overcome the difficulty of reducing metal into rod
for nailmakers before it cooled so much that it could no longer be worked by hammering.
To reduce bar iron to rod, a slitting mill was used but there were also plain rolls for
producing sheets of metal or grooved rolls which were used to shaped bars into specific
shapes such as rounds or squares.
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Pairs of rolls made of cast iron were mounted one above the other in a stout cast iron
frame (Figure 6.3). The rolls were rotated in opposite directions which forced a lump of
metal presented to them through the gap between the rolls and as it came out the other side
the metal became thinner and longer. The metal was returned to the starting point over the
top of the rolls in what was known as a dead pass u
 - ready for subsequent passes through
the rolls. The gap between the rolls was adjusted between each pass by the use of screws
on the corners of the frame" and the rolls for producing bar iron, which were in
diminishing order of size across the roll, had grooves to give the required shape to the
material. The metal was passed through a series of these grooves until the requisite size was
reachedM.
The slitting mill" was mounted in exactly the same way as rolling mills, but they
were not as wide as the plain or grooved rolls. The slitting rolls consisted of discs with a
steel rim mounted on an axle, with a spacer of smaller diameter between each disc. As the
rim of the disc cut into the iron bar guides forced the cut metal either up or down over the
spacer discs and thus split the iron bar into narrower strips. The width of the spacer discs
controlled the final width of the metal rod produced.
One method of getting the rolls to contra-rotate was by connecting them to two
separate undershot water wheels turned by water flowing in opposite directions and it was
by this means that Henry Cort drove the rolling mill at his Fontley forge". Different types
of rolls were arranged on the same shafts so they were all driven by the same power
source" but as it was difficult to adjust the two waterwheels to prevent one roll moving
faster than the other, a flywheel was needed which was of a size to rotate three times to the
waterwheels' once". By the beginning of the nineteenth century rolling mills were also
being powered by steam engines and again Wilkinson was early in the field taking out a
patent for such a machine in 1792.
Although descriptions of rolling and slitting mills frequently refer to the iron
industry, they could be used for any type of metal. Indeed it was for the re-working of
Copper that the Royal Navy purchased rolling mills for use in Portsmouth Dockyard59.
170
6.6.5. Casting : As well as forging metals, the Dockyard had Foundries for casting metals.
All the metals commonly in use in the Royal Yards, Iron, Copper, Lead and Brass could
be cast as well as forged. A mould of the required shape was made in a sand bed for very
large objects, or in a mould box, and Abraham Darby introduced the idea of two part mould
boxes in his patent of 170760. The pattern was impressed into sand in the two halves of the
box and when the halves had been put together the molten metal was brought from the
furnace in a ladle and run into the moulds through a hole in the top (Figure 6.3.1). The
mould was then left until the metal was cold and had set 61 . In an exchange of letters between
the Navy Board and Portsmouth Dockyard officers in 1813, the Master of the Millwrights,
William Kingston suggested to the Navy Board that it would be possible to make an anchor
with a hollow shank which could be cast from best-quality mixed metal s. The responses
by Hamlet Vernon, Master of the Metal Mills to a query as to what would be required to
make an anchor with a hollow shank gives some idea of both the equipment of a Foundry
and the problems involved. Vernon said he would require a suitable space in which to do
the work with room to move the moulds around within it, a large drying stove for the
moulds, obviously of some more permanent material than sand, and a crane to lift them with
a furnace to melt the metal. None of these were then available to him.
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FIGURE 6.3
FIGURE 6.3.1
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6.6.6. Machining : The advances in power, forges and mills led inevitably to greater
precision in manufacturing metal goods but for their finishing, powered milling and grinding
tools did not come into general use until towards the middle of the nineteenth century. For
the period under review," finishing" continued to be undertaken by traditional hand powered
methods using files, grinding wheels or sand and rags. However machines for the
intermediate operations between casting and finishing appeared earlier.
Hand shears were used to cut either sheet or bar metal and a punching and shearing
machine, operated by three men, was installed in Portsmouth's Metal Mills in 18O5. In the
second decade of the nineteenth century planes for metalwork began to appear and indeed
Matthew Murray's plane was in use for the manufacture of slide valves for steam engines
as early as 1814. This was closely followed by a planing machine built by Richard Roberts
who is better known for inventing the self-acting mule for the Cotton Industry. However,
1818 saw the invention of one of the first examples of a milling machine by the American
Eli Whitney
6.6.7. Scrap reprocessing: Both copper and lead scrap could be reused after treatment in
a melting furnace. New scrap, which was from shavings, and pieces which occurred during
the shaping of the metal, could be melted and either rolled or cast into useable sizes. Old
copper scrap such as the sheathing removed from ships' hulls would have been put into a
melting furnace and when molten, the slag was skimmed off. Charcoal was stirred into the
molten metal with a green wood pole which assisted the oxidation of any remaining
impurities. This was then hammered or rolled to produce sheets or bars of purified copper.
Quite obviously, as discussed at the start of this Section, the Navy and its Dockyards were
forced by the Fleet's rising demands to invest in those technologies which enhanced their metal
production output. However Portsmouth Dockyard's involvement in metal re-processing derived
from other pressures.
Prior to the Portsmouth's facility coming into use, most of the Royal Dockyards were
returning their old copper sheeting to commercial manufacturers by the long sea route around
Land's End and up the Irish Sea - an area notorious for bad weather in winter and a graveyard
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for many small ships down the ages. Whilst the Channel routes to Portsmouth were not without
some risk, they were firstly very much shorter and secondly along them were places to which
ships could readily run for shelter. The net result of establishing a re-cycling facility at
Portsmouth must have been a major saving for all Yards in transportation costs as well as the
Navy having much less material tied up in "the pipe line". However the major reason for the
change from "contracting out", as was the case with the old iron scrap sent to Cort's Fontley
forge, to the building of extensive "in-house" facilities was in fact the search for quality. The
lack of this was a constant problem with contractual supply and indeed Cort did not get his
contracts until the quality of his product had been extensively examined. In the case of copper
sheathing the Navy Board had received numerous complaints about the poor quality of contract
processed copper and it could be said that their reversion to "in-house" facilities was actually in
accordance with their established policy of building their ships, whenever possible, in the Royal
Yards on the grounds that they had much more control over the quality of the materials used and
the standards of workmanship applied.
In summary it can be said that during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the
British metal industries expanded rapidly; this was particularly evident in the iron industry, but
copper, lead, tin and zinc industries also expanded. Table 6.3 illustrates the nature and rate of
advances in the development of metal manufacturing and if it is looked at in concert with Table
6.2 (developments in steam power) it would seem that the metal industry were quite remarkably
quick to exploit steam power - indeed it could be argued that in some cases the metal industry
was the driving force for advances in engines. Certainly the developments of these two areas
were very closely inter-woven.
Given that construction of the Metal Mills in Portsmouth Dockyard started in 1802, less than
10 years after updating of the Smiths workshops, and the plans for those Mills were expanded
three years later in 1805 to incorporate the re-cycling of copper sheathing on a Navy-wide basis
it would be difficult to draw any conclusion other than that Portsmouth Dockyard was very much
at the forefront of the application of new technologies in the metal area. Whilst its involvement
in "re-cycling" may have owed more to "necessity" than to progressive management strategy that
does not detract from the fact that the width of Portsmouth's investment in the new metal
technologies was impressive.
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6.7. Fibre: The introduction of "new" technology into the textile industries and in particular
cotton is inextricably linked with the Industrial Revolution and all the well known innovations
in spinning and weaving by machines and the application of first water and then steam power to
the making of cotton are very well documented. However wool, and flax for making linen, were
more difficult to mechanise and thus innovations in their areas developed more slowly as the
problems facing them took longer to overcome. Indeed the first patent for a spinning machine
for flax was not taken out in this country until 1815 - around 50 years after Hargreaves's
Spinning Jenny was invented. As there are similarities in the characteristics of hemp with flax,
the two fibres would have been similar in the development of their manufacturing processes.
There is very little information on the making and supply of canvas, but the Admiralty's system
obviously worked well and it was unlikely that any serious consideration was ever given to
producing canvas within the Royal Dockyards where space was always at a premium. There
would have been little to spare for the necessary spinning and weaving sheds or the associated
storage space for raw materials and finished canvas. Indeed sailmaking was to remain a hand
craft into the twentieth century in spite of the invention of sewing machines in the 1850's.
With any fibre based product, there are a number of stages in the manufacturing processes
where machines could be used rather than hand skills. Although the examples familiar to most
of us are from the cotton industry 70, there are 3 areas which need to be considered in the
manufacture of cordage - preparation of the fibre, spinning the yarn and making up the cordage
itself. To prepare any fibre for spinning, it is cleaned and then combed until the fibres are lying
parallel to one another. This was fairly easy to achieve with cotton which has a short staple 7t and
only has to be combed in one direction. Wool, flaxTh and hemp74 were far more difficult to
prepare and thus a more difficult process to mechanise because they needed to be combed in both
directions as the fibres did not have an even thickness.
Furthermore, as hemp had a very long staple - about three feet - it was both easy and
economic to spin manually. This remained the normal way of spinning into the 1860's 75 and did
not generally disappear until the early 1900's - in fact it can still be found in a few small roperies
today. Mechanisation of spinning for ropemaking only really began to make headway with the
introduction of different fibres 76 such as manila, coir and sisal during the nineteenth century.
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6.7.1. Powered Ropemaking Machines: There were a number of attempts to introduce
machines and a power source into ropemaking and Grimshaw is credited with building steam
powered ropemaking machinery in 1790 although the degree to which it was used for
forming the rope is unclear. As we have seen in Chapter 5, this process consisted of
twisting yarn into strands, strands into hawsers and finally hawsers into cables. Each stage
has more 'threads' to be twisted together and the product becomes larger in circumference
and heavier. A patent by Edmund Cartwright - better known for a power loom for weaving
cotton - was taken out in 1792 for a ropemaking machine with Cordelier. This machine was
able to maintain the opposite turning twists in each constituent element of the rope during
spinning and the idea was widely adopted.
The Navy Board and the Royal Dockyards considered and tested a number of ideas
which were suggested to them, these included, in 1793, Huddart's register plate and
forming tube78, ropemaking machines from Belfours 79
 and Seymour8° and later Goodrich and
Maudslay's forming machine for Chatham. Captain Joseph Huddart was a senior and
experienced commanding officer with the East India Company and therefore had practical
experience of the problems of wear and tear on ropes. His register plate and forming tube81
were designed to overcome the problems of the uneven tension on internal and external
strands in a rope which caused them to break. Huddart's approach was to put rotating
bobbins of yarn on a bobbin bank and pass the yarns through a pierced plate ahead of a
forming tube where they were compressed. This process allowed an even tension to be
maintained on all the yarns which increased the quality and working life of the rope.
It must be said that Huddart's idea was initially rejected both by the East India
Company and the Admiraltyu and therefore it does not seem surprising that there was little
interest from other ropemakers at that time. However, after the expiry of his patent the idea
was successfully adopted in the latter half of the first decade of the nineteenth century.
Benjamin Seymour's ropemaking machines were horse-powered, and they were given
trials in the Dockyardsu; three cables were made using unskilled labourers rather than
skilled ropemakers. The Portsmouth Yard officers who saw these trials were undecided
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about their merits, and had reservations about Seymour's working methods but they did
suggest further trials which should be attended by the Master Ropemakers.
The Yard officers were more impressed with John Belfours' machine when they had
seen it in operation in June 1799M and agreed that it was suitable for making the same types
of rope which had been specified in a Navy Board warrant of 28 May 1799. Machines of
this type were subsequently fitted at Deptford 85 in the early years of the nineteenth century.
They do not appear to have been a success, as they were replaced by Huddart's machines
which were used until 1855.
The forming machine made by Maudslay in 1811 still exists in the Ropery at
Chatham but it is unclear if Goodrich actually designed the machine, although he was
instrumental in its production. This forming machine could make six strands at a time and
was driven down the ropewalk by a ioop of rope taken round a capstan at one end of the
buildingV.
 Today it can still be seen in use although an electric motor has taken the place
of the capstan.
There were several attempts to apply steam power to the ropemaking processes
Proposals by Bentham in 1802 for a steam powered ropery at Woolwich, fitted with
machines designed by James Grimshaw of Sunderland, had been planned for three years
when the Navy Board ordered work to cease until further orders. No reason for the
decision is given, but on 20th July the Admiralty had informed the Navy Board of
Bentham's imminent visit to Russia. This quixotic decision by the Navy Board merely adds
fuel to the argument for a lack of support for technical innovation on the part of the Navy
Board.
6.7.2. Rationale for NOT using Power: Table 6.4 shows the degree of technical progress
in the Fibre area and it also shows the total lack of application of them in Portsmouth
Dockyard. A number of reasons for this can be advanced.
6.7.2.1. The "Fire Risk" factor. This would seem a very understandable reason for
the general caution in the application of steam power to Roperies given, as we have
seen, that Portsmouth had had three major fires9' in the Ropeyard in less than 30
178
years. Ropemaking was a particularly "high fire risk" process since hemp, if too
tightly packed and damp, will spontaneously combust; so correct storage of raw
materials was essential. Furthermore ropemaking used highly inflammable substances
like Stockholm tar - a by-product of the Scandinavian wood industry - as a
preservative for the yarn. Significantly steam power was not applied to Chatham;
probably the most innovative of the Dockyards in ropemaking until 1836. It is
uncertain whether Portsmouth ever used it although Henry Lewis in his description
of the Dockyard in 1854 mentions a 6hp engine used for tarring the hauls of yam,
the date of which is unclear.
6.7.2.2. Management Strategy. - There might have been a conscious decision by the
Navy Board to establish another yard (Chatham) as the "Lead Yard" in the rope area
in a similar manner to Portsmouth's position in the "Metal Area". This would have
made good sense especially as the workload on the Thames Yards was reducing due
to problems getting ships in and out of them. Consequently, there would have been
labour readily available to Chathain to fuel an expansion and offset a rundown in the
Dockyard's standing.
The idea of Portsmouth looking to external sources for much of its rope
requirements was already well established by 1805. As was shown in Chapter Five
(5.8.2.2) its 1805 ropemaking output (1,633 tons) was above that of Woolwich
(1,190 tons) but below that of Chatham (1,938 tons) and Plymouth (2,120 tons) with
Contractors supplying 7,696 tons. At 13% of the total, Portsmouth would have had
to go outside its own resources for much of its rope as it refitted some 42% of all
ships being refitted in Britain in that year. Given that this was a management practice
which appeared to be working it would seem illogical to invest both fmance, and
more especially space and people, in building up alternative supply sources within
Portsmouth Dockyard.
6.7.2.3. Personality Considerations - Within Portmouth Dockyard Management it is
reasonable to suggest the recent history of fires would not have put the Master
Ropemaker in a strong position, when it came to arguing for new resources whilst,
as suggested in 6.7.2.2, the situation might have been very different for his opposite
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number at Chatham. More significantly the "Men of Influence" in London may well
have had their own priorities for developments, quite apart from which they might
well have been reluctant to see Portsmouth grow even more into a "Super Yard"
with all the attendant management risks that might bring. Not least of these might
have been that the Dockyard Management might become more powerful than the
Navy Board would like; a "Head Office" type attitude which has certainly been in
evidence in Whitehall this century.
Whilst it is tempting to select 6.7.2.2 as the most acceptable of these hypotheses it would
be wrong to casually discard the idea that the "Personality" factor might have been the more
likely reason.
Whatever the reason Portsmouth Dockyard can have no claim to a place in the history of
the applications of new technology in the Fibres area across the period 1790 - 1815.
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6.8. Wood: As we have seen wood was the material used in the greatest quantities by an
eighteenth century dockyard. Wood had been used to provide shelter, transport and many
everyday items since the dawn of history. By the eighteenth century both the skills of the
craftsmen and the tools used had evolved for different crafts and trades - for example there were
different types of adze, each adapted to the particular needs of the shipwright, wheelwright,
cooper or carpenter using it. Many wooden items were produced by local craftsmen as and when
they were needed. There was thus little incentive to mechanize working of wood, unless large
quantities of nearly identical items were needed.
The way "mechanisation" could be applied to woodworking varied across the range of tasks
involved but power could be harnessed only to woodworking in one of two ways - either
rectilinear - in a straight line, or circular. Planing required rectilinear, boring needed circular
motion and drilling a combination of both although sawing could use either rectilinear or circular
motion,
In rectilinear movement, only one part of the sequence is "powered"; the recovery part of
the movement is not. For example, the blade of a plane is set so that wood is removed from the
surface on the forward movement only; the plane must then be returned to the beginning of the
work for the next powered stroke.
With traditional hand woodwork the object to be worked on was held steady with the
craftsmen applying the tool to it. However, with mechanized tools in this period the tool was
fixed and the work was moved onto it. Lastly the introduction of power generally demanded that
there be a means of stopping the machine when the piece of work was completed so that the
machinery was not damaged by running too fast without a load. The subsequent history of the
introduction of mechanisation and power into woodworking is largely recorded in terms of
factories in which a number of different woodworking processes were carried out together on
the same site. Nevertheless the records show that the basic processes of sawing, turning/planing
and drilling/boring were all mechanised, in one degree or another, prior to 1793.
6.8.1. Sawing: One of the earliest uses of mechanization was in sawing wood since the
preparation and cutting into planks of timber ready for use employed many men doing hand
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work. Sawmills powered by wind or water had been used on the Continent of Europe since
medieval times but attempts to introduce mechanical sawing into Britain in 1663 and again
a century later in 1767 were unsuccessful due to the hostility of the sawyers who were
afraid of losing their livelihoods94.
Where the rectilinear motion of a saw was required (as one uses a hand saw), one
saw blade could be used on its own, or several were set in parallel in a frame, although in
this arrangement the frame was more likely to be used for up and down movement. The saw
frame powered by a water wheel or steam engine, slides up and down in a second vertical
frame in the same way as a sash window does (Figure 6.4), The timber was advanced to
the saw on a horizontal frame which fitted through the vertical saw frame and a rack and
pinion used to move the horizontal frame forward.
The circular saw had been in use by clock and watch makers since the middle of the
seventeenth century and in the 1770's a circular saw, for making wooden blocks, was
introduced by the Taylor family - the Navy's chief contractor for blocks. The saw, a small
disc with teeth round its circumference can be seen in a portrait of Walter Taylor, thought
to have been painted in the 1780's. There were two primary options for installing a circular
saw. It could be mounted on a bench with belt drive (Figure 6.4.1) to give it motion placed
under the bench or it could be mounted on a moving overhead arm and raised and lowered
at need, as in Brunel's saw for the Wood Mills at Portsmouth.
6.8.2. Turning and Planing: The principle of turning on a lathe is ancient. There were two
types of lathe used for wood, the pole and the wheel lathes. The pole lathe where the work
is rotated by a string attached to a foot treadle is a simple machine made from easily
obtained materials and it could be used either in a workshop or in the open air. The foot
treadle to provide power leaves both hands free to control the tool being used to shape the
wood, and can provide different turning speeds as required. Lathes could also be turned
with a wheel like that used on a spinning wheel, a loop of cord went round a second wheel
on the same spindle as the wood to be turned and the larger wheel was turned by a handle.
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By the middle of the eighteenth century there were small lathes designed to produce
parts for clockmakers, which had tool-holding carriages giving greater accuracy to the work.
In 1770, Jesse Ramsden devised a lathe for making screws for instrument makers, this was
a lathe made of metal to work metal as were those of the early nineteenth century like
Maudslay's lathe of 1800w.
The idea of a machine for planing really originates again with the working of metal rather
than wood because the expertise of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century made
smoothing and finishing sheets of metal far more difficult than that of finishing wood where
there were many different types of hand plane. However, there were some mechanical
planes for wood and Samuel Bentham designed one during his years in Russia (1780-1791)
but it is unclear if it was ever made. A mechanical plane which was built, and used, was
designed in 1802 by Joseph Bramah for the Ordnance Board for the manufacture of gun
carriages by the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich'°'.
6.8.3. Boring and Drilling : The terms "Drilling" and 'Boring" appear to have been used
interchangeably in the period with machines being, in general, developed for metalwork
although small boring machines were used with wood for specific products. For instance the
Taylors used a simple machine to remove excess wood from wooden pulley blocks and it
would seem certain that machines which today would be classed as drills were an integral
part of later powered Block Mills.
Large boring machines were used to make water pipes and parts for pumps. The
object to be bored was firmly fixed and a rotating boring head advanced horizontally
although initially the head tended to wander off the true line as it moved. However,
Wilkinson's patent of 1774 solved the problem by mounting a bar on bearings at both ends
of the object being bored and the cutters traversed along the bar thus giving a straight bore.
This enabled Wilkinson to produce cylinders for Boulton and Watt's steam engines of a
regular wall thickness.
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6.8.4. Wood Mills: A "Mill" appears to have been the general name for a wood processing
plant utilising a variety of machines, but in general, a relatively restricted output. One of
the early examples was the Taylor's blockmaking mill at Southampton. This was followed
by a steam powered block mill in Portsmouth Dockyard and thereafter the term "Wood
Mill" appears to become more common as the range of uses for the products of the mill
diversified.
6.8.4.1. Taylor's Block Mills: It would be fair to say that Taylor's block
manufactury at Southampton was a model for what could be achieved in the
mechanisation of woodworking during the eighteenth century. From their first entry
into the business in the 1750's, the Taylor family planned and used machines as part
of their manufacturing processes powered by horses and later water. Improvements
in the design of blocks and accuracy of manufacture meant that Taylor's blocks were
half the size of the traditional hand-made product. This reduced the weight on mast
and spars considerably. The blocks were also more effective when used, and cheaper
to make. Firstly because they used, block for block, only half as much raw material
and secondly in their construction, they were produced largely by semi-skilled, as
opposed to skilled, labour. Although they nearly had a monopoly in supplying blocks
to the Royal Navy, the Taylor family were not the only firm using machines for the
sawing, boring and turning processes. The firm of Dunstervilles in Plymouth also
used machinery which was seen by Simon Goodrich during his visit in September
1802. Indeed, it is possible that these machines were purchased for use in
Portsmouth as a stop gap measure until the Block Mills, which took longer than
planned to build, were in full production.
It seems ironical that the drive for building the Portsmouth Wood Mills
appears to have been initiated by Bentham, via the Admiralty Board, following the
rejection by Taylor of Brunel's design for the machinery which he had first offered
to that firm before approaching the Admiralty. In fact the Block Mills, and their
machinery, built for Portsmouth were actually produced to a later design by Brunel.
6.8.4.2. Brunel's Block Machinery - Portsmouth: Taylor's blockmaking machines
were built with wooden frames, powered by horses or water and had stops and
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guides to ensure accuracy, the machines were used for a number of tasks on both
blocks and sheaves and the rest of the operations were done by hand. Brunel's
machinery has been described at length and in detail in the work of K.R.Gilbert'°3
and Carolyn Cooper'°4 . The machines were made of metal and driven by a steam
engine through belts and lineshafting and were constructed between 1802 and 1808.
The metal construction gave a greater robustness and rigidity to the machines and
thus the ability to achieve precision work. Unlike Taylor's machines, each operation
in making a block shell, sheave or its pin had its own specialist machine to perform
one operation only, and the partially completed component was moved to the next
machine for the subsequent operation. The only operations done manually were the
final shaping of the block shell with a spoke shave and the assembly of block shell,
sheave and pin. There were three series of identical machines to make blocks of
different sizes - 4 to 7 inches, 7 to 10 inches and 10 to 18 inches long'°. Figure
6.4.2 illustrates the range in size and complexity of some of the blocks to be found
in HMS VICTORY.
6.8.4.3. Portsmouth Dockyard Wood Mills: In a letter dated 21 December 1797 to
the Admiralty Board, Bentham suggested the use of machines which included
reciprocating and circular saws and machines for planing, rebating and mortising
which he had patented in 1791 and 1793. Although the machines were originally
designed for manual operation, by 1797, Bentham was proposing to power them with
a l2hp steam engine. Bentham's chief reason for this was ".... the substitution of the
invariable accuracy of the machine to the uncertain dexterity of expensive manual
labour"°7 . His ideas were accepted and the Portsmouth Dockyard Wood Mills were
built between 1798 and 1802.
6.8.5. Brunel: Marc Brunel's skills as an engineer were brought to the attention of the
Armed Forces due to his successful collaboration with Samuel Bentham over the
blockmaking machinery. Concurrently with patents for circular saws and wood cutting
machinery and setting up his own sawmills at Battersea, he produced designs and estimates
for machines to make cask staves for the Victualling Board in 1807. A more successful
venture was the design and erection of a steam-driven sawmill for the Gun Carriage
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department at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich on behalf of the Ordnance Board between 1808
and 1812'.
In November 1811, Brunel, in a paper'° 9 to the Navy Board, detailed the costs and
output for the six hundred Royal Dockyards sawyers as 66,000 feet of sawn timber per day.
He went on to show how with four sawmills, each composed of eight saw frames - with
an average of 36 saws per frame - an hourly output of 1,260 feet could be achieved which
would meet all the requirements of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, Woolwich and
Deptford. After amortisation of installation costs, 10% allowance for machinery
depredation, and 13.25% allowance for running costs, a gross saving of £14,400 per annum
would be achieved. The Navy Board was sufficiently persuaded by this to promptly enter
into negotiations with him to proceed and install the requisite machinery at Chatham.
6.8.5.1.Brunel's Wood Mill - Chatham: It was in his approach to this task that
Brunel moved the whole concept of power operated wood mills from just a factory
process to a totally integrated development in which transportation and movement of
raw and processed timber received as much attention as the sawing process itself. By
exploiting the presence of a 38 foot high hill and sinking a huge 90 foot shaft to river
level, he introduced a series of hydraulically operated inclined planes, iron railways
and a large moveable crane with a huge arm. A 32 horse power steam engine
pumped water around the system of balancing tanks and powered the sawmill of 8
frame and 2 circular saws where 10 or 12 men undertook the work processes which
had previously employed 50 pairs of sawyers"°.
Although this ambitious project was not fully commissioned until 1816, it was
still years ahead of its time. In the space of a mere 15 years, Brunel had advanced
the 'bulk' processing of timber in this country from the 'status quo' of the previous
200 years to a highly manpower efficient and totally mechanised process. Whilst the
transportation elements of his system were unique to the site at Chatham, other
elements of the scheme were used in different Dockyards.
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6.8.6. Basis of investment in Wood Machines: On the evidence it would seem entirely
justifiable to suggest that Portsmouth Dockyard was very much to the forefront of the
exploitation of new technology in the woodworking processes during our period which are
summarised in Table 6.5. However it is particularly interesting to assess the driving forces
behind this. - Three considerations initially stand out:
6.8.6.1. Bentham: The influence of Samuel Bentham with the Admiralty Board, and
subservient to that, the Navy Board - albeit somewhat reluctantly, as some of its
members were undoubtedly apprehensive about Bentham's high standing with the
Admiralty.
6.8.6.2. Bentham and Brunel: The origins of the close working relationship between
Bentham and Brunel are not clear but both men were entrepreneurs and first-class
engineers at a time when the latter were a relatively small and select section of
society and this must have played its part. More obviously they complemented each
other's apparent ambitions. Bentham must have found Brunel's expertise of
enormous value in pushing through his ideas for modernising the Dockyards and
Brunel must have greatly valued Bentham's access to the Admiralty and his ability
to promote Brunel's engineering designs into outright contracts and funding.
6.8.6.3. The Scale of Woodwork in Portsmouth: Lastly Portsmouth Dockyard was,
on the evidence of Chapter Four, the Navy's biggest refitting yard and user of blocks
and this would have made it a contender for the establishment of the Navy's first
Wood and Block Mills.
6.8.6.4. Accidental Factors: All the above factors point to the influence of
personalities being the dominant reason behind Portsmouth Dockyard's "primacy"
in the exploitation of the new technologies in woodworking. Whilst that is
undoubtedly true in part, there is strong evidence to suggest that a more immediate
reason that Portsmouth Dockyard was so early in the field was very largely
accidental. In 1795 Bentham succeeded in persuading the Admiralty, in principle, of
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the benefits to be obtained from introducing machines for woodworking but that body
remained reluctant to authorise, and fund, an installation in a Royal Dockrd".
However, the Admiralty was content for Bentham to use his new machines, powered
by a steam engine, as a trial during the construction of six experimental vessels he
was under contract to build at Redbridge, not far from Portsmouth.
In the event the steam engine, designed by Sadler, was sufficiently delayed
in construction that the opportunity to use the plant during the building of those
ships, passed before the engine arrived in Portsmouth from where it was to be
transported to Redbridge. Benthain therefore pressed the Admiralty to approve the
installation of his machines and the steam engine in Portsmouth and approval was
actually given in 1797112 for what was to be the Portsmouth Wood Mill.
In other words the origins of Portsmouth Dockyard's early exploitation of new technology
in the wood area owe as much to a "damage limitation" exercise on Bentham's part as they do
to the Admiralty's commitment to this new technology and Portsmouth's requirements for it.
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6.9. Miscellaneous: Discussion under this heading, in this Chapter is limited to what can best
be called "Services and Structures" in which technology in the period advanced significantly and
played a major part in the business of the Royal Dockyards. Inevitably, other technological
advances in the period will have been omitted in the interests of remaining within the finite limits
of a thesis - both in terms of time and in terms of the size of the work itself. The exclusion of
a particular item is therefore no reflection on its significance but results entirely from the
author's view of its direct relevance to the potential of new technology in Portsmouth Dockyard
between 1790 and 1815 its interaction with advances in the primary work areas already
discussed. The selected areas are:
Dry Docks - for refitting and fitting out of ships.
Dredging - of channels and dock approaches.
Sea Transportation - (in sheltered confmed waters - NOT open seaways).
Services and Structures - Water, fire fighting and buildings (from the technical standpoint)
Land Transportation - as it could potentially apply within a limited industrial site.
6.9.1. Dry Docks: Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Royal
Dockyards were enlarged and improved and the same was true of commercial docks and
harbours as the rapid increase in the tonnage of merchant shipping created a demand for
facilities to load and unload goods regardless of the state of the tide. Engineers like John
Smeaton and John Rennie were involved with harbour works and the building of
lighthouses. By 1800, the largest wet dock outside the Royal Dockyards was the Brunswick
Dock, built for the East India Company at Blackwall on the River Thames in 1790 3
Associated with the wet dock were warehouses and bonded stores. This pattern of wet dock
and warehousing was repeated in the docks built in the early years of the nineteenth century,
notably the West India Docks in 1802, and the East India Docks in 1808114 to serve London,
but other ports such as Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Bristol and Glasgow were also
increasing and improving facilities.
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As far as dry docks were concerned the Royal Dockyards inevitably led the way
simply because the ships of the line were so much bigger and more sophisticated than the
merchant ships of the period. The only possible exception to this generalisation were the
ships of the East India Company and even they barely approached the size of third rates (74
guns). Portsmouth dry docks were expanded and updated between 1796 and 1803 under the
direction of Benthain and this work included the introduction of caissons instead of the
traditional lock gates. Further discussion of the detail of the complex and how it shared
steam power for pumping with other new plant in the dockyard will be found in the next
Chapter.
6.9.2. Dredging: The problem with dry docks is keeping the channels leading to and from
them clear of silt and with a depth of water sufficient to enable ships to be warped in and
out of them on a regular basis. Furthermore this requirement to maintain a given depth of
water frequently extended right across a harbour or dockyard since the action of wind and
tide tends constantly to move mud, sand and gravel into the channels through which ships
must pass and up against the walls where they lie alongside. Wherever possible engineers
utilised the natural water flow to scour out silt but in many circumstances it was also
necessary to remove mud by mechanical means. Indeed, the difficulty of doing this in
sufficient bulk was a constant problem for both the Admiralty and Commerce alike in the
Thames Estuary. It was also a problem within Portsmouth Dockyard and particularly the
approaches to the dry docks where regular dredging was essential.
At its most basic, dredging was done either by digging the silt out manually with
spades at low tide, or by the use of scoops on long handles operated over the side of a boat.
By the 1750's dredgers with several buckets or bags that could move round a frame or chain
were in use in Sunderland harbour and under the aegis of Trinity House on the River
Thames. The bucket chain either worked over the side of the dredger or through a central
well in the hull and around 6 tons of mud could be raised in an hour from a depth of 10 feet
by this means"5.
In 1780, the Hull Dock Company commissioned a horse powered dredger with
eleven buckets on a ladder frame which could work at a depth of fourteen feet and raise 22
tons of mud per hour"6. The first steam powered dredger, using steam to power the
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dredging operation, was introduced in Sunderland harbour in 1798. It was fitted with a 4hp
Boulton and Watt engine which cost £390 and the mud raised was removed by a hopper
barge; regrettably history does not record the hourly "lift" of this vessel. Nevertheless it
appears to have been used for some time but the engine and hopper barge were sold in 1804
so it may not have been a great success"7.
Although Portsmouth was using a dredger of a similar type to Trinity House's, in
April 1800118, Samuel Bentham proposed to the Admiralty Board, the building of a dredger
with steam powered machinery. This idea was accepted and the vessel was built in
Portsmouth Dockyard at a cost of £1685119 with its machinery being made in London. Its
performance was impressive, as it was able to lift 80 tons of loose shingle an hour from a
depth of 14 feet and it remained in service until 1816.
A second vessel for use at Woo1wich'° was subsequently built between September
1805 and April 1806 at a cost of £2986 and this had an even greater capability being able
to work down to 21 feet and lift either 60 to 70 tons of gravel or 90 tons of mud per hour.
This vessel appears to have had an even longer life since it was not withdrawn from service
until around 1830121.
6.9.3. Sea Transportation. Since Roman times, damaged or becalmed ships had been moved
by towing with smaller boats and the effects that could be achieved were limited only by
human endurance but the arrival of steam was to change this dramatically.
Early steam powered tugs had wooden hulls and paddle wheels. Initially designed for
work on inland waterways such as lakes or canals, the tug quickly developed for use on
tidal rivers and at sea. The first successful trial of a steam powered boat took place on a
Scottish loch in 1788 when a steam engine, designed by William Symington, drove a paddle
wheel positioned in the centre of the stern (transom). The same layout, but with an
improved engine, was used for the 'Charlotte Dundas' which on the 28 March 1803 towed
two 70 ton boats into a strong headwind for nearly twenty miles along the Forth and Clyde
Canal in six hoursln.
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The first tug to enter commercial service was the 'Industry' built in Glasgow in 1814
and she remained in service until the 1870's. Her design was different from that of the
'Charlotte Dundas' in that a single paddle wheel was fitted well forward on the centre line
so that it 'pulled' the vessel along rather than 'pushing' itlu. Within two years major ports
like London, Liverpool and Newcastle had tugs in service.
Attempts were made to interest the Admiralty Board in the application of steam to
power vessels. Charles, Earl of Stanhope undertook trials of a small vessel on the Thames
during the 1790's' 24 . Another attempt was a private venture by James Linaker, the Master
of Millwrights at Portsmouth, whose plan is described in a letter of 4 July 1808 to
Goodrich'. It appeared that a 2 hp steam engine was to drive two pistons which would
force sea water through trunking and out at the stem - in effect this would, if successful,
have pre-dated the "Pump engine/jet" we know today by 170 years. In a subsequent letter
of 19 December 1808, Linaker told Goodrich that the Navy Board would not advance funds
for the trial since they did not believe his concept was applicable to ships of war. However,
he would do the trials at his own expense'. Most unfortunately any further correspondence
on the subject has not survived and therefore the outcome of the trials is not known.
6.9.4. Water Supplies: Today, the vast majority of the population of Great Britain take the
instant availability of water from the tap for granted. Two hundred years ago, the situation
was very different with the majority of people depending on buckets to move the water from
either a well, a pond or a river to where it was needed.
Piped water supplies had existed from Roman times but these were, in the main,
dependent on some form of storage - be it a lake, pond or water tank (topped up by a
horsedriven or waterdriven pump), positioned at a higher level than the outflows. For those
people living and working in flat areas it was not until steam driven pumps were introduced
at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that mains water supplies became a
practicability. The New River Company was the first of London's great water supply
companies and its aqueduct to supply the Round at Clerkenwell was formally opened in
1613. The company's first steam pump was installed in 1768 and by 1822 no fewer than
nine separate water companies were supplying the needs of London while, at the same time,
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the arrival of steam pumps led to a major expansion of the water industry across the
country.
In the inunediate vicinity of Portsmouth Dockyard, the Portsea Island Water
Company' 27 was founded in 1808 to supply piped water in Portsmouth Town but it was in
direct competition with the Farlington Water Company, also founded in 1808. This company
drew its supply of water from the springs along the base of Portsdown Hill and used a 24hp
Boulton and Watt steam engine and 28 miles of main and service piping to supply their
customers in Portsmouth.
Until the establishment of these companies, Portsmouth Town depended for its water
supply on springs and wells sunk into the sand/gravel strata. Portsmouth Dockyard was also
subject to the same geological conditions which did not retain the water as well as some
other materials and thus the supply was periodically threatened by droughts or lack of rain.
It is not clear from the surviving records where the Dockyard's fresh water supply was
located. Historians are at odds with each other on the subject since Roger Morriss says that
Portsmouth had no natural fresh water supply' while R.J.B. Knight, writing about the Yard
during the American War of Independence' says that supplies were usually adequate which
suggests a nearby source if it is not within the Dockyard. According to the London
Journal'30 of 7 September 1723 - "The dockyard by the late improvements is made the best
in England, and from a well in the centre of the yard they are about to lay pipes to one of
the Gitty'3' heads, where three longboats may come at any time of the tide to fill
water......" The existence of a well within the Dockyard is confirmed by Bentham's
comment in a letter of 27 September 1801 which refers to" several wells at different parts
of the Yard...". A plan enhancing any existing water pipes and storage tanks within the
Dockyard was proposed by Bentham in a letter of 12 February 1797132 for a ring fresh water
system to provide for the needs of ships, the Dockyard and firefighting. Included in the
scheme was a new fresh water well, which was completed and in use by 1801. Tanks to
store water for everyday needs were used in the Dockyard as a Navy Board instruction of
30 June 1778 refers to water tanks to be built on the north side of the Ropehous& 33 whilst
in 1791 the Yard officers sought permission to install a 50 gallon water tank to provide
water for the smiths's.
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6.9.5. Firefi ghting : By the eighteenth century, mobile apparatuses to deal with fires were
being developed; Richard Newsham patented a manually pumped fire engine in 1721, which
was based on the principle of a pump. Along each side of the engine were handles and foot
treadles which were operated by teams of men. The more men who could work, the greater
the jet of water produced BUT the water had to be constantly replenished by buckets.
Subsequently Newsham made six different sizes of improved fire engine, the largest of
which could project 170 gallons per minute a distance of 40 yards' 35 . In bucket terms, that
equates to two three-quarters full two gallon buckets being provided at the fire engine every
second. Not surprisingly; there were obvious attractions in having a ring main readily
available. A further comment from Bentham's letter of 12 February 1797 about water for
firefighting says "...by means of Engines used on such occasions...." which suggests that
the Dockyard did have firefighting appliances at that date.
6.9.6. Buildings and Fire Precautions: By the end of the eighteenth century, manufacturers
were having to take the potential dangers of the steam engine and the weight of the new
machinery into consideration as well as traditional fire risks in building factories and
workshops. Investigations by William Strutt in the 1790's into the problems of fires in
cotton miu1s' initiated a wider use of brick as a structural material and the use of fire
resistant cast iron in place of wood for internal elements such as supporting pillars and
floors. These ideas were incorporated in his calico mill at Derby built in 1793. The first
fully iron-framed building was a flax mill built at Shrewsbury', which was owned by
Charles Bage who was a friend of Strutt.
The Dockyards were particularly aware of the hazards of fire with many of their
structures, built in the seventeenth century, being of wood as well as being used to process
or store combustible materials such as hemp, pitch, tar, or wood. The planned extensions
to Portsmouth Dockyard, which were approved in 1760 and undertaken over the next 20 to
25 years, called for brick rather than wooden buildings to mitigate these fire risks. The
beneficial effect of this policy was demonstrated when the fire of 1776 gutted the ropehouse,
but did not spread to the adjoining buildings, unlike the fire of 1770, which had not only
devastated the ropemaking facilities, but caused considerable damage in the centre of the
Dockyard.
199
However the new brick storehouses, as well as the ropehouse and sail loft still had
their internal floors, supporting columns and stairs made of wood' although during the
1780s, fireplates to inhibit the spread of fires in particularly vulnerable areas were
introduced. These were probably made of cast iron or tin and were fitted under the floors
of the storehouses, ropehouse' 39 and the rigging house' 40. Portsmouth Dockyard's first 'fire-
proof structure, built of brick with cast iron vaulting, was the Pay Office built about
18O8''.
6.9.7. Railways: The eighteenth century saw developments in both the construction of
coaches and wagons and in the road surface on which they were used. Typically these
plateways, wagonways or tramroads were to be found where large quantities of coal or
other minerals were moved from the colliery or quarry to a point of embarkation on a canal,
river or the sea. Initially, the movement of loaded wagons along wooden, or cast iron rails
was dependent on horses to pull the wagons but later stationary steam winding engines were
introduced. It was not until Richard Trevithick invented the steam locomotive in 1804, that
"mobile" power became available and the steam railway could take on the role of 'common
carrier' of goods and people.
R.C.Riley writing about Portsmouth Dockyard says that "Given the unevenness of
the roadways and the weight and quantity of materials moved within the Georgian
Dockyard, quite apart from the presence of such clear-sighted men as Bentham and
Goodrich, it may be assumed that some form of tramway must have existed 142" but evidence
to support this assertion has not come to hand.
Indeed there would have been major difficulties in using such a system in a Dockyard
at this time. Firstly, the wagons of the period were tubs on wheels which, whilst being
suitable for moving bulky minerals, were much less usable for timber where a flatter and
longer wagon was needed. Secondly, the layout of the Dockyard was against the economical
use of time and effort in running a tramway compared with moving lines of wagons from
the point of loading to the point of delivery and back. The Dockyard would have needed to
supply many different points all of which were relatively close together, unlike a colliery
which needed just one or two lines between the loading point and a quayside, possibly at
some distance.
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However the Navy Board quite clearly accepted the principle of a tramway as Marc
Brunel used a steam driven crane running on overhead rails to lift timber as part of the
infrastructure for his sawmills at Chatham in 18 12'.
6.9.8. Roads: Side by side with the early phases of railways were improvements in the
construction of roads, pioneered by men like Metcalf, Telford and Macadam who
emphasised the need for good foundations and cambered, firm surfaces to improve drainage.
However there is no evidence of such techniques being used in this period to improve the
roadways in the Dockyards. It may well be, certainly in the case of Portsmouth, that the
distances involved within the very restricted Dockyard site, did not appear to justify the
expense. Or, more likely, the inevitable interruption to the daily work of the yard, whilst
such work went on, was not acceptable in wartime.
6.9.9. - Assessment of the "Miscellaneous" Area: In 1790, Portsmouth Dockyard was still
in the process of implementing a large number of "services and structures" improvements
which had been initiated in the 1760s as a result of earlier serious under investment in the
Royal Dockyards being forcibly brought home to the Government of the day. With the
outbreak of war in 1793 and the demand for the Dockyards yet again to expand the
operational fleet as fast as possible it was natural that the ongoing improvement plan should
be enhanced, expanded and extended. As a result, Portsmouth's applications of the emerging
new technologies in the miscellaneous area, summarised in Table 6.6, was generally
amongst the early investments and, in some cases such as in the dry docks and dredging,
right at the leading edge of the new technologies.
Only in the transport area did the Dockyard, certainly in this period, not exploit the
advances available. Whilst its lack of investment in rail or plateways would seem to be
based on sound economics, its tardiness in recognising the benefits to be had from steam
driven tugs does not ride well alongside its other enthusiasms for steam power. However
it is most unlikely that a decision on whether to invest in steam tugs was taken at a level
below the Navy Board and it is even more likely that it was taken at Admiralty Board level.
Understandably that organisation could hardly have been expected to look favourably on an
invention that potentially could (and did) challenge the supremacy of the world's largest
sailing navy.
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6.10. Overview of Available Technology with Dockyard Potential. It will be recalled that this
Chapter set out to discuss the technological advances that came available during the period up
to 1816 which had potential for application within Portsmouth Dockyard. Since the detail of those
that were introduced into that Yard are discussed in greater detail in the next Chapter this
Overview is biased towards sunimarising those advances which had potential but which were
exploited.
In the general area of the "lift and shift" of solid objects advances in the technology of the
period generally involved static machines and machinery. However the primary dockyard
requirements were for lift/shift right across the yard with very few fixed "high utilisation" lift
points and therefore it would seem that it was sound economic sense for the Dockyard to
continue with its range of purpose-built portable devices that met its many and varied
requirements. In the area of lifting and shifting water the Dockyard's exploitation of steam
pumping in the period was considerable (the details are discussed in the next chapter).
Portsmouth's exploitation of developments in the metal area was extensive and the
substantial investment in re-cycling copper (and, on contract, wrought iron) could be envied by
many of today's industrial plants. In the wood area the Yard also exploited a whole range of
developments and in a number of them it led the way - not only in the Royal Dockyards but
across the national industry as a whole. In the "miscellaneous" area it was also well to the fore
with the exception of transport. Its lack of investment in railways/plateways would seem to be
based on sound economics but the decision not to invest immediately in steam tugs must surely
have been an Admiralty Board one - based possibly on "policy or strategic considerations" - a
suggestion which actually may be both fairer and more accurate than just claiming that the
Admiralty was driven in this matter purely by "conservatism" or "tradition".
The one major area in which Portsmouth totally failed to invest in new technology was
"Fibre". The reasons for this are not clear and the possibilities include the Yard's fear of fire
in the rope works, a sound management decision by the Navy Board to use some yard, other than
Portsmouth as the "lead" yard in this area and for Portsmouth to rely on supplies from other
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sources. Lastly there could well have been a lack of influence on behalf of the senior fibre
management within Portsmouth. Dockyard.
Across the whole of the technologies two things stand out as far as Portsmouth Dockyard
is concerned:
The variety of activities in which Portsmouth was involved and the range of technical
innovations introduced in the period was very large. It would seem doubtful if there were
many, if any, other establishments in the country which invested in so many new advances
in this period.
The name of Samuel Bentham comes up time and time again, both as an advocate
for approvals and funds from the Admiralty and as engineering project manager. In
addition, he even produced some inventions himself. The debt the management of that
Dockyard owed to him in this period was immense. He may well not have been as gifted
an engineer as Brunel but as a Project Manager, there are a great many areas in Defence
today where he would be most enthusiastically welcomed.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
INTO PORTSMOUTH DOCKYARD
7.1 Introduction of New Technolo gies into Portsmouth Dockyard. Chapter Two introduced the
various Authorities and bodies who were ultimately responsible for approving and funding new
technology in Portsmouth Dockyard whilst Chapters Three to Five considered the reasons for
such introductions. Chapter Six reviewed the relevant new technologies which were potentially
available and identified those which were, and were not, in fact exploited. This Chapter now
looks at the individual applications of the new technologies in the Dockyard with reference to
who proposed them, how they caine to be approved, procured and installed and how that
installation took place in relation to the Dockyard site itself, other installations within it and to
the people who worked in that yard. It does this by first examining the common aspects affecting
all installations before moving onto the specialist work areas along the lines followed in earlier
Chapters, although in this Chapter, consideration of the steam engines, the dockyard site and
the dry docks comes ahead of the familiar areas of metal and wood since the dock and steam
engine investment were very much "common" considerations.
It is impossible to avoid consideration of the administrative aspects which governed so
much of the process of introducing new technology into the Dockyard but discussion of them is
limited, as far as is possible, to the consequences of the "inputs" to and "outputs" from the
process, as they affected the advance of technology, with the detail as a whole being presented
in a series of tables and diagrams.
Inevitably the pace of the introduction of new technologies varied greatly through the period
1790 - 1815. In the period up to 1800/1801 the attention of all concerned with Portsmouth
Dockyard was focused on the twin imperatives of meeting the immediate needs of the fleet and
in completing the major re-build of the dry dock complex which, more than anything else, was
limiting the Yard's ability to match the output demanded of it. From 1803 onwards however the
pace of technological innovation steadily increased until the moment when victory in the war
against France appeared assured and hence the need for the fleet began to decline. At that point
the funding for new applications began to dry up.
At the start of the period the Admiralty was severely limited in the selection of suitably
qualified personnel to whom it could delegate the actual authority for initiating and implementing
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the introduction of new technology, to a relatively select and small number of technical
entrepreneurs and inventors none of whom were long term naval personnel or Admiralty
servants. However, as events unfolded, there was a steady growth in technical familiarity across
the Navy Board's fields of responsibility until by the end of the period we see the appointment
of the first de facto "Chief Engineer" of the Navy and the recognition and growth of a range of
technical skills across the Dockyard area.
The installation of steam power was undoubtedly a major part of the "engine of change"
throughout and by the end of the period Portsmouth dockyard had no fewer than 8 steam engines
installed on site with their combined power generation having risen from l2hp in 1797 to l46hp
by 1814.
Common to all considerations of new technical applications in Portsmouth Dockyard was
the site itself. Paradoxically the fact that the site was surrounded on two sides by water, which
made it so suitable as a Dockyard in the first place, was also the principal cause of the
management not being able to take a "green field" approach to the establishment of new plant
and being so constrained in how they approached each new installation. This engendered a
parsimony with land allocation and a leaning to duplication of use wherever possible. The
resultant technical advances therefore tended to be innovative in their installations.
After an examination of the Metal and Wood working areas the Chapter is completed with
an overall view of the technical investments and advances that are discussed within it.
7.2 Administration Process for Introducin g
 New Technology . Figure 7.1 attempts to illustrate
the principal administrative steps in the process between the origination of an idea for new
technology in Portsmouth dockyard through to the point at which the resultant plant was in full
use.
7.2.1. Proposals & Approvals. At the "new ideas" stage there was effectively a figure of
eight (illustrated in purple with the element designators being prefixed by "P") between the
Admiralty Board, the Navy Board and the Dockyard with the Navy Board being at the
centre of the pattern. Ideas were brought to the Navy Board either from the Dockyard or
from a wide range of interested parties such as civilian entrepreneurs, engineers, serving
officers or from commercial organisations involved in the maritime business - be that in
terms of operating ships or in terms of supplying and fitting equipments to them.
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Where the Navy Board thought an idea worthy of consideration it would be passed
to the Dockyard Officers for their comments and possibly trials of the proposed process or
equipments might have then been undertaken. When appropriate, plans and models were
used for evaluations and to generate estimates of costs. The results of all this work were
then forwarded to the Admiralty Board who made their own assessment of its value, often
seeking additional information, more detailed plans or refined costs via the Navy Board,
before authorising or discarding the proposal.
7.2.2. Procurement & Contracts. Shown in Green in Figure 7.1 and prefixed by "C" is the
procurement and contract part of the process. Authorization, often recorded as a note on
one corner of the original proposal, was then given to the Navy Board to proceed and that
body issued a warrant to the Dockyard to undertake the necessary work. Much of the
subsequent planning and administration fell upon the Dockyard; a site within the Yard had
to be found for the new project and buildings adapted or built to house the necessary
equipment before contracts or orders for equipment were placed. Subsidiary systems such
as a water supply which might mean the extension of an existing system or a power supply
had to be made available plus storage space for raw materials and fuel.
Contracts and orders for equipment were generally placed by the Navy Board, but
both the Dockyard and the Inspector General's office were frequently delegated authority
to place orders with manufacturers who were well known to them, and with whom they had
had previous dealings; or in the case of the Dockyards, with established local firms who had
a proven track record for providing good service.
Deliveries of equipment were made either to Deptford, which acted as a central
'clearing house' for the Navy, for onward shipment or directly to the Dockyard concerned.
Equipment arriving from the west side of the country was generally sent straight to
Portsmouth rather than going via Deptford. Requests to the Navy Board for payment of bills
by contractors were passed to the Dockyard for scrutiny and confirmation of delivery of
goods or services and that they were up to specification for their proposed tasks. Only when
this confirmation was received was authorization given to pay the contractor. Even then the
complete bill may not have been paid without additional and protracted exchanges of
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correspondence. Where large sums of money were involved, payments tended to be made
by instalments' though these may also have been somewhat tardy.
7.2.3. Manpower - Changes and Additions. As well as the provision of facilities and
equipment, suitable men had to be recruited to operate the new processes - this is shown in
blue on figure 7.1 and prefixed by "M". Once suitable men had been found, the Dockyard
was then authorised by Navy Board Warrant to enter them on the Dockyard paybooks.
The technologies concerned dictated the likely sources of recruitment. In the case of
the Wood Mills where the Dockyard was mechanizing familiar hand skills, men could be
drawn from within the Yard or from the local area, depending upon their aptitude for
learning the new skills. However there was undoubtedly a problem in recruiting and training
the workforce for the fresh skills that new technology was demanding. In the case of the
Metal Mills, men had to be recruited from far afield due to the limited nature of
metalworking in the Dockyard's catchment area. It is on record that the dockyard went as
far away as Birmingham in its drive to recruit appropriate technical personnel.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the interface between the dockyard workforce
and the new technologies is the apparent lack of any real resistance by the former to the
latter. Indeed there does not appear to be a single recorded case of complaint that the new
machines were taking away their livelihood, which was a not uncommon facet of the
Industrial Revolution as a whole. The causes of this apparent anomaly seem to be
attributable to the facts that by 1802, when the new technologies were beginning to come
into service, the workforce's attention was probably focused on the inability of its pay to
match the rampant inflationary prices of the most basic essentials of life. Consequently the
Yard was seriously undermanned and hence there was plenty of work available for the
traditional skilled men; therefore they did not feel threatened by the new technology and did
not see it as a challenge to their continued employment. In fact it actually offered the
prospect of advancement to those less skilled men who were willing and able to learn new
skills.
7.2.4. Installation and Service. Lastly there was the installation and introduction into service
stages (identified in figure 7.1 by the prefix "I" and the use of red) and this work was
frequently carried out by the contractors' men working with the Dockyard workers 2 - the
Millwrights whose numbers steadily built up with the passage of time.
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Throughout this Chapter the prefixed codes shown in Figure 7.1, which denote the main
stages in the proposal and procurement process, are used in tables for each work area which
sunimarise the flow of submissions/requests for information between the Admiralty Board, the
Navy Board and Portsmouth Dockyard. Derived from those tables are associated diagrams
(Figures), which again use the prefixed codes, and also the colours, from Figure 7.1 to
illustrate the tiniescales of the progress of introducing new technologies into their respective
areas.
7.3 The Authorities in charge of New Technolo gy . Figure 7.1.1 shows the range of organisations
and people involved in exercising authority over the technical development of the Royal
Dockyards. However it has to be remembered that the effectiveness of most of these depended
upon the skills and knowledge of the individuals contracted or employed rather than on their
position in the managerial structure. As a manager, of the highest calibre, Bentham had the
ability to see what needed to be done and he had the knowledge of Government, the Navy, the
new Technology and people to make it happen. Indeed, most of the proposals for alterations and
additions to the Royal Dockyards, and Portsmouth in particular, in the years 1796 to 1808 came
from him and this is not surprising since it was for this very purpose that he was appointed
"Inspector General of Dockyards" and the office of Naval Works was set up in 1795.
7.3.1. Office of Naval Works. Chapter Two introduced this Office and Samuel Bentham
(see Table 7.1.1 for brief career summary) who without doubt was the most important
figure in the technical development of Portsmouth Dockyard and his appearance in that
Chapter arose both as an example of the operation of the patronage system and as a
precursor to his regular appearance in successive Chapters. Almost certainly Bentham owed
his invitation from the Admiralty Board, in 1794, to visit the Royal dockyards 3 and report
where machinery could be advantageously introduced, to activities on his behalf by his half
brother Charles Abbot (later Lord Colchester) who was at that time the Speaker of the
House of Commons. It seems unlikely however that the invitation would have been issued
if he had not already successfiully designed, and had manufactured, machinery for the prison
service4 . That opportunity he owed to his brother Jeremy5 the utilitarian philosopher, who
was then in an influential position in that service.
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TABLE 7.1.1.
(AME: Samuel Bentham
Date of Birth	 11 January 1757
Place of Birth	 London
Father's Occupation 	 Lawyer - Jeremiah
Influential	 Brother - Jeremy Bentham, utilitarian philosopher
Relatives	 Half-brother - Charles Abbot, Lord Coichester, later Speaker
of the House of Commons
Education	 Westminster School,
Married	 Maria Sophia
Children	 Yes
EMPLOYMENT/TRAVEL RECORD
Date(s)	 Detail
1771 - 1778	 Apprenticed to Master Shipwright at Woolwich/Chatham
1780 - 1791	 In Russia, worked for Prince Potemkin, able to travel
widely. Served with Dnieper Flotilla during Russian-Turkish
War. Promoted Brigadier-General.
1791	 Returned to UK to visit manufacturies. Father died. Decided
to remain in UK.
1791 - 1793	 Patents for machines mainly for woodworking 26/11/1791
and 3/4/1793.
1794	 Asked to visit Royal Dockyards and report on them.
April 1795	 Admiralty gave approval for Office of Inspector General of
Naval Works to be set up.
25 March 1796	 Warrant entitling Bentham to salary of £750 per annum.
Aug 1805 - March	 In Russia. On return found office was to be incorporated into
1808	 Navy Board.
1812	 Department of Naval Works abolished. Pensioned.
1814 - 1827	 Living in France with his family
1831	 Died in London aged 74.
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Obviously his subsequent report went well beyond what was initially envisaged but it found
favour as the Admiralty Board approved Bentham's plan for an Office of Naval Works. This
was set up as a part of the Admiralty Board and was intended particularly to address
improvements in the construction and fitting out of ships, the buildings within the
Dockyards, improvements in machinery, the tools then in use and the introduction of new
machinery. Therefore, most significantly, Bentham had direct access to the Admiralty Board
rather than having to present his ideas to the Navy Board first, although papers relating to
the establishment of his office say" . . . .without taking the business in any respect out of the
accustomed channels6."
It would be a fair observation that real progress was rarely achieved (some would
say "is" rarely achieved) in "Military" matters via accustomed channels and it is equally fair
to assume that Bentham did not achieve what he did by this means nor, in the process of
effectively bypassing them, did he endear himself to the Navy Board members.
Planned by Bentham to have a staff of about 15, the strength of the Naval Works
Office was reduced by the Admiralty Board7 to around seven. They were Bentham as the
Inspector General, John Peake his secretary, Samuel Bunce as Architect and Civil Engineer,
Samuel Rehe as the Mechanist, and a Chemist - James Sadler, with the team being
completed by a draughtsman and clerk. In fact, there seems to have been more than one
draughtsman as Simon Goodrich and James Burr were certainly in the office at the same
time. The Office was established in 1795 and functioned until 1808 when it was
incorporated into the Navy Board as the Department of Naval Works being somewhat
reduced in size as the post of Chemist was abolished at this point. The Department was
eventually disbanded in 1812 and Bentham pensioned off but the posts of Architect and
Mechanist survived as Surveyor of Buildings and Mechanist & Engineer respectively.
7.3.1.1. The Architect: His work took up a substantial part of the working regime
of the Inspector General's office. As well as all the building within the Dockyards,
he dealt with work for the Victualling, Sick & Hurt Boards and the Marines, and
in the course of his duties travelled from Great Yarmouth on the East Coast as far
as Hawlbowline Island off Southern Ireland. Given the scale of building work that
took place in Portsmouth during the period it is fair to conclude that this official was
regularly involved with the development of that Dockyard.
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7.3.1.2. The Mechanist: was responsible for the implementation of technical projects
and travelled extensively between the Dockyards and to contractors. In addition,
either alone or in company with Bentham, he visited leading manufacturers of the
day to keep abreast of new developments which were of interest to the Royal
Dockyards. In key projects he also operated on occasions as the "on-site" manager
who controlled the day to day activities of the workforce associated with bringing the
equipments into service, and liaised directly with the designer and builders of
equipment. It is clear from his diary that after Simon Goodrich became Mechanist,
he was regularly on site in Portsmouth and in the later stages of his career, after
1814, his office was at actually in Portsmouth rather than London.
7.3.1.3. The Chemist: The post does not seem to have been particularly successful
although Bentham appreciated that such skills and knowledge were necessary. It
may be that James Sadler was not the right man for this post. He had started his
career as a balloonist and was introduced to Bentham in 1796 by his patron William
Windham who was Secretary for War but there is no evidence to suggest that he was
really qualified for such work. In any event there was very quickly a high-level loss
of confidence in his abilities and in 1806 he had to defend himself against charges
of ineptitude. Nevertheless he had undoubted mechanical abilities and his table
engine, one of the very first of its kind, worked successfully for 10 years in
Portsmouth dockyard until replaced by a more powerful engine.
7.3.1.4. The Draughtsmen: several of the those who served in the office were to rise
to more eminent roles. James Burr subsequently became Master of the Wood Mills
and Joshua Field is better known as the partner of Henry Maudslay. Simon
Goodrich, who started his career as a draughtsman in the Inspector General's office
in 1796 (see Table 7.1.2), had risen by 1805 to be the Mechanist. He acted as
Bentham's deputy in charge of the office whilst Bentham was away for three years
in Russia. Subsequently, in 1814, he was appointed Engineer and Mechanist to the
Navy Board.
TABLE 7.1.2.	 221
Simon Goodrich
Date of Birth	 28 October 1773
Place of Birth	 ?Suffolk
Father's Occupation	 NK - Isaac
Influential
Relatives
Education	 NK
Married	 Yes
Children	 Yes
EMPLOYMENT/TRAVEL RECORD
Date(s)	 Detail
1773 - 1796	 Details of education and training not known
25 December 1796	 Drauglitsman to Mechanist in Inspector General of Naval
Works office.
25 October 1799	 Appointed Mechanist on death of Samuel Rehe.
Aug 1805 - March	 Acted as Bentham's deputy during his absence in Russia.
1808
25 December 1812	 Department of Naval Works abolished.
Dec 1812 - April	 Served as Mechanist without warrant.
1814
April 1814	 Re-appointed as Engineer and Mechanist to Navy Board,
resident in Portsmouth with salary of £600.
1831	 Retired with a pension of £400 per annum.
1834	 Moved to Lisbon in Portugal.
1847	 Died in Lisbon aged 74.
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7.3.2. Industrial Personnel. As important as the Naval Authorities were the technical
inventors and the industrialists who were able to translate inventions into successful systems.
Pre-eminent in these fields was Marc Brunel who was contracted for the extensive work he
did for the Admiralty rather than being employed by them. Amongst the manufacturers of
new equipments for the Dockyard, famous names which appear in the records are Henry
Maudslay and Boulton & Watt but there were others less well known, for example John
Lloyd a London millwright who produced equipment for the Wood Mills, the steam dredger
and actually constructed Sadler's table engine.
It would be easy to place too much importance on the roles of Brunel and Maudslay
in Portsmouth since, from the viewpoint of the Dockyard, they were primarily involved only
with the Block Machinery project. This project came at an important moment in both their
careers, as it proved to be the first big contract that either of them undertook and it set them
both on the road to greater fame and success.
Clearly, in the 1790s, the levels of expertise in the fields associated with marine
activities were in very short supply and only a combination of good fortune on behalf of the
Admiralty and Navy Boards brought this talented team together at this important point in
the Royal Navy's history. It is also important to appreciate that neither power nor money
was available to alter the ability of Government Service to increase significantly the rate of
attraction of such people to its cause since there was no way that a Government Department
could match the financial fortunes being made in the new commercial manufacturing centres
arising from the Industrial Revolution.
7.3.3. Dockyard Officers. The Dockyard Commissioner was a senior naval officer who
was generally completing his career in a shore post rather than being a civilian like the
remainder of the Dockyard staff. As well as being the primary link between the Dockyard
Officers and the Navy Board, he acted as the focal point between the Port Admiral and thus
the Fleet, and the Dockyard Officers over ships which needed immediate attention as
opposed to planned refits and repairs. There were just two incumbents of this post between
1790 and 1815 and the stability they brought to the management of the Dockyard during this
period of intense activity and development was important. Figure 7.1.1 shows the
managerial structure immediately beneath the Dockyard Commissioner down through the
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Dockyard Officers. As was seen in Chapter 5, the two largest organisations in the Dockyard
were those of the Master Attendant and the Master Shipwright.
7.3.3.1 .The Master Attendant, who was recruited from the ranks of experienced
ships' masters, was in charge of all matters afloat in the Dockyard and the harbour.
His department had charge of all the ships in Ordinary, all ship movements within
Portsmouth Harbour and any related matters such as moorings, buoys and pilotage.
In addition, it prepared ships for docking, docked and subsequently undocked them.
Also part of the Master Attendant's department were the riggers and sailniakers - the
two Dockyard crafts which did some part of their work afloat as well as ashore.
The departments of the Master Attendant and the Master Shipwright worked
closely together, particularly where the activities of labourers and horse teams were
concerned, as both departments needed their services and therefore were "customers"
for steam power.
7.3.3.2. The Master Shipwright was the senior technical officer in the Dockyard and
not only did he have the largest part of the workforce in his department but he was
responsible for the design and building of new warships, as well as the surveying,
repair and refitting of the existing Fleet. Concurrent with that, he was charged with
inspecting the work of a range of contractors who included both those building ships
in civil yards and those working on building projects within the Dockyard. This latter
task fell to him since traditionally he acted as architect for new Dockyard structures.
The rapidly increasing numbers of ships in the Fleet and the expansion of
dockyards and associated facilities as a result of the war, greatly increased the
burden on the Master Shipwrights. Even though the task of surveying transports had
been removed from them by the recreation of the Transport Board in 1794, (para
2.4.3). Their load was however lightened when the Architect in the Inspector
General's Office took over much of the work involved with the structure of the
Dockyard buildings.
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7.3.4. The Dockyard Workforce - Lower Levels of Res ponsibility . The Dockyard
Workforce was organized within departments by trades; the larger ones being managed by
a Master Craftsman with a hierarchy of foremen, quartermen and work gangs under him.
It will be recalled that the structure and strength of Portsmouth's Workforce was discussed
and analysed in some detail in Chapter Five where a series of Tables and Figures showed
its composition on a year by year basis, whilst Figure 7.1.2 serves to remind us of the
relationship between the various sites within the Dockyard.
New departments were created for the workmen recruited to service the manpower
demands of the developing technologies in which the Metal Mills encompassed the refining
and rolling of Copper and Iron and the Wood Mills the mechanization of the preparation of
wood. The Millwrights were something entirely new to the Dockyard and were the key men
who could erect and maintain large machinery of all types. In civilian industry, they became
the major trade in the shops of machine and engine makers such as Boulton and Watt or
Maudslay. As a Trade, the Millwrights grew out of itinerant workmen drawn from skilled
workers in both the wood and the metal areas 8 . However, by the end of the eighteenth
century, millwrights had become a major trade in their own right and ultimately many of
the engineering trades of the nineteenth century were derived from them.
7.4 Steam Engines - Although the numbers of steam engines within the Dockyard appeared to
increase quickly, each engine was carefully chosen for its projected task. A summary of the
details of the individual engines appears in Table 7.2 whilst Figure 7.2 illustrates the growth in
the horsepower they collectively generated. A letter9
 from the Admiralty to the Navy Board in
July 1799 shows that the initial l2hp engine to pump water and run the woodworking machinery
was completed and then at work. By October of that year, Bentham was proposing a second
engine, supported by the Dockyard officers as they were ".. . .of the opinion that one will not be
sufficient to answer the purpose and that it will be proper to erect another as General Bentham
proposes"°. This was approved and a 3Ohp engine was duly supplied by Boulton and Watt. By
1805, the l2hp engine was no longer providing sufficient power for all the demands upon these
two engines. The Wood Mills which now had block machinery as well as saws and lathes,
needed the full power output of the 3Ohp Boulton and Watt engine during the daytime and a
second 3Ohp engine was suggested to replace the l2hp."
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On this occasion, Whitmores and Fenton, Murray and Wood of Leeds both bid for the work
but, on Goodrich's advice, the Navy Board ordered a 3Ohp table engine from Fenton, Murray
and Wood on 19 December 180512. Despite their bid at £1845' being more expensive than
Whitmores' 4 at £1656. However, Goodrich felt, in the light of experience with the engine in the
Metal Mills, that the Whitmore company's workmanship was not of the standard required' 5 . The
Fenton engine was delivered to Portsmouth during the late summer of 180616 and was erected
by August 1807, when the bill of £157114/6d for travelling and expenses for Fenton's engineer
was paid'7.
The largest capacity engine was that for the Metal Mills which was 56hp, and Whitmore of
Birmingham included the engine and one boiler in his estimate of 180318 to supply the necessary
equipment to run the rolling mills. In 1807, when Goodrich was proposing that the Metal Mills
could make copper bolts as well as sheathing, he conducted trials to "....see if there is sufficient
power to keep sheathing rolls going at the usual rate at the same time" 9. The trials proved the
point as the scheme was successfully put into practic&°, interestingly, despite Goodrich's earlier
adverse opinion on its workmanship, this engine successfully remained in service throughout the
period.
Following the introduction of these large engines, Portsmouth's subsequent acquisition of
new steam engines, and associated plant, was very much more modest and, within the period,
it was limited to just two, possibly three, small engines each of which was less than 10 horse
power. Two drawings for 6hp engines survive, one of which is marked "....for the new
Millwrights shop" and is thought to date from 180921. This accords with the Navy Board
approval in 1808 for a steam engine, lathes, drilling apparatus etc. for the Millwrights. Later,
in 1813, when the Dockyard was reporting on progress with a new building, they said that "The
seasoning shed at the west end of the Boathouses has been removed and the building erected for
a Smiths shop for the Millwrights with six forges, three lathes have been fixed in the said shop
removed from over the Coal Cellar and one is left there for the use of the Millwrights. The
boring machine is in hand making. The small engine is complete and fixed1n.
A second drawing, dated 18 April 1809, shows a 6hp engine of a very different design
which was a small beam engine on an 'A' frame and this appears to have been obtained from
Fenton, Murray and Wood in 18l0. Sadly, Goodrich's diaries for November 1808 to April
1809 are missing and there is no other remaining evidence of what the rationale for its
acquisition was but in 1813 Burr was suggesting a power source for Beale's treenail machine as
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.present machine fully employed by Block Mills which are short of space, suggest small 6hp
engine in a very forward state and needing a task... ". This suggests either that the 1809
drawing took some years to turn into a real engine on site or that that engine was first used for
some purpose we can no longer identifr and became available for re-assignment around 1813.
Of these two possibilities, the former seems to be just the more likely.
The last requirement for an additional engine at Portsmouth in the period is suggested in
February 1814 by a sketch plan which was sent to the Navy Board "....to show where 6hp steam
engine for tarring yarns could be erectedIV and in August 1814, Goodrich recorded in his
Journal that he had been taking measurements for the "....chimney for engine at the Tarring
House". However there is no further recorded progress on that project in the period. Indeed
it would have been surprising if, at the end of the war, an engine had been ordered, built,
installed and set to work in less than sixteen months.
On balance it seems fair to say that the earlier and larger horsepower engines certainly were
bought for specific and clearly detailed roles and even the later and smaller ones were only
procured, after analysis of the fmancial benefits, for continuous factory type work which would
have been barely possible without this new power source.
The one notable exception to this apparent policy was "...The Moveable Steam Engine equal
in power to the incessant exertion of six horses or of thirty men and applicable to the unloading
of vessels, to the driving of Piles, to the pumping of Water, and to various laborious
Operations. The engine and machinery, shown in Figure 7.2.1, were made by John Lloyd
and were brought into use in 180230 mounted on two wagons which could be moved to any work
site by Horses. One wagon was for the boiler and the other for the engine itself, flywheel and
windlass. It was designed to provide either linear or rotary motion with the former being used
for pumping or pile driving and the latter being needed to power a windlass.
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FIGURE 7.2.1 — MOVEABLE STEAM ENGINE
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A most unusual feature of it, which makes it historically very interesting, is that the boiler
was made from a wooden water cask, with the firebox and tube fitted within it. In general,
boilers fitted to British-built static steam engines were made of iron in a variety of shapes, which
were supported on, or within, a brick structure encompassing the fire and the airways to the
chimney. Obviously this was not feasible for a mobile engine and a different solution to the
problem was needed. This is illustrated by two drawings of 1 804' of designs proposed for
replacement for rectangular wooden boilers for both the Dredger and the Moveable steam engine
(Figure 7.2.2). The fire was contained within a firebox which itself was totally enclosed within
the wooden boiler cask in which the water was heated. To improve the efficiency of this process
the single airway, or flue, from the firebox, a feature of the original boilers for these engines,
was replaced by a series of separate tubes which only came together into a larger single flue
immediately prior to exiting from the wooden cask. Thus the hot metal surface area in contact
with the water was considerably increased, a similar design appears on a drawing of about 1806
which is titled "Design by Simon Goodrich for Wooden Boiler in lieu of the Cask". It appears
that the Moveable steam engine boiler, at least, was not replaced in 1804 and a wooden boiler
was still in use in 1809 when Goodrich was corresponding with James Linaker the Master
Millwright about repairs to it 32 . This led to the suggestion of replacing it with a wrought iron
case33 . The boiler of the steam dredger was definitely replaced in 1806 as Goodrich records that
he was "... .on board the Ballast Engine to see the new boiler which answers very well...
unfortunately he does not say what this one was made of.
The two 3Ohp and the 56hp engines were initially equipped with a single boiler each but in
1807, a contract for their replacements show that the engines were then fitted with two boilers35.
One boiler would have been working and the other being cleaned or at standby. The original
boilers were made of iron and so were the replacements. At the same time, Goodrich did
persuade the Navy Board to sanction the purchase of at least one copper boiler. He believed that
although the initial purchase of this type was more expensive than an iron one, potentially it
offered better serviceability which would have more than offset the difference in purchase price.
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7.5 Portsmouth Dockyard Site. As can be seen from Figure 7.1.2 the Dockyard, which
embraced some 84 acres, was laid out with the Dry Docks complex at its heart. Given the nature
of the site, the only practical option for acquiring more land was to reclaim it from the harbour
and hence the existing site had to be used to best advantage. In fact a small piece of land was
reclaimed in the 1790's and mainly used for seasoning timber, but the next big reclamation did
not take place until the 1840's. Thus, to make space for new installations, old buildings had to
be adapted or taken down and rebuilt elsewhere. Indeed several of the covered timber stowages
and sawpits disappeared during the enlargements to the metalworking facilities. Another method
of gaining extra space was used in 1812, when the Dockyard removed the roof of the Rigging
House and added a storey, thereby gaining more space without enlarging the site used.
7.5.1. Dry
 Docks. Table 7.3 summarises the key events in the development of the Dockyard
Complex and is supported by Figure 7.3 which shows diagrammatically how the
development progressed. Figure 7.3.1 illustrates the layout of the complex before and after
improvement. During the early 1790's, the Dockyard put in train plans for work on the Dry
Docks and contracts were placed with Pariby's, a local firm, on 2 January 1792 for a new
South Dock (No.! as shown in Figure 7.3.1) and on 27 January 1795 to enlarge the Double
Dock so that it could take two 74 gun Third Rates37
 rather than two frigates. In April
1793, the Dockyard officers reported to the Navy Board that the South Dock should be
completed by midsummer of 1794. However, despite the issue of the contract for the
Double Dock, the work actually never started since before it could do so the Admiralty
Board had in front of it Bentham's plan (he was appointed Inspector General in April 1795)
to replace the Double Dock by two single docks (Nos.2 and 3) opening into an enlarged
Non-Tidal Basin. Discussion of this plan continued throughout 1796 and into 1797 when a
warrant was finally issued to carry out the work on the Basin and new docks on 30 August
1797°.
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What the original Dockyard plan was trying to achieve was an increase in dry dock
capacity but Bentharn's plans were also trying to maximise the utilisationof the facilities and
thus achieve the best possible turn-round of ships being repaired. Four single docks and one
double dock provided space for six ships simultaneously, but there were problems in that
two of the four single docks (Nos 1 and 6) opened into the harbour. Consequently, even
though water in the dock could be removed or returned by pumps, ships could only leave
the dock when there was sufficient water in the harbour, ie at high tide. Against this a
Non-Tidal Basin could maintain a constant depth of water, so that once the dry dock had
been flooded (water pumped into it) ships could be taken out or put in regardless of the state
of the tide in the harbour. Furthermore, ships in a non-tidal basin could be worked on from
shoreside without the need constantly to alter gangways, lifting devices and securing ropes
to match the changing position of the ship relative to the shore edifices. Unfortunately the
double dock also opened into the harbour and had the added disadvantage that as the ships
were berthed one behind the other, the one at the head of the dock could only be taken out
when the ship behind her was completed. Bentham's plan overcame this problem and
connected 4 dry docks (Nos 2, 3, 4 & 5) to both the Non-Tidal basin and the Reservoir.
The first ship to enter the enlarged Non-Tidal Basin was the First Rate, Britannia, in June
1801.
Traditionally, dry docks were built with wooden floors (Figure 7.3.2) which required
very regular maintenance by shipwrights and house carpenters; the exception at Portsmouth
was No 5 dock which had been built of stone in 1689. The two new docks were built with
stone floors and this appears to have been a successful innovation because the wooden floors
of the other docks were slowly replaced.
Measurements on a map of l858' show that the South Dock and the two new single
docks ,which were completed in 1802 and 1803, were both longer and the entrance sill was
deeper than the earlier docks. These features enabled these docks to take the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century built warships which, type for type, were larger in all respects
than those built in the 1760's and 1770's.
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7.5.2. The Reservoir. The other far-reaching scheme to retrieve space and increase dock
utilisation was the plan to cover over the Reservoir used to receive and hold the water
drained down from the Dry Docks. It is possible that this concept was first put forward in
around 1793 by Samuel Wyatt42 but it was not proceeded with. However Bentham's plan
was considerably more ambitious in that it also aimed to exploit the space within the
Reservoir whose area was about 35,000 square feet43 with, at that time, only eight of its
thirty foot depth being exploited. By means of brick arches supported on masonry piers, a
single floor building was put into the Reservoir above the stored water at an estimated cost
of £16,O0O'. The floor of this building, being well above water level, but equally well
below ground level, was to be used to store highly inflammable items such pitch, tallow,
tow and rosin43
 rather than having them spread around the Dockyard creating fire risks.
Furthermore, as the ceiling of this building was at ground level it created an area for further
new building above it. The structure of the Reservoir and this building is illustrated by
Figure 7.3.3.
Perhaps understandably the Dockyard officers were initially critical of the range of
new proposals emanating from Bentham and they had doubts over the merits of the
Reservoir scheme especially as they were concerned over the need to ventilate the storage
area to prevent damp from the water getting into the stores. Bentham's solution was to add
passages to and from the engine pumphouse, thereby creating a warm airflow through the
system. In the event, the work on the Reservoir was accomplished by December 1802,
when the Dockyard officers informed Bentharn's office that a building on part of the
Reservoir space would be completed in the spring of 1 803
7.5.3. Dock Pump House. An equally effective approach was adopted when the existing
pumphouse beside the Reservoir was to be altered to take a steam engine which would drive
chain pumps instead of the horse-gin. Bentham suggested that an adjoining building could
house the sawing machinery which could share the steam engine's power with the pumps.
This would run the steam engine to best advantage, working the sawing machinery by day
and when needed, pumping the water for the docks at night. This is again illustrated by
Figure 7.3.3.
F-L
	 0
p.0
0
238
0
0
cJ
U
0
>
LL
0
0
z
0
z
-
,
--p i I
L)
0
LU
H
zC
239
7.5.4. North Basin and Camber Docks. To provide better facilities for small ships and
prevent them from using a dry dock which would have been better used by a large vessel,
Bentham, in 1797 suggested using the North Boat Pond for fitting out frigates and the
other smaller vessels. This Pond (see Figure 7.3.4) was connected to the Harbour by a long
channel wide enough, but not deep enough, to take a 50 gun ship. By deepening the canal
by four feet and adding three pairs of lock gates and drainage arrangements, a long dock
capable of taking two Fifth or Sixth Rate frigates or three sloops or four gun-boats was
made. The North Boat Pond, which was theoretically large enough to accommodate seven
or eight frigates for fitting out, also had to be deepened before it could be used for vessels
of this size but of course the entry or exit of ships from these berths could only be done
when the channel was not in use as a dry dock. However the original estimated cost was
only £600O° and Bentham had suggested that the work could be done in three to four
months. On 5 November 1799, he was instructed by the Admiralty, to place the necessary
contracts with Parlby's without delay 5' but unfortunately we do not know when the
contractor actually started work or indeed when he finished. However, Morriss suggests that
the facility was in use by the middle of 180152 and this indeed seems to fit in quite well with
the earlier estimate of six months. In any event, it must surely rank as one of the most cost
effective improvements in the history of the Naval Dockyards.
7.5.5. Increased Dry Dock Throughput. Taken together Bentham's schemes for the Dry
Docks, the Reservoir and the North Basin/Camber Docks show a remarkable ingenuity in
terms of space utilisation and minimisation of the construction work required to achieve it.
Effectively, as the tables in Figure 7.3 show, the improvements provided a means to match
the demand for dry dock time to the availability of it. Therefore, the improvements
represented the basis on which further investment in the Yard could be justified since, unless
the ships could be docked, the Dockyard could not take them and consequently much of the
investment in other areas of the yard would have been questionable. Whilst none of the
proposals involved extending the boundaries of technical knowledge they demonstrated not
only a rare degree of situational appreciation and original thought but also very considerable
skill in driving such novel changes through the corridors of power in Whitehall. Certainly
they established Bentham as a power in the business of the Dockyards and, in so doing, they
laid the grounds for his downfall since he must have undoubtedly upset the working
practices of the Navy Board.
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7.5.6. Caissons. Prior to the improvements the entrance to the Non-Tidal Basin was closed
by two pairs of lock gates 53 while the Dry Docks had a single pair each which were hung
on piers of masonry on either side of the entrance and between them was the entrance sill
of wood, set on piles driven into the harbour bottom. As the masonry piers were not
connected to each other (Figure 7.3.2) they tended to settle by different amounts; this
caused the gates to move out of alignment and leak. Indeed, repairs and alterations to the
Non-Tidal Basin entrance were part of the improvement plan for the Docks put forward by
the Dockyard Officers; a scheme which was subsequently overtaken by Bentham's plans.
In a letter of 4 August 1798, Bentham writes of an entrance made of masonry in a reversed
arch shape and in addition " ......for closing the Entrance, I would propose to make use of
a hollow floating dam which when lying across the entrance should fit water tight being
pressed against either the interior or exterior side of a groove formed in the Masonry
according as the water is kept in or out. " The reversed arch shape for the entrance may
have been under discussion for some time as a number of drawings for dock alterations still
exist but unfortunately they are undated. A plan of the new South and double docks signed
by Edward Tippett55 on 21 August 1794 shows the traditional type of dock entrance, while
a plan of the Basin and dock entrances signed by Bentham on 22 April 1796 shows the
reversed arch shaper. The reversed arch made the piers and entrance sill into one
continuous curve of masonry. This strengthened the entrance by tying the two sides of the
dock together thus eliminating a cause of leaks whilst the masonry sill needed less
maintenance than a wooden one. it can, with justification, be said that this was a civil
engineering evolution rather than a technological innovation but it was nevertheless
important.
The idea of a caisson or hollow floating dam is credited to George St. Lo who was
Dockyard Commissioner at Chatham from 1703 to 1714 but although his device was built
and given trials it was not adopted. However it is possible that as Bentham had been
apprenticed to the Master Shipwright at Chatham he could have heard about St. Lo's idea.
Bentham describes his idea as " ......this floating dam which is built much in the form of
a navigable vessel, is ballasted so as to float at an immersion of somewhat less than 20 feet,
whereby as soon as there is 21 feet of water at the Entrance, the dam will have risen one
foot which is sufficient to clear it out of the groove so as to admit of its being hauled
away."59 At 157 tons60, it was a small hull by Royal Navy standards and, like any other, it
was built of timber and coppered, the lowest part of the caisson contained 171 tons of
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ballast6t and on the deck above the ballast were tanks which held sea water. The pressure
of the water either externally or internally on the hull kept the caisson tightly against the
masonry and thus closed the entrance. The tanks were emptied into the Harbour by gravity
at low tide and any remaining water was pumped out until the caisson floated clear of the
entrance and could be moved. This principle of floating or sinking a vessel by altering its
buoyancy is of course how a submarine works.
The caisson's upper deck was strengthened so that it could be used as "a bridge of
sufficient strength to bear the weight of the heaviest loaded carriages....... " This was not
only convenient but saved the time taken to move men and materials around the Basin and
associated Docks. The caisson was moved by 40 men, a considerable saving of manpower
compared to the 90 men needed for operating the South Dock gates (No 1) or the 60 for the
North Dock (No 6).
Approved by the Admiralty in September 1798M, the caisson was built by Portsmouth
Dockyard and completed in l801. Fincham says that "Considerable opposition was made
to the building of this caisson, on the supposition that it would not answer the purpose for
which it was intended; and on the day when it was first removed, a great assemblage of
persons appeared anxious to witness the operation: amongst them were the principal
authorities in that branch of the service, and many naval officers. Apprehensions were,
however, removed by decided success;....." Certainly caissons not dock gates were fitted
in the Boat Pond Canal6' as well as the Non-Tidal Basin entrance and probably in the
Camber to make unloading of supplies independent of the effects of the tide. The fact that
caissons, although of a different design, are still in use in Portsmouth Harbour today
demonstrates that both the idea and its implementation achieved all that was expected of it.
Indeed caissons are now standard the world over in dry docks.
7.5.7. Seppings Apparatus. Not all the ideas for improving the movement of ships through
the dry docks arose in the Inspector General's Office, an 'Apparatus for examining ships
keels' was designed by the assistant to the Master Shipwright at Plymouth, Robert
Seppings. Traditionally, a ships' keel when dry docked rested on a line of piles of wooden
blocks with the hull being kept upright by shores positioned against the dock walls. To allow
the blocks to be removed so that the keel could be examined or worked on, the vessel had
to be raised slightly by means of shores and wedges. This was expensive in time, manpower
and timber and David Steel records that a Third Rate required 300 men working for about
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three days to make the keel accessible. Seppings' apparatus dramatically reduced this to
just 40 men working one twelve hour day.
Seppings' apparatus used ironshod wooden blocks with iron bolts running through
the uppermost block. Under this were iron wedges which could be loosened or driven home
with a ram. When the wedges were loosened, the uppermost block could be moved and
allow ready access to the keel. The ship did not have to be lifted. The system was first tried
at Plymouth in 1801, on a Third Rate, Canopus 7° and the other dockyards quickly followed.
Portsmouth was certainly using the apparatus by 1803, as a letter of October 1802 to the
Navy Board says " ......we propose as directed by your warrant of 14th August last to dock
Pigmy Cutter, when by placing her as near as maybe to one side, the Dock may be fitted
with the Blocks above mentioned.......", these were "the blocks of Mr Seppings
invention"71.
7.5.8. Dredgers. Bentham's design for a Steam Dredger was based on a lighter or similar
dockyard craft and was about 100 feet long by 27 feet wide and had a draught of 9 feet with
an adjustable bucket ladder, powered by a table-type steam engine, operated through an 18
foot by 8 foot well near the centre of the vessel. The object was to raise about 1000 tons
of spoil in a 12 hour shift from a depth as much as 28 feet. Initially proposed in April 1800
because of the costs of manual dredging, Bentham revised his original design for a vessel
with a flat sloping bow and bucket frame operating through a well in the stern, to a more
conventional boat-shaped hull and the central well in June 1801 before work commenced
on the vessel.
The bucket ladder was fixed at an inclined angle in the well and its frame was set
in guides so that it could be raised or lowered to the appropriate working depth. The
buckets, shown in Figure 7.3.5, were 48 ins wide and were attached to an endless loop of
chain at either side which passed over drums at the top and bottom of the frame. Connected
to the steam engine by shafting and bevel-gear wheels, the top drum rotated and moved the
buckets around the frame. This is similar in design to the chain pumps discussed in Chapter
6. The bucket frame was counterbalanced, via a wheel and iron chain by a large weight.
Spoil raised in the buckets fell onto a moving belt set in an inclined trough extending
over the side of the vessel, and on reaching the end of the trough, it dropped into barges
secured alongside the Dredger. The moving belt was driven by a rope drive from a wheel
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mounted on the shafting between the steam engine and the bucket frame. This was raised
and lowered with the aid of a drumhead - like that on a capstan - and flywheel in
conjunction with the counterbalance. Links could be added to and removed from the chains
to make them the correct length. The steam engine was a table type of l2hp which was
built, with the rest of the machinery, by John Lloyd but the engine designer is unknown.
Built by Portsmouth Dockyard, the keel of the Dredger was laid in July 1801 and the
vessel was launched in November 1802. As she was being prepared for trials of her
machinery, supervised by the Foreman of the Millwrights, a crew to man and operate her
became necessary. Bentham's recommendation for the man to be in charge was William
Mortimer who had been a scavelman and thus had considerable knowledge of the harbour;
plus a crew of two more scavelmen and four labourers.. However dispensation for this
appointment had to be given by the Admiralty Board, since in September 1802, it had
forbidden the employment of scavelmen or riggers on dockyard craft. Mortimer must have
been successful in being appointed since the records show the Dockyard recommending a
suitable man for promotion after his death in l8l5. In any event, trials were completed by
May 1803 when Bentham reported to the Admiralty Board that the Dredger could "fully to
answer its intended purpose" and was raising 2 tons of soil a minute74.
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7.6 Metal Works. The principal metalworking facility was the Metal Mills but in addition there
were the smiths' shops and the foundries.
7.6.1. Metal Mills Table 7.4 shows the progression of the metalworking facilities from
inception to full production and Figure 7.4 shows diagrammatically the rate of progress with
that development. Figure 7.4.1 show 4 "snapshot" extracts from the Dockyard Plans of
1793, 1796, 1805 and 1810/14 - these being the dates of the plans that are available for
inspection today. In looking at Figure 7.4.1 it is necessary to bear in mind that what is
shown is a mixture (at the time the plan was produced) of what actually existed and what
was then being proposed. However by examining all four plans as a whole, alongside Figure
7.4, it is possible to achieve a reasonable appreciation of the development throughout the
period.
The complex which became known as the Metal Mills originated in 1797 as a
proposal for a small melting furnace to solve the problems of dealing with old copper
sheathing removed from ships in Portsmouth" but, as Figure 7.4 shows "on-site"
construction work did not commence until 1802. Until 1797, the dockyard practice was to
burn off weeds and other detritus using furze for fuel and then return the copper to the
contractor who had originally supplied it for re-cycling. Against this background, the
rationale for the 1797 proposal was that the cost of the furnace, estimated at £100, would
be off-set by reductions in labour and fuel costs and losses of copper metal during the
burning process76.
There was sufficient interest in the plan for the Dockyard to initiate trials of burning
and melting using 5 cwt of copper but unfortunately there are no details of how this was
done, or what type of furnace was used - cupola or reverberatory. In fact, it is clear from
surviving drawings of the Metal Mills that reverberatory furnaces were acquired to heat
both copper and iron and a cupola was used to recover copper metal from the furnace slag.
However the decision to acquire the melting furnace was not implemented until August
1802, as the Navy Board had quietly shelved the project considering that it had been
completely set aside by the result of the trial that was made at Portsmouth
Yard......and which was so materially in favour of the usual mode of managing that article,
that we took for granted (the more especially as the subject had laid dormant for upwards
of three years) that the General's project had been entirely at rest80".
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This seems to be a remarkably weak attempt to save the Board's face following the discovery
of its inaction on this matter. By this time, the original proposal had been incorporated into a
more far-reaching scheme to improve the quality and life of the copper sheathing as a
consequence of the Royal Dockyards undertaking the re-cycling of the copper themselves rather
than returning it to the contractors. It is noteworthy that the original concept involved other
Dockyards, besides Portsmouth81 , being involved in the re-cycling of copper although it is
probable that as early as 1802/1803 it had been decided, at least in the short term, to concentrate
on Portsmouth.
The site selected within Portsmouth Dockyard was close to the Smiths shop which had been
rebuilt and enlarged in the early I 790s on a part of the Yard site mainly used for timber
seasoning and sawpits. (See Figure 7.4.1). Following approval in August 1802 to proceed with
the more ambitious plan, the major part of the equipment and a steam engine were ordered from
Whitmore and Son of Birmingham. Progress was slow although the melting furnace was
completed and in operation first in September 1803, subsequently the rolling machinery and
steam engine arriving throughout 1804 and the early months of 1805. That there were delays in
the arrival and setting up of the Metal Mills machinery is confirmed by this comment on a letter
from the Admiralty Board, H Direct General Bentham to report what circumstances have
delayed the erection of the machinery for rolling copper and when will it be in readiness?"83
Bentham's reply of 18 April 1 804k explains that machinery which should have left
Birmingham in February was only just being dispatched and much of it would not arrive until
September. This was due to problems with the manufacturer's workmen who had to exercise with
the Volunteers. This would seem a reasonable explanation given that the threat of invasion by
Napoleon's forces was not to fade finally until after the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 - up to then
the Volunteers were an essential part of Britain's defences. By early 1805, Bentham was
explaining that although most of the steam engine and rolling machinery was erected, two boiler
parts which had been broken in transit, were being re-cast at the carrier's expense. These two
incidents serve to remind us that progress in introducing new technologies was invariably subject
to factors outside the control of those concerned.
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By the late autumn of 1805 the rolling mills were finally working (Figure 7.4.2) and
in June 1806 the last ancillary pieces of equipment and spares were ordered. These were
received from Whitmore's in August l8O6 and included a stamping press, a second pair
of shears for cutting copper and spare rolls. A screw-cutting lathe for use in the
manufacture of copper bolts had been purchased the year before in 1 805 and this marked
a further expansion in the ambitions for the plant.
The process of recruiting the necessary skilled workmen for the Metal Mills started
in the autumn of 1802, when the Navy Board and Bentham considered the merits of nineteen
applicants to manage the copper refining at Portsmouth. Out of these, there were only two
serious contenders and the post was given, at Bentham's request, to W.E.Sheffield, duly
confirmed by his entry on the Dockyard paybooks 91 . His name disappears from the
Dockyard paybooks in late 1 8O5 and no appointment to replace him seems to have been
made and thus it is likely that his responsibilities would have been included with those of
the Master of the Metal Mills.
In 1805, Samuel Beach was appointed as Master of the Metal Mills and part of his
job was recruiting men to operate the machinery then being installed for rolling copper
sheathing. In his search for the skilled men he needed, Beach travelled to Birmingham and
despite difficulties, he would appear to have been successful since the manpower was
evidently in place by the time the plant was ready to operate. In fact, Beach was almost
too successful as his trip was immediately followed by the Navy Board receiving a letter of
complaint from a firm called Grenfells saying that refiners had been ".. . .seduced away from
Temple Mills for the service of Portsmouth Yard......." The Navy Board was forced to
investigate this allegation but Goodrich's Journal shows that the workmen, a copper
melter and his mate had approached the Dockyard and offered to work there. The
workmen were employed at the Metal Mills and after some initial difficulties, proved to be
thoroughly competent. However the incident undoubtedly confirms that at this time, as now,
skill shortages in the new technological fields were a matter of serious concern. At the
management level, the Dockyard was unlucky in losing Beach (who died in October 1 806)
so soon after taking up his appointment. After advertisements were placed in the
newspapers Hamlet Vemon who was known to Goodrich, having worked at Fontley Forge
for nine years, was appointed Metal Master on 20 February 1807'. It can be claimed
therefore, with some justification given Fontley's close association with Portsmouth
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Dockyard, that Vernon was one of the first senior new "technologists" to emerge from
within the Dockyard system.
Quite the most difficult problem for the Navy Board was finding the optimum
moment to cease purchasing the bulk of the copper sheathing from the contractors and
switch to dependence on the new facilities at Portsmouth. Too soon, and there would be a
shortage of sheathing, too late and Navy would be paying twice. As it was, they stockpiled
old sheathing in the Dockyards ready for operating the Metal Mills, but delays in the
installation of the machinery meant that they had to release some of the old copper to the
contractors to safeguard the supply. In a note dated 18 January 1805101, the Admiralty
authorized the Navy Board to issue old copper to contractors at the real market price.
No detailed figures for output of copper have come to hand, but by 1807, Portsmouth
was producing 800 tons of sheathing annually which Goodrich states was about two-thirds
of the Navy Board average annual usage for 1804-06 of 1172 tons of sheathing and 514 tons
of bolts. A year later, when making a case for not erecting a melting furnace at Plymouth,
which had been the (early) original intention, Bentham stated that the capacity of the
Portsmouth melting furnace was 1000 tons annually and that it was operated with two gangs
of refiners'02 producing a two ton charge in a twelve hour shift'°3 . Given that a significant
amount of copper supplied to the fleet was not recoverable for re-cycling, it would seem that
by around 1808 Portsmouth was probably able to handle the totality of the material
recovered from the fleet. Thus from the relatively modest ambitions for copper smelting in
1797 Portsmouth developed, in just over 10 years, into the major supplier of copper to the
entire Navy.
However, another scheme for re-cycling waste metal products'°4 was abandoned
before it started because of the death of the workman concerned due to ". . . .the pernicious
effects of his trade" '°. His idea was to heat Lead ashes'° with charcoal in a furnace to
recover the Lead metal.
Expansion to both the equipment and the buildings of the Metal Mills was begun
within five years of the complex starting work and the reason for some of the earliest
changes was the need to make copper bolts as well as sheathing. To save time and effort
in changing the plain rolls used for making copper sheathing for the grooved rolls necessary
for rolling bolt staves, Goodrich sought and received permission to use the grooved rolls
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originally intended for working iron'°7 . Additional furnaces were erected to ensure there
were sufficient quantities of copper for the entire operation.
7.6.2. Smiths In addition to the new Smiths' Shop built during the early 1790s, there were
further additions to their workspace between December 1808 and February 1812 and again
a year later in 1813. The first of these was a workshop with 10 forges for which 35 extra
smiths were employed'°9, a possible location for this (see Figure 7.4.1) was the shop for
repairing Brodies fire stoves - the cooking ranges patented by Captain Brodie and fitted in
all warships. The expansion of 1813 was proposed by the Dockyard officers to maintain the
balance between the numbers of shipwrights employed and those of the smiths. This was
to be achieved by adding a small building to the east of the smiths' coalyard, so the number
of small forges would then be increased to 20110. As the war drew towards a close, the
problem for the Dockyard was not expansion, but that of keeping skilled men employed as
the number of ships at sea and therefore the Dockyard workload, declined. By the middle
of 1814, they were suggesting that the smiths could re-manufacture old iron into bolt staves
and flat iron pieces". Effectively taking on work which had previously been contracted out
to Fontley.
Small, more specialized, smiths' shops were equipped to serve particular areas within
the Dockyard; one such was for the use of the Millwrights and another produced the iron
pins used in the manufacture of the pulley blocks. This was a double forge for which anvils
and forging tools were ordered in February 1806 from Maudslay' 12, but its delivery in June
of that year was not achieved without him being sent a reminder"3.
7.6.3. Foundries. There are a number of references to foundries, but little detail of them
is available. Goodrich's Journal records a proposal of 1808" to enlarge the existing Brass
Foundry increasing its four pot furnaces to eight. The two 16 inch square and one each of
14 and 12 inch square furnaces would be increased to two of 12 inches square and four of
14 inches plus the two existing 16 inch. In 1813 plans were in train for new foundries for
working brass and iron, since the Dockyard officers reminded the Navy Board in March of
that year that the plans had not arrived and did so again three months later"5 . However
Figure 7.4.1 suggests that these had still not been built by 1820.
The Dockyard plans (Figure 7.4.1) show that the Metal Mills went through two stages of
development - initially there was a major expansion with the introduction of the full capacity of
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the copper mills but thereafter there were a series of minor alternations as a result of more
ambitious plans being scaled down to a level which maintained the advance of technology without
matching the full ambitions of some of the Dockyard officials. The net result is that it is not
possible, from the remaining records, to establish the precise nature and timing of the smaller
changes in areas like the Millwrights shop - that these facilities were enhanced is indisputable
but the extent and degree to which this was achieved before 1816 remains open to question.
7.7 Wood Mills. Table 7.5 summarised the key events in the development of the Wood Mills and
it is supported by Figure 7.5 which shows diagrammatically the progress with the development
and Figure 7.5.1 sets out to illustrate the various parts of this building which came to house both
sawing and blockmaking machinery.
Figure 7.5.1 shows that the Wood Mills initially consisted of two three-storey high buildings
with a single storey structure being added later between them. The southern building, in which
the ground and first floor appear to have been combined, was situated over the well at the corner
of the Reservoir and primarily housed the steam engines and pumps. A drawing of 21 December
1197 116
 signed by Bentham shows the sawing machinery sited over the well. However, Rees
Cyclopaedia 'S description of the Block Machinery in 1807 locates the sawing machinery on the
ground floor of the northern three-storey building so that the shafting from the steam plant must
have bridged the ground between the two buildings. Eventually this space was enclosed by the
single-storey building and the shafting could then provide power for the block shell machines
which were, by then, located in this space.
It is not clear when precisely or why the sawing machinery was moved, but it was
undoubtedly still in the southern building in 1801 as a letter of 27 September 117 about the water
supply system refers to the "building with two steam engines and machinery...." At that time the
steam engines would have been the original l2hp Sadler engine erected in 1798 and a 3Obp
Boulton and Watt engine installed during 1800-1801 In 1805, when Goodrich suggested the
acquisition of a second 3Ohp steam engine, the costings"9 for the project actually included taking
down the l2hp Sadler engine and moving some sawing machinery. It is therefore reasonable to
assume that they were moved shortly after this and prior to the installation of the larger steam
engine which was supplied in 1806 and came into service in 1807.
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7.7.1. Sawing Machines. The initial building was erected to contain sawing machinery first
proposed by Benthain and intended for use at Redbridge'°. Although the Admiralty had
shown interest in the machinery, the idea of steam power to drive it had not been accepted
and Benthain decided to demonstrate its worth in the manufacture of some ships of his own
experimental design' 2 ' but in the event, the ships were completed before the steam engine
was delivered. Subsequently Bentharn again sought Admiralty Board permission to use the
steam engine in Portsmouth Dockyard', this time combining its use for driving the sawing
machinery with the more urgent need to increase pumping capacity for the enlarged Non-
Tidal basin and new Docks. An inventoryln shows that the machinery at Redbridge
consisted of three large and two small sawframes, three large and two small circular saws,
a flywheel with stand and a turning lathe and it is a reasonable assumption that some if not
all of these machines were moved to Portsmouth for use in the projected Wood Mills.
7.7.2. Blockmaking Machines. Brunel's blockmaking machinery was a revolutionary
development in the technology of wood processing. Prior to its invention wood processing
machines tended to be single purpose ones which required virtually constant human
involvement in their operation and the overall process in which they were involved was still
substantially dominated by hand work. However, with his new machines Brunel effectively
introduced the "production line" approach in which machine work was the primary process
at every stage of the whole and the numbers of a particular type of machine in the plant
were varied to ensure a near continuous output of basically finished products from the total
plant.
Collectively the blockmaking plant was a system for manufacturing the parts for a
pulley block, namely the shell made of elm, the sheave of Lignum Vitae and the iron pin
on which the sheave turned. As Rees says, "The whole series are calculated for operating
upon large or small work; and this is one of the greatest merits of the machines. More than
100 sizes of sheaves are made by them, of all diameters and all thicknesses." Brunel had
designed the machines to ensure that every block part made was identical but the individual
machines were sufficiently flexible in operation to be able to produce the range of sizes
required. Initially Brunel had been rebuffed by both Taylor and the Admiralty Board when
he approached them with his ideas. However, Bentham, who had also been considering
blockmaking machinery, persuaded the Admiralty to reconsider Brunel's scheme' and
Admiralty permission to proceed was given on 2 August 1802126.
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Brunel incorporated in the design of various machines which made up the production
line, a range of innovations. Some were simple adaptations of previous inventions whilst
others were outright new developments and their importance to the history of technology
lies in their collective advance rather than in the individual elements which made up the
whole. Since the machines were invented for Portsmouth Dockyard and were developed
within it the Yard can justifiably claim to be at least the owner, if not the inventor of this
revolution and it is for that reason that the various aspects of the development are now
discussed in considerable detail.
7.7.2.1. Construction of the Machines. The plant comprised three similar sets, or
production lines, to make 4 to 7 ins, 7 to 10 ins and 10 to 18 ins blocks with either
single or multiple sheaves. The machines were built by Maudslay from Brunel's
drawings and the principal materials used for their construction were iron with
cutting surfaces being made from steel. At that time, many machines still had
wooden frames but these lacked the necessary strength and rigidity to withstand the
speeds that these new machines were required to work. For example, the chisels in
the middle sized mortising machine made 110 strokes per minut& V , hence
Maudslay's use of iron frames.
7.7.2.2. Alignment and Accuracy of Marking. Rules and guide rollers were used to
achieve the correct shaping of every part which went through the machines. For
example, the cornering saw used for the initial shaping sequentially cut a rectangular
shape into the oval one of the block shell. To do this the machine had rules set
against the ledge to hold the wood in the correct position and height regardless of its
length. The guides in the shaping machine had to be even more sophisticated as
not all the four surfaces of the block were of the same shape. The front and back of
the shell had one curvature, while that of the sides was greater. When the first side
was completed, a roller was moved from the first guide to a second and this
arrangement gave the correct curvature to both sides. When the process was
completed, the roller was returned to the original guide'29.
These machines required the materials being worked on to be held securely
in the machines and precisely positioned whilst dust and debris from the process
which would have prevented the machines working correctly had to be removed.
The necessary positioning of the block shells within their machines was ensured by
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the fact that the first machine which bored the holes to start the mortises marked the
ends of the shells so that they would be held in the correct position in subsequent
machines°. This attention to controlled and accurate positioning also appears in even
the smaller block parts since the site of the holes to be drilled in the metal "coak"
were actually marked as part of the casting process.
7.7.2.3. Automation/Semi-unattended Operation. The new machines were amongst
the first important examples of automated operations. Here the word 'automation'
is used to signify operations preset into the machines and 'semi-unattended
operations' for those needing minimal human adjustment, Whilst screw-drives were
in use on machines like lathes and pawis and ratchets had been around for many
years, Brunel combined these ideas in his mortising machine where the pawl and
ratchet controlled the screw threa& 3 ' and thus advanced the carriage holding the
block shell by one twenty-fourth of an inch at each chisel strok& 32 without any
operator involvement.
7.7.2.4. "On-Line" Power Engagement/Disengagement. Gilbert comments on the
innovative nature of the cone clutch used on the mortising machine which enabled
the machine to be stopped rapidly and so ensure a uniform length to the mortises'33.
Other machines could, by the use of "blind" pulleys, be disconnected from the power
source without stopping the flywheel. This was achieved by moving the belt across
the pulley which had been driving the machine to a second "idler" pulley which was
free to rotate independently of the drive shaft passing through it.
7.7.2.5.Variable speed and Power of Operation. Some machines could also work at
different speeds depending upon the work being done. In the face-turning lathe used
in the manufacture of the sheave, the machine has to turn both the metal coak which
has already been inserted into the wood and the wood of the sheave. Rees describes
the process.... "Thus, when the machine is first set in motion, and as long as the tool
continues turning the bell-metal, the strap is upon the slow pulley; but as soon as the
workman sees the tool is beginning to cut the wood, he shifts the strap upon the
quick pulley, by which its velocity and consequently that of the lathe, is immediately
doubled, and continues so until the sheave is fmished turning; and then the workman
returns it back again to the slow pulley, and immediately after shifts the strap to the
idle pulley upon the spindle A, which slips round upon it and the motion ceases. "
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7.7.2.6. Simultaneous multi-operations. The crown saw was used to make the sheave
circular whilst simultaneously a hole was drilled through the centre of the sheave.
To achieve this the saw and the drill had to operate at different speeds. This was
effected by the saw and the drill each being driven by separate pulleys running at
different speeds, the pulley for the saw being larger than that for the drill'.
7.7.2.7. Cooling and Lubrication. With the machines for turning and polishing the
pins Brunel had to make provision for cooling the fast moving parts. The turning
machine was similar to a lathe, but with a triangular rather than circular bar' 37 so
that when water was used to cool the turning tool, it fell past a flat side on the
triangle (and since it did not wet the bar that did not rust). The water coolant was
supplied from a sinai! vessel with a cock ".... set to drop a small stream of cold
water on the tool to keep it cool; but the water falls together with the shavings, clear
down through the iron frame, and is caught in the cistern below."'
To polish the pins, they were drawn through steel dies fixed in a box which
contained oil to prevent the heat created by the effect of friction from damaging
either the pin or dies. Two pans connected to the die box received the oil displaced
by the passage of the pin through the dies so that the necessary oil level could be
maintained'39.
7.7.2.8. Waste product Re-cycling. In the Pin turning machine the metal swarf from
the pins was collected in a cistern with the water and was then recovered by filtering
off the water prior to re-cycling. The metal turnings from the face turning lathe were
also recovered and returned to the foundry for re-use. Rees describes the process
The turning dust which this machine makes, is winnowed in a machine, similar
to that used in corn-mills, to separate the wood-chips from the metal-turnings, which
are returned to the foundry to be re-melted and used in casting other coaks. "140
7.7.2.9. Safety. Modem photographs' 4' of the circular saws, which survived until
quite recently, show them with guards although these do not appear on the
early/original drawings of the machines and thus they may well be later additions to
conform with safety requirements. The shaping engine, however, was fitted with a
guard as part of the original design' 42 although its effectiveness is open to question
in the light of an unattributable report on an accident with the machine ".. . .The
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accident alluded to was occasioned by one of the wheels of the chuck cracking in the
rim, so as to let loose the blocks, and they all flew out behind the machine, passing
through a window, into the steam-engine house, where they struck the governor or
regulating balls of it, and broke them in pieces. It is singular that, in passing through
the window, all the blocks followed each other through the same pane of glass with
great violence. "143
Initially the metal parts of the blocks, the coak/bush and the pin, were obtained from outside
sources since the Dockyard was not equipped to produce them. The coaks were made by
Maudslay's works for a period of several months from September 18O4'' but later in that year,
Bentham was given authority to employ a Founder and purchase the necessary tools and
materials'45 . Pins were provided by Littlewood's foundry but eventually a double forge manned
by two smiths forged the iron pins within the Wood Mills.
The Navy Board had earlier informed the Inspector General's office that the first set of
block machines, to make the 7 to 10 ins blocks, should be ready in February 1803'. In fact,
they did not begin producing blocks until September of that year' 47 and it was May 1804'
before the second set (4 to 7 ins) was also on line. More significantly, it was to be November
1807 before the whole system was completed and in operation' 49 . The delays were in part due
to improvements by Brunel - for example, the first shaping machine required a quarter turn by
the workman to shape each side whilst in the later versions this process was automated'50.
Secondly there were outright additions, for instance, two riveting machines were added.
Although it has been suggested that the idea for these came from Bentham' 5 ' as he felt Brunel's
idea of rivetting the coaks by hand was too inaccurate. Another addition in April 1806 was a
machine to turn iron pins up to five inches diameter and thirty inches in length for the large
blocks since the machine already installed was too small'52.
Although the design of the plant machinery was Brunel's, it had been intended from the start
that there should be a close working relationship between Brunel, Bentham, Goodrich and
Maudslay'33
 and the Portsmouth plant undoubtedly owes much to this co-operation. Once Brunel
had made all the alterations he considered necessary to ensure the smooth operation of his
system, there were no further additions and alterations. Indeed it ran as a complete system and
provided pulley blocks for the Royal Navy until metal ships superseded wooden ones, and block
production actually only fmally ceased in the l960's'.
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The determination of the output of the Wood Mills, its productivity and the extent to which
the plant was mechanised as a whole can be assessed with only varying degrees of accuracy due
to gaps in the records available. Whilst the works of Carolyn Cooper and K.R.Gilbert described
the block machines, neither addressed the level of hand work which would have been necessary,
for example the fmishing and assembly of the blocks. Nor did they consider the ancillary tasks
needed to support the plant as a whole and neither offers precise figures on the total manning
level for the machines. However Rees is more specific in relation to the block machines, and
says that four men worked the shell making machines and six were employed on the machines
making sheave&" but this was only in relation to one set or production line. Brunel 's notebook
quoted by Cooper gives design production data for an eleven and a half hour shift and states
that when working the block shell machines, one man operated the mortising and boring
machines and one man also operated the shaping machine and scored the groove around the shell.
However there is no corresponding data concerning the other machines for making the sheaves
or pins.
Fortunately the manning levels of the Wood Mills as a whole are available from the
paybooks and these are included in Table 5.4 in Chapter 5. However the question then arises of
whether the mills did or did not work more than one shift daily and here again there is no precise
information available. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suggest that only one shift was worked
per day because Bentham's design philosophy was that the power from the steam engines should
be used at night for pumping out the reservoir and dry docks. This is reinforced by Goodrich,
who in 1805, when putting forward the case to replace the l2hp Sadler engine (the smaller of
the two engines on site, the other being 3Ohp) states that there was insufficient power for the
Wood Mills. This implies that there was no pumping capacity whilst the mill was working which
would have meant that all pumping was indeed done at night and therefore the mills only worked
a single shift. Taking all this into account, it is possible to arrive at a reasonable assessment of
how the total Wood Mill workforce could have been employed, based on three assumptions.
Firstly, that the manning practises for the block machines were also applied to the others.
Secondly, an allowance is made for hand assembly work and thirdly, provision is made for
unavoidable support tasks. The outcome is shown in Table 7.5.1.
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Sadly the available records do not contain details of the output but it is known that the fleet
used 154285 new blocks in 1806' and at that time all new blocks were coming from
Portsmouth. From this and Table 7.5.1 it is possible to generate some indications of the wood
and block mills productivity. Firstly, it would seem reasonable to suggest that block mill was
producing an average 498 blocks per day, or 43 per hour over an eleven and a half hour working
day at just over one man-hour per block. Perhaps even more interesting is that only 6 men out
of the forty involved in blockmaking were engaged in hand work. Across the mill as a whole it
is assessed that 53 machines were manned and directly supported by only 64 men. However
those 64 needed to be backed up by a further 38 to run the Mill as a whole.
There is no direct evidence to support the precise assessment shown in Table 5.7.1 of how
all these 38 men were employed. However, bearing in mind that the mill had five working
floors, on three different levels, and that a very large amount of raw material was moving into
it every day whilst large quantities of both processed wood and waste material were constantly
having to be moved out, the illustrative allocations look very reasonable - especially when
Bentham's proposals for training (boys), machinery repair and engine keepers are added in.
Certainly the block machinery design and the basic arrangements for the Mill must have been
sound since the block mills remained in operation for over 150 years - a great tribute to its
designers. Nevertheless it took much longer to bring the mills "on line" than the Admiralty had
expected and had originally planned on.
The period 1803 - 1807 was a particularly difficult period in the history of the Portsmouth
Wood Mills. Not surprisingly, having invested considerably in this major plant the Navy Board
was soon trying to terminate its contracts for blocks with contractors. At the same time, the
needs of the fleet dictated that supplies had to be maintained regardless of problems with their
manufacture. Therefore the delays mentioned earlier were a source of considerable all round
annoyance and exasperation. For three years, the Navy Board had to deal with uncertainties in
the supply of pulley blocks not just for Portsmouth, but for the entire Navy with the additional
problems of having to negotiate a series of small scale contracts with their original suppliers.
Taylors, the largest of the block making contractors could especially feel aggrieved at having had
their major contract cancelled and then being almost coerced into continuing to supply the
Admiralty without a long-term market for their products.
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There are a series of letters from the Navy Board to the Inspector General's office between
October 1804 and November 1 807' requesting information on when the block machinery would
be fully working. An example is a letter of 13 November 1804; "We received your Letter of
1St inst and have given Messrs Taylor to understand that we shall continue to demand of them
for six months to come such articles included in the contract of Blockmakers Goods as may be
wanted according to the common usage of the Service. And acquaint you that at the expiration
of that time we shall expect the supply of all the said articles for the service of the Navy to be
furnished from the machinery erected in Portsmouth Yard."
The six months ended in May 1805, and in June when Taylor's contract had - with
Admiralty Board approvaP 60- been stopped, the Navy Board to their annoyance were told that
only blocks of sizes "....up to 10 ins could be made until 1st August next"' 61 . This meant that
Taylor had yet again to be asked to continue to supply and of course he was then very much able
to make such terms as he pleased. It would be another eighteen months before the Navy Board
were asking Goodrich to confirm his statement of 28 September 1807 that"... .the Wood Mills
would be able to make and furnish by the 1st inst all the articles mentioned in the Blockmakers
contracts except those which you have pointed out. "'
The eventual success of the block machines in producing very large quantities of uniform
items may have predisposed the Dockyard to consider the possibilities of making other large
quantity items with specialist machines and one such idea was a machine to make treenails. In
1809, the Dockyard officers examined a machine invented by a shipwright named Cook, but
dismissed the idea as impracticable. In 1813 a much better one-man operated' TM invention by Mr
Beale was examined by James Burr, the Master of the Wood Mills. In the interests of accuracy,
he suggested that the machine parts, whether wholly or partially made of metal, should be made
in London under Beale's supervision. This would have followed therefore the example of
Brunel's metal framed, steam driven machines with which Burr was very familiar. No details
of Beale's machine exist, but he made a number of adjustments to his original design at Burr's
request. Nevertheless, there remained the problem that there was no spare power capacity
available from the Wood Mills steam engines and to overcome this Burr cleverly suggested the
purchase of a 6hp engine'TM . The treenail machine would only need about 2-3hp so the remaining
horsepower could be used for boring pumps - a job still being done by manual power. The
purchase of the steam powered machine was approved and it was ready for operation by August
1814 167 ,
 at which point the contract with John Chainey who had made treenails in Portsmouth
Dockyard since 1773 was terminated.
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This contract cancellation, coming on top of those for the commercial block makers, and
indeed the copper processing plant provides the likely answer to a question raised earlier of why
the Dockyard workforce apparently never objected to the introduction of new technologies. The
penalties in terms of loss of employment arising from the new machines fell not within the
Dockyard but on contractors outside. Beamish in his biography of BruneP says that "TEN
MEN, by the aid of this machinery, can accomplish with uniformity, celerity and ease, what
formerly required the uncertain labour of ONE HUNDRED AND TEN."
If that was the case then the men put out of work by the Portsmouth Blockmaking
machinery were those employed by Taylor in Southampton and the other blockmaking contractors
- not men in the Royal Dockyards.
7.8 Overview of the Application of New Technolo gies in Portsmouth Dockyard. Figure 7.6
brings together the technical advances and applications discussed in this Chapter and it does this
against the background of the Admiralty and Navy Boards' organisation for managing the
development of the Royal Dockyards in the period. Figure 7.6 is supported by Figure 7.2 which
summarises the growth in Portsmouth Dockyard of the use of steam power.
1799 saw the introduction of the Dockyard's first steam engine which was a l2hp Sadler
table engine used to power the wood cutting machines by day and pump out the Reservoir by
night. Over the next 8 years, the total horsepower used in the Yard rose steadily to 146hp. 66hp
of this was involved with powering the Wood Mills in association with the Reservoir, 62hp was
used in the Metal Mills, I2hp in the Steam Dredger and only 6hp was used as a general
alternative to horse/manpower for such tasks as pile driving and operating cranes etc. After
1807, two more small machines were introduced but again they were for use in continuous,
factory-type operations. The strong deduction to be drawn from Figure 7.2 is that steam power
was only introduced where there were clear operational or economic benefits from so doing and
that these circumstances were predominantly confined to those installations which operated
continuously, and on fixed sites. Only the cases for introducing the dredger and the mobile
engine involved what might be called horse/manpower substitution.
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The first major work area to benefit from technological investment was the Dry Dock
Complex and this investment had three facets; highly imaginative and innovative management,
outright new developments; such as Caissons and a steam powered dredger, and shared
exploitation of steam power with the Block and Wood Mill. As the table on Figure 7.3 shows
there were around 1,800 theoretical dock days available per year in 1791 at Portsmouth but by
1803, following the improvements, this had risen to close on 3,000. The significance of this
becomes apparent when it is appreciated that from 1804 until 1815 the annual utilisation rate
(Figure 7.3) rose steadily from about 2,000 to a peak of just under 3,000 in 1814.
The Metal Mills represent the second major investment area with the prime focus being on
the recovery and reprocessing of the copper sheeting regularly removed from, and replaced, on
ships hulls. In this area the technology was already relatively mature in the commercial field but
the Navy Board was constantly worried about the regularity of supply and variabilities in quality.
What would today be called the Feasibility and Definition phases of the Project to establish the
requisite plant in Portsmouth Dockyard took some six years largely due to uncertainties in the
original specification and subsequent major changes as time went by. In the event the plant was
in full production by 1807. At which time, it was assessed as being able to meet 66% of the then
current total annual Naval requirement for 1172 tons of sheet and 514 tons of copper bolts. Thus
going a long way towards meeting the Admiralty's requirements for security of supply and
assurance of quality, as well as providing undoubted economies. Perhaps the most significant
feature of the Metal Mills was that they, in conjunction with the arrival of steam engines,
provided the platform for the development of sheet metalworking, foundry work and
engine/boiler installations and repairs just a decade or two before steam power and iron hulls
started to replace sail and wooden hulls in new construction warships. Whilst these forthcoming
"Revolutions" in warship design were not yet recognised there is no doubt that the instigation of
new metal crafts and trades such as the Engine Keepers and Millwrights, together with the
establishment of the post of Mechanist and Engineer on the Navy Board provided the startpoint
for the new expertise that would soon be vital for the Navy.
The last major area to benefit from new technology was woodworking. Here the technology
introduced was very much at the leading edge of powered machine development and was even
more advanced in terms of the deployment and operation of individual machines as a co-
ordinated production facility. In the case of blockmaking, some 51 machines and only 57 men
were capable, once the plant was in full production, of meeting the full annual naval requirement
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for blocks of all sizes which was assessed in 1807 as being 154,285. Although it took from 1802
to 1807 to bring the plant into full production, some years later than the Navy Board had planned
on, the machinery was so successful that it remained in use until the 1960s. A real tribute to its
inventor - Marc Brunel.
All these advances took place in the relatively short space of 18 years and all were master
minded by Samuel Bentham and a small team of fewer than 15 men. The Navy was indeed
extremely fortunate to have been able to bring together such a team at a critical point in its
history and it is little short of amazing that it managed to retain Bentham's services and his
loyalty throughout. It can be said with considerable certainty that in Bentham, his team and the
relevant parts of Portsmouth Dockyard Management, the Navy was served with skill, success and
dedication.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
The period 1790 - 1815 is rich in the history of both the operations of the Royal Navy and the
Development of Technology, yet relatively little is recorded on how the British Fleet was maintained
on near continuous operations for over twenty years and what part the new technologies played in that
vital support task.
This Thesis addresses part of this perceived historical vacuum by assessing the work undertaken
in the largest of the Royal Dockyards at Portsmouth, examining the new technologies which had
potential relevance to that work and considering the benefits arising from those technologies which were
introduced whilst also discussing the reasons, known or surmised, why others were ignored or rejected.
Statistics have been assembled in both graphical and tabular form to show how the Dockyard's output
and productivity grew in response to the demands made on them and how also the Dockyard workforce
developed in parallel. Tables and charts also have been introduced to illustrate the rate of progress with
the introduction of new technologies into that Dockyard.
The impetus for the introduction of new technology did not arise from within the established
organisation of either the Admiralty or Navy Boards but rather from the unique organisation of the
Office of Inspector General of Naval Works. This was created as an adjunct to the Admiralty Board
in 1795, transferred to the Navy Board as the Department of Naval Works in 1808 and finally abolished
in 1812. Interestingly, its principal, Sir Samuel Bentham, whose background and activities in these
timescales were discussed in Chapters Two and Seven, owed his appointment to the power of patronage
that dominated government service at that time rather than to any previous employment in the business
of the Royal Navy. Yet to him must go much of the credit for the advances in technology in
Portsmouth.
The Government's requirements from the Navy altered significantly during the war; initially its
aim was to isolate Great Britain, its friends, its territories and possessions from the "evil" influence of
the French Revolution. In the first years of the nineteenth century the immediate priority was to prevent
an invasion of this country and when that threat was effectively defeated by the British victory at the
Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 the protection of the country's overseas trade had become absolutely
fundamental to financial survival and the eventual defeat of Napoleon. By 1810, after many years of
vacillation, the Government had arrived at a realistic strategy for the use of its land forces but the
success of those forces overseas was heavily dependent on supply and reinforcement from Great Britain.
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Thus the Royal Navy was called upon to escort convoys supporting Wellington's growing Peninsular
Army from British ports; across the whole Atlantic coast frontage of the French Navy (and its privateer
compatriots) to destinations in Portugal, Spain, and eventually Southern France - whilst at the same time
continuing its worldwide protection of British trade and possessions.
To meet these requirements successive British Governments, to their credit, accepted the need,
even during periods of severe financial difficulties, to fund a steadily increasing Fleet, but as the
objectives of the war changed so also did the composition of the Fleet. As Figure 3.8 showed there
were around 160 ships of the line and 230 smaller vessels in 1790 but this grew to 211 and 768
respectively by 1809. Nevertheless, as Figure 8.1 indicates, the number of line of battle ships ua
remained relatively constant throughout the whole period and the real operational growth occurred
among the smaller vessels. In the same period between a third and a quarter of the total fleet was
generally in dockyard hands at any one time - either in reserve, awaiting disposal, or refitting to make
good the wear and tear inflicted by the forces of nature which did far more damage to the Fleet than
the enemy did! At its extreme the severity of this damage was illustrated in Figure 3.9 which showed
the numbers of ships lost each year due to various causes - of no fewer than 482 ships lost during the
war (39 in 1807 alone), 326 were either wrecked on shore or sank at sea. Only 125 vessels were
captured by the enemy and just 16 British ships were destroyed in action. Between 1790 and 1815 there
were over eighteen hundred entries of ships in Portsmouth Dockyard and the records show that the
greatest proportion of remedial work undertaken on the vessels was due to environmental, rather than
enemy, causes. Moreover, these records make the point that without the sustained and effective support
of the refitting dockyards the Fleet would never have been maintained in the state of repair needed to
achieve the eventual successes it did.
Early in the war the Admiralty accepted that to maximise the operational fleet at sea there would
have to be increasing reliance on private commercial sources for new ships whilst the major Royal
Dockyards concentrated more on refitting. This was particularly true at Portsmouth, which was the
Navy's biggest refitting yard and undertook some 30 - 40% of the total annual Naval refitting work.
This consisted primarily of repairing and replacing worn out material and "making good" leaks which
tended to become progressively worse in hard-worked ships with the passage of time since their last
refit. The records of ships worked on at Portsmouth mentioned earlier also provides the material for
an indicative measurement of the Yard's year by year "output"
 in terms of tons/dock/days and Figure
4.13 illustrated how this rose from around 2 million at the start of the period to 4 million at the end.
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However the figures are distorted at the start and end of the period, due to two very large ships which
occupied dry docks for a number of years during which little work was done on them. Once these
distortions are removed from the calculations a realistic indication of the increase emerges at around
107% over the period 1793-1815. The peak in 1803/4 could be explained by the need to rapidly re-
activate the Fleet after the Peace of Amiens whilst that in 1806 might well have been, in part at least,
consequential on the Battle of Trafalgar.
As a broad generalisation much of the refitting, and indeed fitting out, work had to be undertaken
"in situ" on the ships concerned; often in small confined spaces or with the workmen precariously
positioned on staging over the ship's side or up amongst the rigging. Consequently the emerging new
technologies, which invariably involved fixed installation machinery, offered no substitute for the use
of manual skills and tools. Indeed it could be said that the Napoleonic War, which was the last major
war involving all wooden ships, saw the finest, as well as the final, flowering of the shipwright's craft.
Of all the resources used in the Royal Dockyards, the biggest was inevitably manpower and
whilst the Navy Board had been attentive in the last decade of the 18th century to the need to invest in
increased output from Portsmouth and the other dockyards, it had singularly failed to address how it
could sustain and expand its Dockyard workforce. As a result, by 1803 there was severe undermanning
due to the workforce being very seriously underpaid compared to their commercial counterparts. Thus,
at the time when the new technologies were first introduced into Portsmouth, the attention of the
workers was primarily focused on attaining a reasonable wage level and the new technologies were not
seen as an immediate threat to their livelihood. It seems fair to conclude therefore that Portsmouth
Dockyard, unlike many other major industrial sites in the country during the Industrial Revolution, did
not have to contend with serious opposition to new technologies from its workforce. Undoubtedly there
were job losses; particularly in the blockmaking and copper processing areas but they fell upon the
erstwhile Navy contractors' workforces. Indeed, as Figure 5.6 showed the dockyard labour force
eventually grew from 2,394 in 1790 to a peak of 4,627 in 1813 - an increase of 93%, with the majority
of that growth coming in the woodworking area which grew by 100% although the proportional increase
in the metal area, which employed a much smaller number of men, was by far the largest at 356%.
Figure 8.2 brings together the trends across the whole period for the increase in the size of the
fleet, the increase in Portsmouth's output and the rise in the Dockyard workforce and it can be seen that
the general slopes of all three graphs are remarkably parallel. It also suggests that the year on year
demand for increased output from the Yard continued up to 1812/1813. Equating the increase in output
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of 107% with the 93% increase in the workforce suggests that productivity increased by some 14%
but this is almost certainly an under assessment since the output calculation, which derives solely from
ships passing through Portsmouth, takes no account of articles produced at Portsmouth, such as copper
sheeting and rigging blocks which were supplied to other Royal Dockyards and Naval Bases around the
world. How much of this 14% increase can be directly attributed to the new technologies is impossible
to determine but indisputably the gains in the metal/ wood mills were totally based on it.
New technologies were examined firstly by looking to see when technical advances relevant to
the work in Yard became available and secondly, when and why they were or were not introduced into
the Dockyard. As has already been suggested there were few technical advances in this period that could
be applied to work undertaken "in situ" on ships in dock or at alongside berths and therefore it was in
the dockyard "factories" that new technologies were first applied. However, in this period Portsmouth
had only three "shops" or installations that fell within this category; the smiths' shop, the joiners' shop
and the ropeyard. The latter was the one major area into which Portsmouth did not introduce any new
machinery and whilst there is no authoritative record to explain why this was so, a strong case can be
made for suggesting that a series of fires in the ropeyard in 1760, 1770 and 1776 may have persuaded
the authorities that it was better if Portsmouth looked to other sources for its increasing rope
requirements. Indeed the total lack of any records on the subject suggests that the subject did not even
generate sufficient interest to merit discussion. Similarly Portsmouth Dockyard, like all the others,
continued the practice of purchasing its canvas, still hand woven in this period, from commercial
sources.
Although the Admiralty and Navy Boards' prime interest, as far as the Royal Dockyards were
concerned, focused on the timely despatch of serviceable ships to the operational fleet, both bodies were
constantly concerned about the assured supply (in both qualitative and quantitative terms) of vital
materials and manufactured products. Furthermore these Boards were forever searching for economies
in the face of the inescapable annual year on year increases in the costs in maintaining the growing and
ageing Fleet.
In this thesis the investigation of new technology introduced into Portsmouth Dockyard has been
carried out under the four headings of the Dry Docks, Metal, Fibre and Wood working. Unfortunately,
due to the size constraints of the thesis, it was not possible to give as much space to the support services
such as water, lighting and firefighting as had been originally intended. As has already been discussed
there was in fact no new technical investment in the fibre area at Portsmouth but that was not true of
Chatham where ropemaking machinery from this period is still in operation to this day. This, taken
together with the investment in Portsmouth in the other areas, gives rise to the suspicion that there was
285
an overall plan by the Navy Board to spread the introduction of technology across several dockyards.
However no evidence to support this has been uncovered during the research into developments at
Portsmouth and this was disappointing since the idea would have been eminently sensible and it
certainly seems to fit the facts.
In 1795, at the time of the introduction of the Office of the Inspector General of Naval Works,
Bentham's attention at Portsmouth focused initially on the dry dock complex for the introduction of new
technology. In 1793 a contract had been raised, though not yet activated, to increase the overall capacity
by enlarging the existing double dock, but Bentham appreciated that what was really needed was a
substantial increase in "throughput" and the basis for achieving this would be to radically reduce the
amount of time ships had to wait for the right tidal conditions before entering or leaving dry dock.
Figure 7.3.1 showed the complex before and after Bentham introduced new civil engineering concepts
to the Dock Entrances, steam power to the dock pumps, caissons to the dock entrances and subsequently
the first steam powered dredger to clear and deepen the dock approaches. Equally imaginative was the
incredibly cheap conversion and enlargement of the boat pond into the North Basin (non-tidal basin for
fitting out frigates and other small vessels) and with an approach to it which could be used as a double
dock, this was illustrated in Figure 7.3.3. In combination all these advances, shown in Figure 8.3 (a
composite from Figures 7.3.1 and 7.3.3) enabled the Dockyard to dock about twice as many ships with
8 docks as they had done earlier with 5 docks. Capital installation costs were saved by using one steam
plant for two different purposes as a result of placing the Wood Mills on top of the Reservoir and using
it to drive the wood machinery by day and pump out the Reservoir by night. This innovation also
allowed the steam engine to be operated more efficiently as a result of being kept in near continuous
use.
In fact the first steam engine, a 12 hp. Sadler engine designed by the first (and only) Chemist
in the Office of the Inspector General of Naval Works, did not arrive on site until 1799. However, by
1807, as was shown in Figure 7.2, there were seven engines in use in the dockyard with a combined
horsepower of 146 hp. It would be easy to assume that once steam power was accepted, a "culture"
would develop around it and the use of progressively more powerful steam engines would proliferate
regardless of whether they represented "value for money". Indeed the Navy Board and the Portsmouth
Dockyard Management appear to have kept their feet firmly on the ground and only invested in steam
power, and indeed other new technology, when the economics of a particular installation made sense.
Thus a number of possible uses of steam power were not taken up, for instance No.1 and No.6 docks
continued to be pumped by horse teams. One should applaud this hard headed approach to a technical
revolution since it would have made no sense to install steam engines which would have spent most of
the time sitting cold and idle.
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The investment in the Metal Mills also showed this strong attention to economics. In the first instance
the proposal had been only to install furnaces to melt old copper sheeting down prior to transportation
to commercial reprocessing facilities. Before this was implemented the scheme was expanded to include
the actual re-processing itself both on the grounds of saving money and to ensure new sheeting met the
Navy's standards. Furthermore, it is understandable that the Admiralty would always have felt that their
commercial supplies, which came from Wales, were vulnerable to the storms of the Irish Sea as well
as the deprivations of French privateers operating off Land's End. The Portsmouth Metal Mills solved
all these problems and by 1807, after a number of installationdifficulties, the Mills were providing no
less than two thirds of the Navy's annual copper sheeting and bolt requirements from re-cycled material.
Whilst no definitive "measures" (total acquisition/production costs adjusted for inflation to allow year
on year comparison) of the cash savings have been discovered there can be little doubt that these were
significant if for no other reason than there would have been considerable reductions in transportation
costs. Today of course the 100% re-cyling of recovered copper and the resultant provision of around
66% of the total new copper requirement from it would be highly acclaimed in itself. Subsequently, as
Figure 7.4.1 showed, the Metal Mills were the subject of further expansion into the brass and iron
fields although, with the end of the war in 1815, not all the Dockyard management's aspirations were
fulfilled.
As important as the immediate gains from the Metal Mills, and the other steam powered plants
in the Yard, were the long term benefits which were to arise from these investments. In manpower
terms these provided the basis for the development of the new metalworking crafts/trades such as
millwrights, engine keepers and the rolling mill and foundry workers all of whom would prove
fundamental to the Navy's and the Royal Dockyards' ability to build, maintain and repair the steam
powered, iron hulled vessels which would enter the Fleet, in increasing numbers, in the second half of
the nineteenth century.
Figure 8.4 summarises the totality of the factory developments at Portsmouth, with changes in
the metal area on the left and wood/block mills on the right, and again it was the possibilities of
financial savings and the protection of quality manufacturing standards that led to Bentham's advocacy
of Brunel's designs for the block making machinery for the latter. This, unlike the Metal Mills
development which essentially exploited established technology, broke new ground in the design and
manufacture of the machines and in the wider concept of the development of production plants. By
1807, after a number of delays, the Mill was meeting the entire annual Naval requirement for blocks
which in 1806 amounted to no fewer than 154,285 in a wide range of sizes - some of those machines
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were still making blocks for the Navy over 150 years later. According to Brunel his block making plant
employed one man for every ten employed by less advanced makers of blocks. If that was true the
financial benefits for the Navy would have been considerable. Much more important, from the Fleet's
point of view, would have been the consistency in block performance since simple though a block may
appear, any significant additional clearances or, worse still, any inadequate clearances, would inevitably
lead to a rope jamming with very serious possible consequences in bad weather. Again this technical
evolution in Portsmouth had a significance beyond its own immediate application in that it established
Marc Brunel, the father of the better known Isambard Kingdom Brunel, as an "inventor", an engineer
and a project manager. Figure 7.5.1. provided a reminder that the Wood Mills were situated over the
reservoir for the dry docks and embraced within them the steam plant which served both the mills and
the reservoir and dock pumps. It also showed where the larger woodworking machines were situated
and it may well be that it was the fact that the very large reciprocating saw; apparently capable of
working on full size tree trunks, was placed in the centre of the yard mitigated against the introduction
of further machines of this type in favour of the retention of traditional saw pits which were situated
close to the raw timber stowages and the boundaries of the yard. Logic suggests that this arrangement
would have presented a far easier movement problem than that involved with transporting the raw
timbers to the Wood Mill and this supposition is reinforced by the fact that Brunel's woodworking
equipment which was installed at Chatham from 1810 onwards was based around a very large and
highly sophisticated hydraulic system for moving timber around the yard. Certainly the development
of the use of hydraulics in the Royal Dockyards as a whole would seem to offer an interesting
expansion of the work on the introduction of new technologies begun in this thesis.
Figure 8.5, which combines the salient features of Table 7.2 (Steam Engines) with Figure 7.6,
shows that in less than twenty years major technical advances were introduced in Portsmouth in all areas
except that of fibre work. It is true that there were a number of delays with both the metal and wood
mills coming into production although in the case of the former much of this delay could reasonably
be attributed to changes in requirements during the development of the projects. However the most
impressive aspect of the total installation is that all three elements achieved, in full measure, the
performance that they were designed for. Without question the Navy was extremely fortunate to have
in Samuel Bentham, Marc Brunel, Simon Goodrich and a few others a highly competent team. These
men had imagination, flair, drive and the technical competence to understand the potential of the
technologies which were available, to devise means to apply them to the tasks in Portsmouth Dockyard,
and in the relatively short space of time to bring them all into full and economic production.
Undoubtedly it was the pressure generated by the demands of the war that persuaded the Admiralty
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Board to empower Bentham as it did in 1795. However, it was inevitable that when those pressures
began to ease then the establishment would take its revenge on the "outsider" and as Figure 7.1.1
showed, his "power base" was first curtailed by the Navy Board in 1808 and then finally abolished in
1812. But by that time the age of steam and new machines was firmly established and indeed this was
given official recognition in 1814 with the appointment of Simon Goodrich as the Navy's first
Mechanist and Engineer, a post he held until 1831. With the exception of Ian Christie's book on
Bentham's years in Russia, there is no twentieth century biography of Bentham, furthermore there is
no biography of Simon Goodrich and both men would seem worthy of further study.
Many histories of the Royal Navy tend to portray the support organisations of the Navy, and the
Royal Dockyards in particular, as incompetent, inefficient and frequently corrupt. Roger Morriss
encapsulated this view when he wrote "Traditionally they have always been regarded as technologically
backward compared with private industry, wasteful of public funds and ship-building resources and a
check, from their inefficiency, on the efforts of the fighting navy". However the Royal Navy of the
Napoleonic Wars could not have been kept at sea for over twenty years without an effective
maintenance system for upwards of 900 ships, more than a third of whom were refitted in Portsmouth.
It follows that without the increase in Portsmouth Dockyard's output, the number of serviceable
ships of the Fleet at sea would have been fewer. Consequently the flow of supplies to the Peninsular
Army might well have been diminished, the inflow of vital raw materials for the Royal Navy and
Industry would have been reduced and the outflow of manufactured goods to the markets around the
world, on which depended the wealth of this country and the revenues which sustained the war against
Napoleonic France, might also have been curtailed. In short, the strategic consequences of Portsmouth
Dockyard not meeting the demands which where placed on it could have been serious for the Nation.
As this thesis has shown, the efficiency of that Yard undoubtedly increased significantly during
the war even if it did not match the ideals of its critics who usually were able to ignore any financial
constraints imposed on the Dockyard Management. Whilst the evidence of this thesis does not
substantiate the suggestion that Portsmouth's achievements were only made possible by the new
technologies, it does make the case with confidence, that the new technologies contributed significantly
to the vital increase in dry dock throughput and that they were wholly responsible for the achievement
of major economies in the metal and blockmaking processes. Moreover it can also be argued that the
variety of new technologies introduced on the one site of Portsmouth Dockyard was unusual for the
period - possibly even unique. Interestingly, this thesis also reveals a consistently innovative and
financially responsible approach to the introduction of new technology in Portsmouth, which is very
different from the impression that history generally accords the Royal Dockyards.
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Finally, it has been shown that both the history of the Royal Navy and the history of Technology
are enriched by the inclusion of the technical advances in Portsmouth Dockyard in the period 1790-
1815.
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